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The thesis is in part a political economy of telecommunications in South Africa, in 
part a discourse analysis of the field. While the thesis investigates issues around 
ownership, control and regulation of the big telecoms companies in South Africa, 
it also considers some facets that do not really fit comfortably into traditional 
political economy approaches. The dominant discourse within 
telecommunications is a neoliberal technological determinism, despite the 
developing context. However, there are lesser known narratives of consumption, 
commodification and control, which demand a cultural studies approach. 
Together these form alternate, ignored yet important facets emerging from the 
sector. The thesis foregrounds these alternate discourses as they relate to wider 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two decades mobile telecommunication devices have proliferated 
across the globe dissolving and transforming some of the more traditional 
communication spaces. The fervent adoption of mobile telephony has led to 
unprecedented global growth in the telecommunications industry. South Africa 
has also experienced its healthy share. Since inception the industry has grown to 
a phenomenal R179 billion in 2010, with a projected forecast of growth to R250 
billion by 2020 (Web 1). Given the phenomenal growth in this industry, the thesis 
takes up the question of effects, i.e. how has the mobile telecommunication 
industry impacted on the individual and society? To this end the thesis explores 
the discourses around cellular telephony focusing on industry, policy and 
consumption.  
The central hypothesis of the thesis is that the discourses around cellular 
telephony in South Africa remain discordant; as a result, development in the 
sector has been lopsided. While industry growth has been phenomenal the 
normative imperatives around development and consumption have been 
deficient. The strong emphasis on industry growth alone has led to a 
commodification of information. The information commodity has been further 
fetishized leading in the first instance to an increasing and unhealthy divide 
between the constructions of the citizen and the consumer. In the second 
instance information fetishism has supported a consolidation of power leading to 
an unhealthy hegemony of the ruling elite in South Africa – unhealthy, as this 
nexus results in a greater accent on the further consolidation and maintenance of 
power, and a far lesser accent on core developmental needs. The concluding 
reflection indicates that major strides in mobile telephony in South Africa have 
been finally limited by the increasing commodification of information. This has led 
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to infringements and monopoly abuses within the industry and those all-
important missed developmental opportunities to utilize mobile 
telecommunications to initiate an active and responsive citizenry in the service of 
a truly participatory democracy.   
In chapter two I begin by a survey of the literature reviewing the field of political 
economy and its relevance to telecommunications analyses. This includes more 
current studies of telecommunications in the South African context, within which 
this study is located. 
In chapter three I outline the theoretical framework building the conceptual map 
from key theorists in the field of political economy of communication. This 
framework also takes into account less prolific authors in the field who have 
nonetheless made a significant contribution that has applicability to the study at 
hand.  
In chapter four I outline the methodology, the ethical considerations of which 
were minor as the dominant part of this study utilized data already in the public 
domain. Nonetheless, the methodology is clearly delineated with the relevant 
institutional clearances disclosed where necessary.      
In chapters five, six and seven I present and analyse the data collected. Chapter 
five investigates ownership and control within the South African telecoms sector 
located within the global telecommunications scene. Chapter six takes up and 
analyses the public narratives of individual consumer experience of the industry 
in South Africa. Chapter seven locates a global debate in the local space. Here 
the troubling spectre of surveillance is examined as it relates to the telecoms 
industry.  
Chapter eight consolidates primary research conducted where one hundred and 
ninety five respondents were asked about their experiences around mobile 
7 
 
telephony in South Africa. Chapter nine considers the range of further study in 
this sector. Finally chapter ten attempts to summarize and reiterate the key 
deductions arising out of the study. Included in this final section is an outline of 
recommendations.     
Given the way technology has metamorphosed, one may legitimately question 
the relevance of investigating cell phones close to twenty years after inception. A 
2011 Cell C1 magazine sported the following cover story:  
 
“Are tablet PC’s the new cell phones?” (Cell C magazine 2011, issue 4, 12) 
 
When the question arises of whether the cell phone has been replaced by a new 
compacted computing device altogether, perhaps it is time to acknowledge that 
the novel phase of cell phones in South Africa lies somewhere in the not so 
distant past. The tremendous excitement at inception in 1994 (Web 2) was not 
unlike the anticipation and exhilaration over a century and a half ago at the 
promise of wondrous connectivity between two somewhat isolated continents.  
In 1866 The Great Transatlantic Sea Cable cut communication down between 
America and Europe from two weeks to a little over twelve minutes. Apart from 
changing trade and basic communication the cable would effectively minimize 
the recurrent problem of truces declared in England and wars continuing in 
America primarily as a result of the communication lag2. This cable is often 
referred to as the ‘earliest wiring of the world’ (Jones 2005). Approximately one 
hundred and fifty years later again communication technology would take a leap 
                                               
1 Cell C is the third mobile operator in South Africa.  




forward and cell phones would unyoke connectivity from the constraints of wire, 
enabling the possibility of wondrous connectivity…anywhere, anytime 
connectivity.  
A flurry of multi-disciplinary research ensued soon after inception, some of which 
shaped the regulatory framework we find ourselves in, others concluding that cell 
phones have irrevocably changed the communication landscape, charging the 
little device with the definite capacity to deliver democracy or anarchy! Vincent 
Mosco (2004) refers to this rather technologically deterministic belief as “the 
digital sublime” (also the title of his book). Often new technology is so very novel 
and exciting that it tends to invite the conjuring up of myths around super abilities 
far beyond its scope, perhaps also as a means of transcending the ordinary and 
sometimes oppressive reality we find ourselves in.  
The arrival of Rail was supposed to bring peace and communication across 
a continent of diverse nations and languages… 
The onset of Electricity was said to be the antidote to crime… 
Cable TV was expected to change the face of consumption… 
The internet was believed to deliver democracy… (Mosco 2004, 12) 
 
At the inception of certain new inventions, history proves that the sheen or 
novelty arising from any of these technologies appears to generate lofty 
predictions as their effect. With the appearance of each new technology, History 
also tends to repeat itself with the reaction being a great optimism for the 
possibility of whatever new technology to address and eliminate society’s current 
ills.  
While Mosco defines this line of thinking as the digital sublime, he also argues 
that when novelty around new technology recedes and new technology becomes 
old…part of the quotidian, that is precisely the time that one may unearth and 
understand what the real impact of it is and what it could be. Issues of 
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communications commons, the public sphere and (the pursuit of) enlightened 
self-interest remain as relevant today as a century and a half ago. Technology 
does not erase the need for these debates, it certainly adds new dimensions, 
complicating rather than eradicating. Given the diminishing sheen of cell phones, 
the contention of this thesis also is that this is precisely the time that analysis 
starts where one may unearth and understand the real impact of cell phones, 
especially given the fact that it is now close to a R200 billion rand industry and 
incidents of torture appear routine:  
A senior Bangladesh telecoms executive was arrested and handcuffed so 
that he could neither sit, nor lie down and administered with electric shocks 
in routine intervals3. Sutherland (public lecture, WITS, 13 March 2012)  
 
Despite the potential for great benevolence in relation to public good/s, an 
industry with this phenomenal a turnover lends itself to proving the old adage 
true, which is of money, too much money, provoking greed and avarice. The 
sombre note is deliberately rung as a fitting precursor to this unwieldy topic of 
telecommunications. It is a harbinger to the complicated, often tricky balancing 





                                               




CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
This chapter begins with a review of the South African context of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) with a close focus on the concept of the 
‘digital divide’. This was deemed necessary as a preceding step to the literature 
review as many of the key arguments and absences are laid out here. 
Thereafter, the review takes up local literature in the field, locating lacunae which 
essentially form the space for this study. 
Introduction 
At its heart, development – if it is to be sustainable – must be a process that 
allows people to be their own agents of change: to act individually and 
collectively using their own ingenuity and accessing ideas, practices and 
knowledge in the search for ways to fulfil their potential. It requires what 
economist Amartya Sen calls ‘real freedoms’, the capacity for people to 
participate in a diverse range of decisions that affect them, and to enjoy 
specific functional aspects that constitute a healthy life…Enabling greater 
numbers of people to speak, engage and respond to one another is 
ultimately equipping them to take political responsibility, which is a key 
ingredient to establishing deep and sustainable change (Warnock, 
Schoemaker and Wilson – Web 89). 
 
The heart of Sen’s definition of freedom is self-determination. This theme 
reverberated through-out South Africa in the early 1990s. Post-1994, the 
transition from South Africa’s apartheid past saw the hegemonic ideoscape4  laid 
down by the State through the Bill of Rights and the constitution. It assertively 
promotes an all-embracing historical redress that seeks to remedy the legacy of 
Apartheid, which systemized discrimination and disempowerment across all 
                                               
4 Arjun Appadurai (2002) offers a useful method of analysis and description. He introduces five 
metaphorical ‘landscapes’ to define five broad areas of globalization, one of which is the ‘ideoscape’. 




facets of society. This reparation was intended to permeate through a series of 
legislation (Web 4).  
While these Acts in part address the communications industry, there remains 
dissent as regards the depth and actual ‘transformation reach’ of the various 
Acts. The Black Economic Empowerment ICT Charter (final draft, 2004) has 
been one response to absences in legislation (Web 5).  The Charter follows on 
from The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, with the central 
objective being to “bridge the digital divide”. The charter was developed by the 
ICT empowerment charter working group which was formed by representatives 
from a number of organizations related to the broader ICT sector. The group is 
as follows:  Black IT Forum (BITF); Communications Cabling Association of 
South Africa (CCASA); Computer Society of South Africa (CSSA); Electronic 
Industry Federation (EIF); Independent Communications Authority of South 
Africa (ICASA); Information Industry South Africa (IISA); Internet Service 
Providers Association (ISPA); Information Technology Association (ITA); The 
ISETT SETA; The MAPPP SETA; National Association of Broadcasters (NAB); 
National Community Radio Forum (NCRF); National Independent 
Telecommunications Organizations of S.A. (NITOSA), NEDLAC (Community) 
and NEDLAC (Labour); South African Communications Forum (SACF); South 
African Contact Centre Community (SACCCOM); SMME Forum; South African 
VANS Association (SAVA); Universal Service Agency (USA); Women in ICT 
(WICT) and finally Business Unity SA (BUSA) (Web 6).  
The direct causes identified for the lack of development were multifold. The lack 
of basic and supporting infrastructure resulted in a high cost of roll-out in rural 
areas. This has a knock on effect on the high cost of services in rural areas, 
which is complicated by ineffectual governance and regulation. This has led to 
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the unfailing tendency of corporates to focus most on commercial rather than any 
other clients.  
The challenges identified by the ICT charter are the lack of equity ownership, 
equity management and skills development5. Certain areas have been identified 
as having critical shortages in skills. Research has been identified as problematic 
as it is either duplicated or inadequate and incomplete. There has also been a 
lack of promoting open source platforms. Given the infrastructural problems cited 
above, rural access was indicated as an area needing growth in addition to the 
urban poor. Finally there was emphasis on promoting fairness, transparency and 
consistency in adjudicating matters related to the ICT sector, ownership and 
control (Web 5).  
If development and democracy are to be the cornerstones of progress in Africa, 
then New Media technology (ICTs) must be acknowledged as development 
catalysts if utilized in a carefully considered way. A series of development 
analysts6 testify to this causal link, bringing ICTs to the fore in development 
initiatives (Richard Gerster and Sonja Zimmerman, 2003). Former President 
Mbeki urged Africans, “to participate fully in the information revolution…to devise 
concrete ways of harnessing this new phenomenon for the advancement and 
enrichment of our democracies” (Web 7). Apart from improving quality of life, the 
most critical role ICTs could play is lending its potential towards democratic 
participation. Nicholas Garnham (2004, 358) rightly indicates that technology 
only facilitates participation but does not guarantee it. “The internet and related 
technologies have created new possibilities for conversation - how these 
                                               
5 This indicates a meaningful participation of black people, women, disabled people and the youth in the 
growth of ICTs. 
6 The World Bank, the Panos institute and the Link Centre (WITS University) are other telecoms analysts 
who have concluded this link. 
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potentials are actualized is not up to the technology itself, but to human decision 
and commitment”7.  
Cellular telephony is the cheapest type of telephony and fastest growing in Africa 
and is therefore probably the most applicable to development initiatives. In the 
past twenty years, Africa has experienced a mobile explosion. Mobiles now out-
number fixed lines at a ratio of 10:1. The demand for telephony has not been met 
with a satisfactory and corresponding supply. This phenomenon speaks directly 
to development themes. The challenges in the field of ICTs and development 
emerge on the level of the normative discourse, globalization, local policy and 
the economy.  
A consistent rhetoric evolving out of the development discourses is the focus on 
democracy and the need for ordinary Africans to claim self-determination over 
their material, social and economic conditions. New media technology is cited as 
the key facilitator for democratic intercourse. This rhetoric recurs consistently 
among many African leaders.   
There must be greater clarity and less ambiguity about fostering 
democracy…It is important, therefore, that as we consolidate our 
democracies and use them as necessary platforms for the acceleration of 
our development, that the progressive movement ensures that the 
orientation of our parties is informed by the need to empower the masses of 
our people, so that they themselves can participate as a conscious force in 
the renaissance of Africa (Web 7).  
The democracy rhetoric is strikingly reminiscent of Jurgen Habermas’s (2004, 
350) ideal public sphere. Indeed the ‘conscious force’ that former president 
Mbeki refers to communes well with principles of the public sphere where public 
opinion can by definition only come into existence when a reasoning and critical 
public is presupposed.  
                                               
7 The Internet is also said to have the capacity to connect people from diverse backgrounds but the 
trend seems to be fragmentation into smaller and smaller groups. The Internet can also be used for 
flaming conflict rather than for rational discourse (Karvonen 2004, 348).  
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Public sphere means a realm of our social life in which something 
approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all 
citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every 
conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body.8 
They then behave neither like business or professional people transacting 
private affairs, nor like members of a constitutional order subject to the legal 
constraints of a state bureaucracy. Citizens behave as a public body when 
they confer in an unregulated fashion – that is, with the guarantee of 
freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and 
publish their opinions – about matters of general interest (Habermas 2004, 
350). 
Habermas’s public sphere has much to offer to development initiatives, providing 
a template against which to measure ideal democratic participation. This is as 
long as the public sphere is pursued as Habermas conceived it, and issues are 
not just aired as a matter of publicity. Karvonen notes this difference: 
At one time the process of making proceedings public was intended to 
subject persons or affairs to public reason, and to make political decisions 
subject to appeal before the court of public opinion. But often enough today 
the process of making public simply serves the arcane policies of special 
interests; in the form of ‘publicity’ it wins public prestige for people or affairs, 
thus making them worthy of acclamation in a climate of non-public opinion 
(2004, 348). 
South African leaders often exhibit a heightened sensitivity to the media’s critical 
eye on the government’s work. On many occasions the South African media and 
intellectuals have been reproached for being too critical of government. 
Habermas points out that, “although state authority is so to speak the executor of 
the political public sphere, it is not part of it. The state and public sphere do not 
overlap, as one might suppose from casual language use. Rather they confront 
one another as opponents” (2004, 346 – 7). 
The confrontation between the state and public opinion (criticism) is a core 
ingredient for self-determination and the creation of democracy. Public opinion9 
must be acknowledged as vital to nurturing democracy and must be most 
aggressively promoted for the good health of the state. It is in this climate of 
                                               
8 Habermas’ concept of the public sphere is not to be equated with that of ‘the public’ i.e. of the 
individuals who assemble. His concept is directed instead at the institution, which to be sure only 
assumes concrete form through the participation of people. It cannot, however, be characterized simply 
as a crowd. 
9 This is qualified as ‘critical’ public opinion. 
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critical public debate that new media technology will realize its full potential for 
achieving renaissance ideals. It is indeed troubling that the South African state 
increasingly appears to use the very tools of democratic engagement (the new 
media) as tools to close society. The issue of surveillance is extremely 
disconcerting and will be discussed in the latter part of the thesis.  
Technological determinism and social shaping 
Comparative political economy is concerned with regulation and developing the 
best model towards the end of universal communication equity. This simply 
translates into the creation and maintenance of equal conditions for all citizens to 
receive, produce, and distribute communication messages. Consequently, a host 
of normative assumptions circulate to form the regulation discourse and it is 
interesting to take a closer look at these.  
As the neoliberal agenda permeates the economic spheres of society, it also 
brings with it supporting ideologies to govern the other spheres of life. A 
tendency of Neoliberalism is its role in hegemony, the maintenance of ruling 
class ideology, alongside which lies the ideas of technological determinism and 
technological neutrality. This subtle permeation will be explored as it emerges in 
the ICT sector. In this site neoliberalism manifests within a technologically 
deterministic framework which promotes the commodification of knowledge; 
together this triad (as it were) privileges a dominantly free-market approach 
despite the location of a developing context.  
Two major theories examine the relationship between media and society. Simply 
put, the one examines how media technologies determine culture and society 
and thus falls into the technological determinism category. The other asserts that 
society shapes technology, never the other way around; hence the social 
shaping category.  
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Marshall McLuhan (Web 8) is always associated with being a key proponent of 
technological determinism in the context of media. His oft quoted pithy maxim, 
‘The medium is the message’, refers to the unyoking of content as a determining 
factor. This means that irrespective of content or consumption of media products, 
the technology which transmits this content changes human perception of the 
world and hence their own practices within it. ‘The medium is the mass-age’ was 
McLuhan’s pun on his media maxim which encapsulated the power the dominant 
media of an era had over society, shaping as it were the thoughts, words and 
deeds of individuals. For McLuhan, media determines consciousness. 
Although dated, McLuhan’s arguments have value as he saw media as an 
extension of the human body and found society quite immersed in media, 
likening the phenomenon to fish in water. Thus he stated the effects of media are 
subliminal yet determining even though the individual consumer may not cognize 
the effects.  
In recent times, media products (and mediums) have flooded the individual’s’ 
environment such that one is almost totally media-saturated. From IPod to IPad, 
smart phones and the DSTV walka, technology appears to move consumers to a 
point of never being disconnected. The user is thus interacting with geographical 
space (for want of a better term) via digital space which is more one dimensional.  
As regards the media changing other aspects, much has been made of 
shortened words and phrases. Use of this rather limited stock of daring, 
sometimes strange abbreviations have increased along with another limited 
stock of emoticons10. Some theorists claim that this shift is shaping our youth in 
particular into ‘iconic’ individuals as opposed to literate ones which may have 
interesting implications for the pursuit of a robust civil society.     
                                               
10 Emoticons refer to icon ‘faces’ showing a range of cartoon-like, exaggerated expressions (such as 
happiness, sadness, love, anger etc.). 
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While McLuhan points to subtler aspects of the influence of technology on the 
individual, other technological determinists take the overt view of technology 
being an agent of social change that is free from social pressures and human 
agency. They prescribe a technological fix for societal ills and ascribe agency to 
technology itself. Progress is defined along technological lines relative to each 
successive stage in development.  
An example would be Moore’s law. Moore was the co-founder of Intel. He 
predicted in 1965 that “the number of transistors that can be placed 
inexpensively on an integrated circuit doubles approximately every two years” 
(Web 9). This prediction was transformed into law as a result of being uncannily 
accurate. Moore’s law simply put means that processing, speed and memory 
capacity increases exponentially every two years. Moore’s law may be 




This picture indicates a bulky computer – the Osborne Executive portable 
computer from 1982. Alongside it is an iPhone released in 2007. The Executive 
weighs 100 times as much, has nearly 500 times the volume, cost 10 times as 
much, and has a 100th of the clock frequency of the iPhone.  
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Technological determinists would define and celebrate progress along such 
technological lines asserting that as technology is refined and improved, so too 
does knowledge increase simultaneously at that pace. While the visual impact 
certainly indicates the convenience of this kind of technological progress, one 
must be reticent at the wholesale acceptance of all other implications. The idea 
of knowledge doubling or increasing exponentially at the pace of technological 
development does not indicate any deliberation on the quality of knowledge that 
is increasing and increasingly available. Hence one must necessarily enter the 
discourse (taken up a little further on in this chapter) on the distinction between 
knowledge, data, information, etc. 
Even if information available was generally of a respectable quality, there is the 
ironic manifestation of information wealth with simultaneous information poverty. 
As it is, there is simply too much information available for the capacities of the 
layperson to assimilate and digest. However, reiterating the conveniences of 
cellular telephony, McLuhan’s central message of the transformative power of 
the medium is helpful as the cell phone has affected communication and 
mobility, positively, resulting in new potentials for development.  
A key counter theorist who disagreed with some of the key thoughts of McLuhan 
was Raymond Williams. Williams (Fourie 2007, 142) had Marxist leanings and 
insisted on a cultural materialist perspective and did not accept technological 
determinism as sound or adequate. He argued that technology could not be 
ascribed with ‘a power of its own’ without taking into account the political, 
economic and social milieu within which it found itself. Although Williams agreed 
with McLuhan on some aspects, he argued that no media could engineer change 
as the media was a by-product of pre-existing socio-economic and political 
hegemonies. Therefore the medium will only reproduce those existing patterns of 
use and exchange (ibid). 
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The social shaping theorists evaluate technological determinism and find it 
wanting as an inadequate description of technological innovation and social / 
cultural change. Theorists within this camp assert that technological determinism 
fails in establishing technology as an instrumental cause for change. They further 
assert that social factors do not only shape the utility value of media technologies 
but also shape their design and implementation. Social shaping theories thus 
emphasize the primacy of human agency (Lievrouw 2002, 183- 189).  
It is important to summarize these two trajectories of thought on media 
technologies as both permeate the development media discourse in different and 
sometimes contradictory ways.  
For the developing context the primacy of human agency applies in a very 
qualified way and cannot be interpreted as a universal given that is experienced 
equally. When addressing the development context, human agency is 
circumscribed tightly by the political and economic environment, perhaps even 
more than the consideration of media technology itself. 
Following on from Moore, technology has progressed in leaps and bounds to 
deliver highly sophisticated devices that have become an integral part of those 
individuals’ lives that are able to afford them. Circumventing the technological 
determinism - social shaping debate, one may reflect that at a larger scale, new 
media technologies have expanded economic connectivity and consequently 
increased accessibility of different national markets to one another, thus injecting 
growth into the global economy. Developing countries like China and India have 
harnessed the potential of new media technologies (NMTs) to speed up their 
growth, while other developing nations have used NMTs to support development 
efforts. Given that NMTs have such a transformative effect on the social/cultural, 
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political and economic sphere it is critical that it is made to be universally 
accessible. However, alongside this tremendous technological revolution:  
There is a profound contradiction in the information age. Gulfs of 
inequalities in the world are growing deeper as electronic and other forms of 
connectivity are drawing people and communications even closer to one 
another (Youngs 2007,143). 
 
Digital divide or data trash?  
The digital divide manifests as a lack of digital technology in some form or the 
other and crosses age, gender, ethnicity, class, race, nations and sometimes 
even education levels. It is of course most often used to emphasize the digital 
technology disparities between the developed and developing worlds. John 
Pilger in his award winning documentary New rulers of the world reflects:  
This is the age when technology has advanced so much that it gives us the 
potential to solve the problem of poverty, disease and other social issues, 
ironically never before that the gap between the ‘haves’ and ‘the have-nots’ 
been greater (Pilger, 2001). 
It is indeed ironic and almost contradictory that while technology gallops forward 
at breakneck speed, simultaneously technological scarcity abounds. While Pilger 
points to the ever widening gulf between the ‘haves’ and ‘the have-nots’, it is also 
a phenomenon which is exacerbated by a troubling expansion in the number of 
the ‘have-nots’.  
Marshall estimates that less than ten percent of the world’s population of 
approximately six billion are internet users. Marshall also points out that with 
regard to technology the ‘have-nots’ are categorized as data trash, “made up of 
the discarded groups in any culture who are not connected to the new structures 
and machines of information” (Marshall 2004, 35). While there is greater 
connectivity celebrated by mobile telephony, there still remains large tracks of 
citizens disconnected effectively negatively branding them as data trash.  
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This appears a rather ruthless categorization; however, given the brutality of 
treatment and indifference towards those occupying the wrong side of the digital 
divide, it is a fitting term, embedded with a most accurate connotation. However I 
will use the categorization ‘digital divide’ (temporarily) for the purpose of 
clarifying a more comprehensive definition.  
The digital divide describes the disadvantage of those who are unable to or 
choose not (for a variety of reasons) to use new media technologies, or as 
Marshall puts it, the new structures and machines of information. The divide is 
further refined according to a range of access or rather the lack thereof.  
Lesame (2005, 3) describes access to technology giving greater clarity and 
depth to the more simplistic, existing definitions. Mental access refers to the lack 
of basic experience with new structures and machines of information (NSMI). 
This could be as a result of a lack of interest, a lack of perceived need or 
technophobia. Material access refers to the lack of technological devices by way 
of actual hardware, a lack of software and / or a lack of connectivity. It has been 
stated that with regard to the new media, content is no longer king. Connectivity 
is king (Evans, 2010). Rural areas are particularly affected by this lack as are 
war-torn regions or those wracked by political instability.  
Skills access refers quite obviously to the lack of requisite skills to utilize new 
machines and systems of information (NSMI) which is caused by inadequate 
education and insufficient user-friendliness. This means not having enough 
exposure and experience with NSMI. A repeated critique of the attempts to 
address the digital divide is that provision of hardware and software is counter-
productive without the concurrent investment of education (Lesame 2005, 3-4).  
Usage access extends the category of material access and refers to the lack of 
sufficient usage opportunities. Linked to usage are the various levels of 
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familiarity present in users. Familiarity of the full range of what is possible in the 
digital environment may be considered as a contributing factor towards the divide 
making users fundamentally unequal. An example elucidating this point is when 
users in more rural areas of South Africa (and some users in the older possibly 
technophobic category) utilize their cell phones for basic first generation 
telephony only, as a result of a lack of familiarity of the full range of services and 
applications11. This is regardless of the availability of a host of 2nd and 3rd and 4th 
generation applications (Lesame 2005, 4).  
Environs access refers to the impact of space and place. The places in which 
people access online determine how they will utilise NSMI. The public/private 
divide comes into play affecting what content would be accessed and also 
determines the diversity of ones use (ibid).  
Language is perhaps the final variable theorists cite as a limitation augmenting 
the digital divide. This refers to the predominance of English across NSMI, which 
severely limits those who do not understand English, or use a minority language 
(Lesame 2005, 5).    
While the access types of mental, material, skills, usage, familiarity, environs and 
language provides a concise description of the digital divide, other theorists’ 
further refine the category. Following on from the conclusions of NWICO and the 
MacBride commission12 theorists of this trajectory reflected on the ‘core-
peripheral’ imbalances that occur in the global information market place.  
According to Hamelink (1994, 143), the root cause of information imbalance is 
the historical colonial form and pattern of trade that was imbalanced in favour of 
the colonisers. Within the South African context one may clearly observe the way 
earlier historical inequalities compound present attempts at development. 
                                               
11 This aspect will be revisited in greater detail when considering planned obsolescence.  
12 NWICO refers to the New World Information and Communication Order. 
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Apartheid geography still lingers both in relation to the rural – urban divide as 
well as with the urban poor. Thus digital inequalities are interwoven with other 
historical categories of inequalities such as class, gender, race, disability and 
even age.  
While much has been made of the possible potential for the developing regions 
to leapfrog into the digital age, failure to address historical and structurally 
embedded inequalities would prove detrimental to the potentials of the digital 
age. Global and local attention with regard to the developing regions appear 
primarily to be on addressing the question of material access, and further 
focusing on meeting basic needs first. This effectively neglects other forms or 
causes of the digital divide. A compounding factor is the speed at which the 
digital economy develops. This adds to increasing inequalities as those who are 
already behind may get left further behind as the digital age gallops ahead. 
Conversely, new media in this infrastructure lends the capacity to increase the 
power and influence of already dominant groups.  
Some theorists like McPhail (2013, 26) argue for an extension of the cultural 
imperialism thesis, stating that this phenomenon has morphed into an electronic 
colonialism. This creates and maintains all sorts of inequalities and imbalances 
which remain unfavourable to the developing regions. Hamelink states that, “the 
inadequate information capacities of most periphery countries are a serious 
obstacle to their own efforts to combat poverty and other deprivations” (1994, 
148). Information imbalances limit sovereignty in that decision making is limited 
to the extent that decision makers lack information about their own region. This 
applies at the level of parliament as well as for the individual or citizen. However, 
the digital revolution has led to ever-increasing control and tightly guarded 
interests of a narrow band of global information owners.  
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The global information market place may be divided into the following variety of 
stakeholders:  
 the owners of the information ‘highways’ or the ‘common carriers’ 
 the producers of information hardware and other infrastructural 
hardware 
 the producers of information software  
 information producers  
 information consumers (McPhail 2013, 115). 
 
The information highways refer to the mechanisms of actual connectivity, which 
are satellites; fibre-optic cabling, digital switching technology; and microwave 
towers. Without pre-empting the analysis which follows this chapter, these 
carriers are dominantly owned by MNCs from the core countries and mark the 
starting point of informational inequity.      
Information and other infrastructural hardware refers to devices at the point of 
connectivity such as fixed line telephones, cell phones, televisions, various 
computing devices and personal digital assistants (pdas). Most hardware 
processors and carriers are installed in the core countries. The technology is 
manufactured, designed and developed and controlled by the core. If there is 
any participation, Youngs states that, “…the technological know-how remains 
under the control of the transnational companies and the periphery countries 
play a minor role just in assembly” (Youngs 2007, 297).   
Information software apart from the obvious one of programming, refers to the 
media as in the press, broadcasters, libraries and ‘infopreneurs’. The critiques 
from NWICO-MacBride debates remain similar in this instance in that the volume 
and course of information flows appears largely uni-directional. Furthermore, 
information moves among the core countries and from the core to the periphery 
and rarely between the periphery countries.  
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The capacity to produce, distribute and access pertinent information is very 
unequally distributed among the world’s countries and the core countries 
have infinitely more control (Youngs 2007, 297). 
As regards information consumers, the earlier descriptors of the digital divide are 
applied to the individual end user within the developing world. For Africa, this 
situation is worsened by the high cost of access, inappropriate or weak policy 
regimes, inefficient telecommunication services and a lack of locally created 
content.  
While there may be an emphasis on solving the problem of informational under-
development there are different approaches to how this may be achieved; the 
first focuses on the interdependence of the worlds’ nations thus necessitating the 
integration of the periphery into the global economy. The critique of this 
approach is that it locks peripheral regions into playing ‘catch-up’ according to 
the terms and conditions dictated by the core, thus drawing out the dependency 
of the periphery to the core, which could be indefinite. 
An alternative approach is where the periphery would collectively take the 
initiative through stronger bargaining power to pressure the core for fairer trading 
schemes. This amounts to playing catch up by self-defined terms and conditions.  
A third approach would be for peripheral countries to radically disassociate 
themselves from the core regions and focus on self-reliance. This seems an 
unlikely possibility as the global economic infrastructure is unyielding and 
dominantly neoliberal in nature, with far too much investment of the core regions 
in the peripheral regions. Hence it would be difficult to disassociate from the 
core-based MNCs among other things. The periphery is also still haunted by the 
demons of the past such as poverty, conflict and health issues which weigh 
down decision making processes for change.  
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Thus one may conclude that with regard to the digital divide there are no quick 
and easy solutions. A few general propositions may be for developing regions to 
address the issues of illiteracy by establishing community centers for public 
access, and encouraging the development of relevant content in the vernacular. 
Regulation is also important and in this context becomes a complex issue and 
development leaders ought to monitor this closely. This is because the digital 
media is global in scope and requires a more inclusive international cooperation 
and agreement between national legislators, and the digital media evolves so 
rapidly while regulatory arms (nationally and globally) move very slowly.  
The million yen question is who ought to be responsible for addressing the issue 
of the great divide. The options sway between formal political–economic 
institutions such as the rich core nations, MNCs, intergovernmental 
organisations, and civic lobby groups and the individual citizen/end user 
herself/himself.  
 
Global Constructions of the digital divide  
Wilson (2002) provides a valuable analysis of global NSMI discourses as she 
scrutinizes policy statements, unearthing a set of fundamental assumptions that 
appear to inform policy discourses. This refers to the technologically 
deterministic vision which is compounded by the construction of technology as a 
neutral tool for development. Wilson’s survey of the literature spans 101 key 
documents and general but relevant websites such as UNESCO; UNDP; USAID; 
World Bank; IDCR – ACACIA program; ITU and the Global Knowledge program. 
This survey results in three salient themes:  
1) The construction of the category of ‘information poverty’;  
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2) The construction of what counts as legitimate/valuable information 
and knowledge;   
3) The development aims of these programs, in particular models of 
progress and catch-up to industrial country ideals (Wilson 2002, 1-4). 
Forced to play catch up 
Wilson indicates that most development programs are framed in a modernization 
theory paradigm. This results in a vision of the developing regions:  
- as stagnant needing the injection of technological progress 
- as stuck in the past of dominantly agrarian activity while trying to 
meet basic needs 
- as behind in terms of technological progress thus living in a kind of 
information darkness. 
Wilson quotes from the United Nations Development Program and the World 
Development Report (1999, 1) which respectively reads:  
Knowledge is like light. Weightless and intangible, it can travel the world, 
enlightening the lives of people everywhere. Yet billions of people still live in 
the darkness of poverty – unnecessarily (Wilson 2002, 1). 
Time will be of the essence. Already the fruits of the information revolution 
are skewed and inequitably distributed: developing countries are largely left 
behind and are a little more than fringe players at best, observers at worst of 
the dynamics and benefits enjoyed by many industrialized countries. 
Indeed, a new type of poverty – information poverty – begins to afflict 
developing countries…Information technology has a place alongside 
adequate food, health care, education, and other fundamentals. By taking 
this place it has broadened our definition of poverty. Those people or 
countries who cannot or will not participate fully in the new information 
economy will find it all the more difficult to climb out of poverty (Wilson 2002, 
3). 
 
These two quotes indicate the way in which information poverty as a category is 
delineated. The idea of the digital divide is extended to wealth and poverty with 
time and individuals included as crucial determinants. Knowledge is equated in 
an unqualified way to abundance and success while the lack of knowledge is 
equated to poverty and darkness. The analogy in the first quote thus betrays a 
subtle implication of poverty being a result of ignorance - an unnecessary 
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ignorance at that. Thus a binary opposition emerges with regard to NSMI and 
may be tabulated as follows: 
The NSMI Development Binary 
Developed Developing / underdeveloped 
Rich Poor 
With NSMI Without NSMI 
Information rich Information poor 




Winning the race of the digital                                  
divide 
Losing the race of the digital 
divide 
 
Wilson’s third quote was extracted from the United Nations Development 
Program (Web 10) and represents a further extension of the binary of the digital 
divide.  
And let me lay my cards on the table at the start by saying that in my mind 
there really is no more critical question facing the developing world today 
than how to face up to the challenges and opportunities offered by the 
Information Revolution, and particularly the phenomenon of the Internet. It is 
now the two edged sword that is leading the process of globalization: 
wounding those who don’t quickly enough grasp how to use it by leaving 
them ever further behind, but providing unprecedented benefits for those 
with the courage and willingness to grasp its potential to drive change 
….ICT is transforming everything it touches, from politics, to business, to 
culture, to education and to health. And what we have seen so far is just the 
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tip of the iceberg. But it is an iceberg the developing world is currently at 
more risk of crashing into than making use of (Wilson 2002, 4). 
This quote reveals assumptions of passivity amongst those considered 
information poor. In addition, technocratic solutions are assumed to be the magic 
solution to the social ills related to poverty – a sort of digital sublime (Mosco, 
2004) as it were. Furthermore referring to information poverty devalues 
knowledge of people of the developing world implying a lack of knowledge 
altogether. Information poverty ought not to be seen on its own devoid of or 
excluded from general poverty. The binary extends information rich and 
information poor to include another dichotomy which is the equation of the 
traditional and the modern to the information poor and the information rich. 
Devaluing traditional culture occurs as a result of the particular way in which 
technology is cast. The concomitant effect is equating information to knowledge 
and classifying particular kinds of knowledge as valuable, rendering other types 
valueless, if they are regarded as knowledge at all.  
The critique centrally is that these kind of assumptions are problematic as they 
inform development programs which are designed to provide as much 
technology as possible to developing regions so as to emerge as a reasonable 
facsimile of the North Atlantic region, as this is taken finally as the benchmark. 
The technocratic solutions do not often take into account the political, economic 
and cultural climate of the regions in question. A further and serious weakness is 
to assume a technological solution to poverty. when these very problems emerge 
from very complex political milieu and thus the effects of the problems are not 
really connected to the right causes. It requires more than just access to create a 
climate of assimilation with technology that will have positive returns. Thus it 
remains questionable how achievable these programs carrying such 
assumptions could be.    
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The tenor of the quote also implies that the fault or responsibility lies with the end 
user to assimilate NSMI. Wilson states that the theme recurs across the ICT 
development discourses – and one may even find echoes across local leaders. 
Former South African President Mbeki states:  
in an age of globalization, every country needs to create capacity in the area 
of communication and information technology or face the risk of permanent 
global marginalization of our countries and peoples. We cannot begin to be 
fully integrated into the global economy if we do not develop the necessary 
skills to participate in the increasingly knowledge based communication 
society (Web 7).  
There cannot be a wholesale transfer of responsibility for assimilating the 
information society onto the developing world as there are complex global issues 
at play. Trade regulations, international technological standards, and the 
tightening noose of MNCs and their exertion of control particularly in the 
developing regions, are the range of variables limiting the possibilities for 
universal access in the fullest sense of the term. 
The information revolution offers Africa a dramatic opportunity to leapfrog 
into the future, breaking out of decades of stagnation or decline. Africa must 
seize this opportunity, quickly. If African countries cannot take advantage of 
the information revolution and surf this great wave of technological change, 
they may be crushed by it. In that case, they are likely to be even more 
marginalized and economically stagnant in the future. (Talero and Gaudette, 
World Bank Group Strategy quoted in Wilson 2002, 11).  
The tendency across development ICT discourses also seems to lay down an 
imperative of time – i.e. that it is of extreme urgency for the developing regions to 
participate in and win the race towards an information society, or risk the real 
possibility of marginalization, stagnation and decline. The discourses never 
reveal the complex political and economic quagmire that the developing peoples 
face in trying to achieve a win in this race. As the introduction of this thesis points 
out, the industry is far from benign or benevolent and often beset by greed and 
avarice which itself adds a troubling dimension of a global scale to the political 
and economic quagmire mentioned above.   
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Despite the global political economic quagmire, policy makers still emphasize 
NSMI as the key to fast tracking developing nations out of stagnation and 
decline. While critics are not necessarily in opposition to the potentials of NSMI, 
the key assumptions of value neutrality and technological determinism are 
regarded with some degree of scepticism. In addition NSMI are promoted as 
tools for development in an unqualified way. Thus what is questionable is the 
assumption of a wholesale acceptance of the information society ‘as it is’ in the 
developing context.  
Following on from McPhail’s elucidation of electronic imperialism and in spite of 
the counterpoints of the east (the “Asian Tigers”13), it remains clear that apart 
from hardware and software dominantly disseminated to the developing world, 
the production of knowledge, information and entertainment has assured the 
reproduction and maintenance of western style hegemony via established 
practices of knowledge production and validation. Holtendahl quoted by Wilson 
(2002) states, “the criteria of what counts as knowledge continue to be defined in 
the academic centres of the West. The dissemination of this knowledge is based 
on notions of transfer of knowledge from the West to the South”.  
One issue that emerges is the constant reliance on solutions for development 
problems derived in the West as a result of the developing world’s increasing 
dependence on western solutions as local, indigenous knowledges and 
understandings become ever increasingly under-valued, de-valued or ignored14 
altogether. Another rather troubling issue that emerges as a result is the over 
reliance on knowledges and understandings defined in western academic 
centres. A disturbing trend is that western academic centres are not really 
                                               
13 China, India and Korea 
14 One example is the effort in India to invest in a rural area (Malavli) by providing better housing with 
indoor toilets. Predominantly a farming community, families who benefitted from this scheme often 
housed their livestock in the anterooms and still utilized the fields as toilets as they believed that indoor 
toilets were unhygienic and unlucky. Had there been greater consultation, the construction could have 
been done to suit these belief systems.       
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independent free institutions of knowledge production. In some ways, institutions 
have become hegemonic instruments, propping up neoliberal ideology. Wall 
Street, the World Bank and the IMF have been known to fund academics from 
leading institutions in the west to endorse policy thus putting intellectual weight 
and adding credibility to a host of policies that together form the western 
economic model in which the market is deified. 
 This is the way in which the deck is unfairly stacked against development 
endeavours as alternative modalities cannot even be brought into the discussion.  
The global relevance of the information society and an information economy 
is assumed. The global economy is taken as a given and there is no 
suggestion that perhaps technology or the market should slow down as has 
been argued by various critical development theorists and 
environmentalists…Rather, developing countries are impelled to work 
harder to catch-up (Wilson 2002, 12). 
Within this political economic framework critics remain sceptical of the 
achievement or even pursuit of social goods like universal access, global 
commons, and a healthy public sphere as Habermas originally envisaged it. This 
is because if such things are left to market solutions, the proven track record of 
the market has been a primary concern with the “bottom line”, to the exclusion of 
other concerns such as social goods: the res publica.  
The knowledge society set against the backdrop of the neoliberal economic 
model defines information as an economic category. Talero (a member of the 
World Bank) quoted by Wilson states that “information is a factor of production, 
in a category with land, capital, and energy” (2002, 9). The information society is 
hailed as a global panacea to social ills but what is remarkably silent about the 
information economy is that not all information is equal and not all information is 
valued equally. Information has emerged a commodity like any other, playing in 
the market place to fetch the highest exchange value. Thus information that can 
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translate into high exchange values is regarded as valuable while information 
that does not translate into exchange values is regarded as insignificant. 
An increasing characteristic of the knowledge economy is the way the terms 
knowledge, information and data are used interchangeably, meant to signify the 
same or similar things. In the context of the information society and NSMI 
discourses knowledge, data and information are largely seen to be commodities 
signifying an economic facet; in addition, information poverty is couched in 
economic terms. 
ICT’s serve as a transmission belt to generate, access, disseminate and 
share knowledge, data, information, and communications and best 
practices. Three central features are at the heart of the knowledge 
revolution. Information and knowledge are instantaneously accessible, they 
are transportable and can be simultaneously distributed to an unlimited 
number of users. Indeed, they cannot be depleted. The use by one does not 
prevent the use or consumption by somebody else. They cannot be owned, 
though their delivery mechanisms can. Selling them entails sharing, not 
exclusive transfer. Indeed, information and knowledge represent a global 
public good (UNDP quoted by Wilson 2002, 14). 
While the UNDP report represents an understanding of the utopian vision of the 
knowledge society, there is not enough acknowledgement of the very real, 
tangible barriers to access across a series of levels to this alleged ‘global public 
good’.  Burkett (quoted in Wilson 2002, 16) alerts us to this issue when she 
states that,  
it seems that what is needed to resolve these ‘real’ problems is not further 
information, but rather things which are much more difficult, time-consuming 
and probably not as glitzy as ICT development – that is, political will, 
recognition of personal and social responsibilities, and ultimately action on 
the part of governments and civil society…a call is made for a turn to social 
and human development to counter the increasing emergence of a “cyber-
elite alliance” which is neatly camouflaged within much of the largely 
apolitical ICT and development discourse.. 
Simone and Fernback (2006) point to a deeper immobilizing conflict at the heart 
of the matter. They argue that the difficulty with communications policy broadly 
speaking lies in the attempt to converge two divergent theoretical traditions. One 
tradition relates to neoliberal market theory and the other tradition relates to the 
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public sphere. As a result, Simone and Fernback argue that “problems in 
developing normative guidelines and implementing consistent policy measures 
have reoccurred” (2006, 288). Notions of the public sphere, a global commons 
and even universal access are ideas that do not in the best of times co-exist 
within a predominantly market model as the market model distorts social and 
productive relations. With regard to the knowledge economy, commodification of 
information is the next frontier.       
The commodification of information 
Commodification generally speaking refers to the imposition of exchange 
relations onto social relations, while commodity fetishism refers to the distortion 
of use values and exchange values. Within the knowledge economy, 
commodification and commodity fetishism manifest via the imposition of 
seemingly apolitical and value neutral market apparatuses. These coercive 
market apparatuses of repression and consent effect a blurring of boundaries 
between the private and the public producing an effective distortion of the ideas 
of knowledge, information and data. The distortion of the different categories of 
information is a necessary precursor to the manipulation and profiteering of 
private information.  
The idea of apparatuses was first introduced by Althusser (2001, 79-89) who 
rejected the simple determinant of economics. He asserted that individuals live in 
a symbolic universe and meaning is made out of the process of interpellation or 
identification with sets of ideological representations which function to maintain 
dominant social relations by producing conformist subjects. Althusser identified 
ideological state apparatuses such as the nuclear family, education, religion, and 
the media whose purpose was to constrict such subjectivities. He also identified 
repressive state apparatuses which were the military, the police and the legal 
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system etc. Both ideological and repressive state apparatuses colluded as it 
were to maintain the dominance of the ruling class, the former though consent, 
and the latter through (the threat of) force.   
Althusser’s apparatuses are extremely useful in analysing the information 
society. In the information society the state recedes a little in its role of creating 
ideological and repressive apparatuses. Technology via immensely powerful 
telecommunications MNCs create the technological apparatuses of new 
structures and machines of information (NSMI) and together with political 
regimes give business interests a democratic patina. Marshall (2004) first 
introduced the term new structures and machines of information as a means of 
encompassing an ever widening terrain of the digital world.  
The technological apparatuses of NSMI give rise to twin hegemonic strategies, 
one ideological and the other repressive. The technological apparatus of 
coercion creates familiarity to generate consent with new technology via a set of 
representations designed to create an environment of adoption of NSMI and to 
manufacture consent for a world of digitally based consumption. As Marshall 
aptly puts it: ‘producing us as technological subjects’ (2004, 33). Apart from the 
obvious advertising for specific products, the media has provided niched areas of 
space by way of columns and specialized sections in the press and programming 
on television to construct the public as ‘technological subjects’:   
Each Thursday the New York Times includes a section entitled ‘Circuits’. 
‘Circuits’ is devoted to new technologies generally connected to digital 
gadgets and new computer programs. Reviews of new pdas, discussions of 
digital effects in film, or new functions in the next generation of mobile 
phones are regular features. The critical edge is even more lightly applied 
than to the entertainment sections of newspapers. For eight to ten 
broadsheet pages, the articles express a celebration of technology and the 
cult of the new. ‘Circuits’ represents a very long tradition with relationship to 
technology: new inventions express the superiority of the modern over 
anything traditional. It is a reading of technology in a new Darwinism: each 
succeeding technology improves on its previous generation and liberates 
humanity just that much more. The New York Times is not alone in 
providing a regular space for this celebration of the future in the present 
manifestations of technology. Every major newspaper in the world allows for 
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these fluff pieces about the promise of technology. In the last decade, they 
have developed into a larger niche of the press and have become regular 
features on television with whole shows such as Tech TV devoted to the 
love of new electronic and digital gadgets (Marshall 2004, 29).    
One South African version of ideological apparatuses is the Tech@work show 
screened on a local free to air channel (Web 11). One of the telecoms giants in 
South Africa - Vodacom - has created Vodaworld, located in Johannesburg (Web 
12). These are examples of how ideological apparatuses have evolved from 
meagre press columns and television features to a manifest, tangible show of 
digital life. Again, the critical edge is diminished as newer features are celebrated 
with no reference to the multitude of difficulties within the sector.  
Althusser’s repressive state apparatuses were identified as the coercive forces of 
the state. In this case, the repressive technological apparatuses manifest as 
legalese. Legalese refers to the legal discourses around the adoption of NSMI. 
These are lengthy abstruse legal texts which upon adoption forces compliance 
via the threat of legal action and force from the original state repressive 
apparatus: the police. The prime cause for the rise of the collusive forces of 
these twin discourses is the economic value ascribed to the circulation of 
information, as information in the information society is a commodity, “a factor of 
production, in a category with land, capital, and energy” (Talero, quoted in 
Wilson 2002, 9). As with commodities like land, property and energy, an entire 
legal discourse emerged to enforce the protection of these digital commodities, 
at the centre of which lies Intellectual Property Rights (IPR).  
Intellectual property covers any idea or product or process that has an economic 
value or potential economic value. Intellectual property rights also include patent, 
copyright, trademark and trade secrets. In the US, IP legislation is being used to 
change ideas into commodities thus turning information into ‘goods’, and 
‘perishable goods’ at that. Currently the extension of copyright law appears to 
benefit corporations more than individuals even though technically copyright now 
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covers all creative acts, extending to e-mails, a poem and even text messages 
(Correa 2000, 50-61). The extension of IP law is due to the characteristics of 
NSMI, one of which is digitalization. Digitalization marks the shift from analogue 
to binary code as a means of recording, storing and reproducing data. This 
renders digital texts dematerialized as they are disconnected from the physical 
form and may be reproduced ad infinitum, very easily and cheaply. While IP law 
extends to protect the rights of authors as they are cited as the key stake holders 
in grave danger in this new information society, it is really big business interests 
that IP law really works for, protecting software codes and what may arise as 
other valuable pieces of informational commodities.  
Some theorists argue further that IPR is effectively closing the once open domain 
of the virtual sphere and instead assert the need for information commons, 
where information is freely exchanged without economic value or with minimal 
economic value ascribed to it. Others argue that IPR goes against the 
fundamentals of the public sphere and the fourth estate as it is aggressively 
utilized to hide illicit information about industry malpractice or corruption, 
whereas the public has a right to information. The converse practice of 
surveillance also arises as problematic as IPR tends to protect industry rights to 
privacy but not citizens.  
Following on from Zimbardo’s ideas of Big Brother (Web 13), the virtual space is 
one where there is ample potential for surveillance. Thus anonymity is a myth 
because of the digital trace referred to as ‘cookies’. Two salient questions arise. 
The first asks how behaviour changes when individuals internalize the 
constraints of surveillance in the virtual world15. The second question which is of 
mounting concern asks who has control of and access to surveillance; and what 
                                               
15 One has only to review Zimbardo’s work (though dated: Web 86) to see that surveillance has a direct 
behavioral change effect on individuals. 
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are the implications of this control or access. The key issue is whether MNCs 
colluding with political regimes have acted on their power for surveillance in 
order to seek out and restrict, punish or eliminate dissenting or anti-hegemonic 
voices.  
The real digital divide 
Gandy (2002, 448) presents the idea that the real divide in the digital age has 
been the increasing gulf cultivated between notions of the citizen and the 
consumer. This divide raises debate about the role and responsibility of 
government for ensuring a well-served citizenry. Gandy argues that the Reagan 
administration was credited with dismantling the welfare state and with ushering 
in the era of the sovereign consumer whose interests reign over that of citizens 
as the primary basis for evaluating social systems:  
Neoliberal political philosophy has found a comfortable berth in an 
intellectual stream of post-modern thought that denies the possibility of an 
institutionalized representation of common or collective interests…Ironically, 
despite the obvious inequalities we observe within the marketplace, the 
market is praised as being more responsive than political systems to 
individual interests (Gandy 2002, 449). 
Tracey (in Gandy 2002, 452) asserts that these intellectual constructs took hold 
after the continuous election of right-wing governments which resulted in the 
centrality of the individual-as-consumer alongside which followed the interests of 
the corporation. Hence notions of public good, public interests, community, 
public culture, citizenship, governance and even the nation state were “buried in 
the rubble of the old order” (2002, 452) – the welfare nation state.  
Accompanying these ideas of the centrality of the consumer, a market logic or 
“marketization” ensued. This referred to support for market solutions as efficient 
and self-regulating, paving the way for the dominant role private corporations 
would come to play in managing public culture (Gandy 2002, 451). 
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This raises important questions as to the health of public culture; democracy; 
and civic activities. Calabrese and Borchert as explained by Gandy, indicate that 
the construction of the individual proportionately as consumer or citizen will 
ultimately determine the role technology will play in ‘post-industrial democracy’:  
They suggest that the network environment stratified and segmented, and 
that a ‘new class of technical and professional intelligentsia’ will be engaged 
in activities that will be ‘exclusionary, both by default and by design’. 
Interestingly, they suggest that the civic activities of this new class will be 
financed primarily by the revenue generated by the lower social strata who 
will be involved in the network primarily as consumers, rather than 
participants, or sources of argument and analysis (Quoted in Gandy 2002, 
456).  
Although Gandy’s reflections are somewhat dated, a more recent critical survey 
of EU (European Union) mobile narratives (Lillie 2009), embedded in which lies 
the likeness of the ideal EU citizen of the mobile world, yields three notable 
findings.  Policy goals articulated in “Working in the Knowledge-Based Economy” 
section of the EU action plan white paper for the EU Commission focuses on the 
need for public access as a necessary precursor to training of IT low-tech 
workers seen as important to stimulate 3G development. Thus public access is 
seen in terms of training and development of a new information workforce as 
opposed to the idea of information commons and universal access (ibid). 
In relation to the construction of mobile users, individuals are cast in a seamless 
identity of work and play, “switching from information worker to media consumer” 
(Lillie 2009). Mobile users are further constructed as a fraction of the world 
representing only the elite who can afford the expensive gadgetry and 
accompanying packages: 
Money rather than nationality or residency is the ticket to access in these 
commercial narratives…The libertarian spirit of cyberspace translates to 
freedom of agency and choice in the mobile universe, but the notion of 
“participation for all,” which was key to so many cyberspace manifestos, is 
lost to the “pay per” market criteria… Mobile citizenship is the providence of 
a “pay per” nation of liberated citizen-cyborgs (Lillie 2009).  
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In the information society consumption reigns over citizenship and individual 
consent is not derived so much from the state apparatuses as from 
contemporary technological apparatuses. The idea of technological apparatuses 
is distilled to include apparatuses of coercion / consent and the repressive 
apparatuses of legal discourses around NSMI. It is these apparatuses that the 
thesis attempts to explore and understand in the next chapter. Regrettably, 
Barber’s postulation rings true that technologies can help democracy only if they 
are programmed or designed to do so, and otherwise remain further constrained 
by the politics and paradigms that inform them. “Left to the market it is likely only 
to reproduce the vices of politics as usual” (Barber quoted in Gandy 2002, 456).  
The South African context  
Introduction 
Literature on the media in South Africa is vast and within the sector of 
telecommunications, it is also extensive. However it was found that there was not 
much holistic treatment of the telecommunications industry from a political 
economy and cultural theory perspective. This necessitates investigating the 
industry in terms of ownership patterns, regulation, consumption, and most 
importantly, in terms of ideology in its fullest application. The attempt here is to 
give narrative voice to the lesser told stories (particularly in relation to 
consumption and end use) and link patterns emerging to wider systems of 
control. The thesis thus explores some alternate and covert discourses that arise 
in the telecommunications sector.   
The South Africa media 
The South African media studies landscape is governed by a few key journals 
and key scholars. The scholarship of media in South Africa tends to be divided 
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according to the different tiers of media, i.e. commercial media; community 
media, and the public service broadcaster or SABC. Further divisions occur 
across film, communications, journalism and the public sphere which tends to 
include some consideration of the internet and finally telecommunications. The 
regulatory frameworks controlling each of these sectors are often dealt with 
alongside other discussions of the media or field in question.  
In relation to the relevant journals addressing the telecommunications sector, 
The African Studies Review, The Journal of Southern African Studies, The 
Review of African Political Economy, The Journal of African Law, Alternation, 
Critical Arts and Communicatio all feature articles related to telecommunications 
in South Africa. While these will be considered and are deemed relevant, the 
journal exclusively dedicated to telecommunications in South Africa is, The 
Southern African Journal of Information and Communication. The thirteen 
editions since inception will be closely considered in this literature review as this 
Journal represents the dominant discourse in the field of telecommunications in 
South Africa.  
The review focuses on post 1994 and post the triple enquiry and merger of the 
Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) and the South Africa 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (SATRA) (Web 14). The study also 
focusses more dominantly on the period after 2000, when competition was first 
stimulated with the promotion of the third mobile operator.   
Telecommunications 
Literature on telecommunications falls within a range of related fields and may be 
grouped in associated areas such as legal and regulatory issues, e-governance, 
e-commerce, best practices, sectoral reviews, case studies, gender, 
development discourses, and universal access. The telecommunications sector 
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generates a range of literature and for the purposes of this study, all literature 
focusing on the technical aspects of telecommunications such as fibre optic 
cabling; the mechanics of microwave towers; switching technology; reducing 
noise or interference with voice-over protocols etc. are excluded as it falls 
beyond the purview of this study.  
With regard to e-commerce and e-governance, literature is prolific and focussed 
on comparative studies of the state of e-commerce in the SADC region and 
South Africa (Esselaar and Miller 2001, Moodley 2002, Melody, Currie and Kane 
2003, Oyomno 2003, Verhoest, James, Marias and Audenhove 2007, Mitrovic 
and Bytheway 2010, Olst 2011, and Naidoo 2012). These studies also consider 
factors of e-readiness in relation to e-governance and e-commerce. Burke (2012) 
and Cloete (2012) offer two historical reviews of e-governance research within 
Africa and South Africa respectively. Ochara balances the literature (2012) 
indicating that there needs to be some consideration of the demand side of e-life 
as it were. One cannot only be focussed on the supply of e-commerce and e-
governance, its sustainability requires the meaningful participation at grassroots 
level. Stavrou (2000) located the communication debate within the development 
context; however, none of these early developmental discourses are revisited in 
a substantial way. The focus rests on e-commerce and e-governance. Alongside 
these considerations some space is given to regulatory issues such as licensing 
and IPR.  
One of the earliest articles related to telecoms and legal frameworks was by 
Horwitz (1994) who contemplated the contradictions between political reform and 
economic reform in the telecoms sector in South Africa. Burns (1999) later takes 
up the issue of regulation of telecoms in South Africa at the cusp of ICASA’16s 
birth and Zlotnick (1999) raised the timely question of telecoms monopolies in 
                                               
16 The Information and Communication Regulator in South Africa. 
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South Africa given the then fixed line monopoly of Telkom and the mobile 
duopoly of Vodacom and MTN. Collins (2004) later reviewed the state of media 
policy and convergence in South Africa against the spectre of concentrations 
(monopolies, virtual monopolies and oligopolies) and Sutherland (2010) 
discussed the challenges facing the South African markets given the high 
charges of international roaming.  
In terms of regulation and licensing, apart from Zlotnick (1999), Collins (2004) 
and Sutherland (2010) who deal directly with the vital need to manage the 
monopolistic tendencies of the telecoms sector, most of the other literature 
around regulation focusses on sectoral reviews within South Africa and Southern 
Africa (Esselaar and Gillwald 2006, Esselaar, Gillwald and Stork 2007, 
Westerveld and Maitland 2002), and challenges from a business perspective 
(Henten, Samarajive and Melody 2002, Muhuro and Kennedy 2005, Bur and 
Galperiner 2005, Broek and Lievens 2007, Abrahams, Bakker and Bhyat 2007, 
and Pierson, Baeden and Lievens 2007).  
Studies addressing universal access focussed again on reviewing the field 
(Benjamin 2001, Oyedemi 2004, and Armstrong and Ford 2006). Lewis (2012) 
highlights and important disjuncture when considering universal access. The 
awkward fit of developed nation’s doctrines on a developing world context results 
in little or no impact of such policies towards universal access.  
With regard to gender and disability case studies tended to focus on affluent 
areas and were at best anecdotal (Hyde-Clarke 2006, and Wasserman 2007). 
Literature related to gender was a little more prolific focussing on rural women 
and the development potential of ICTs (Schreiner 1999, Gillwald 2000, Marcelle 
2000, and Pade, Mallinson and Cannon 2005); however, there was no real focus 
on disability issues. 
44 
 
In relation to IPR and privacy concerns the focus of the literature was largely on 
technical protection for businesses and government (Masango 2006, Keats 
2006, Baude, Hofman, Kitz, McDanial, Rens and Riley 2006). In terms of 
surveillance, Cohen (2000) sounds one of the first warning bells highlighting the 
lack of clarity in legal frameworks covering this field. She emphasized the dire 
need for the law to catch up with better protections for more sophisticated crime. 
Hosein (2001) represents the only other focus on privacy; he too reiterates the 
need to update policies governing surveillance given the rapidity of convergence. 
Finally Cassim (2011) addresses that hidden yet growing threat of cyber-crime in 
South Africa indicating that the more pressing problems of poverty, HIV and 
AIDS, and traditional crime have kept government preoccupied without allowing 
much vision to tackle cyber-crime. Though the act lays out certain protective 
provisions, the public at large lacks knowledge of it and hence remains 
unprotected.   
Concluding thoughts  
Horwitz’s (1999) early review of telecommunications policy reform in South Africa 
indicates that a key positive is that the reform process took place in a democratic 
context allowing for debate and consultation within the public sphere. Cheru 
(2001) discusses the complex problem of poverty in South Africa and the 
proposed neoliberal strategy as a key means of poverty alleviation. Cheru 
reflects that there is a price for the over reliance on market led solutions for the 
problems of poverty and inequity as nowhere internationally has neoliberal 
adjustment resulted in socially progressive and equitable outcomes, not least in 
a developing context. This has its implications for telecoms as the sector has 
been marked by liberalization, privatization and internationalization – in short, 
neoliberal policies. Gillwald (2005) later supports the view as she asserts that 
this model was inappropriate for the developing context. Cohen (2003) considers 
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the impact of regulatory capture by market forces in the telecoms sector and 
concludes that the flaw in defining regulatory independence needed to be 
addressed for the sector to bear development and economic fruit. One of the 
most useful articles for this study was Wilson’s (2002) reflections on national and 
international discourses of development and ICTs. Mansell (2004) offers some 
interesting thoughts on ICTs for development; however, Wilson remains the most 
profound on developmental issues. 
Esselaar and Soete (2007) note the incoherence of ICT policy in South Africa 
given the rapid rate of convergence and growth in the sector. Joseph and Parayil 
(2008) analysed the performance of development countries, post the Information 
Technology Agreement (ITA) and trade liberalization of information and 
communication technology, concluding that bridging the digital divide needs 
complementary investment in capacity building as opposed to depending solely 
on trade liberalization to deliver developmental goals. Singh (2010) reveals the 
disjuncture across policy, legislation, rhetoric and implementation. Singh asserts 
that the over-arching approach to ICTs is technologically deterministic which has 
created contradictory and inconsistent views from Government on ICT policy in 
relation to the digital divide and what mobile telephony can offer development. 
Ochara (2012) offers a most interesting account of best leadership for the sector 
asserting that the electronic age demands a development-oriented, socio-
technical ontology of leadership.  
The review reflects a largely technocratic approach to ICT discourses which is 
satisfactory if well balanced with alternate discourses (also of development). The 
review indicates that gender, development and transformation receive 
consideration via specific case studies with a few articles offering a deeper 
theoretical treatment as is the case of Wilson (2002), Mansell (2004), Collins 
(2004) and Ochara (2012). 
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The literature reflects prolific work in the field of e-life (e-governance, e-
commerce, e-readiness etc.) as well as in the technical area of regulation and 
licensing, while less is reflected in the area of universal access. Copyright and 
IPR forms a large part of the literature; however, this is not surprising given the 
rise of information as a commodity alongside ICTs. Thus the space emerges to 
investigate more thoroughly the alternate discourses within the sphere of 














CHAPTER THREE: THEORY 
This theory chapter takes a chronological path delineating the birth of political 
economy and the growth of political economy of the media. Classical political 
economy in some ways leads into the Frankfurt school of critical political 
economy which is differentiated from the later development of contemporary 
political economy. The review takes into account the plethora of work post-
convergence17 which has resulted in the clustering of ‘medium’ (specific) studies 
within media studies, fostering inter-disciplinarity across theoretical approaches 
and methods.  
Classical political economy: the birth of the 
approach 
The official birth of classical political economy is said to have occurred during the 
18th century Scottish Enlightenment via Adam Smith; however, earlier 
philosophers contemplated similar trajectories of thought. In the philosophical 
heyday of Greece and before his disillusionment with politics, Plato was reputed 
to be a great consultant for statecraft (Durant 2006, 26 – 28). In The Republic 
Plato considered the ethical, political, and the psychological problems affecting 
‘just’ rule. Plato’s analysis of the deficiencies of different forms of statecraft rings 
a sombre note centuries later. It is rather interesting to briefly revisit Plato’s 
misgivings (quoted by Durant 2006) and rather lucid insights on democratic rule.  
But even democracy ruins itself by excess – of democracy. Its basic 
principle is the equal right of all to hold office and determine public policy. 
This is at first glance a delightful arrangement; it becomes disastrous 
                                               
17 Convergence is utilized in its broadest connotation of merging across various platforms, i.e. telematics 
and computing leading to telecommunications or telephony; policy; previously distinct and separate 




because the people are not properly equipped by education to select the 
best rulers and the wisest courses… 
The more Plato thinks of it, the more astounded he is at the folly of leaving 
to mob caprice and gullibility the selection of political officials – not to speak 
of leaving it to those shady and wealth-serving strategists who pull the 
oligarchic wires behind the democratic stage. Plato complains that whereas 
in simpler matters – like shoe-making – we think only a specially-trained 
person will serve our purpose, in politics we presume that everyone who 
knows how to get votes knows how to administer a city or state. When we 
are ill we call for a trained physician, whose degree is a guarantee of 
specific preparation and technical competence – we do not ask for the 
handsomest physician, or the most eloquent one; well then, when the whole 
state is ill should we not look for the service and guidance of the wisest and 
the best? To devise a method of barring incompetence and knavery from 
public office, and of selecting and preparing the best to rule for the common 
good – that is the problem of political philosophy (Durant 2006, 26 – 28). 
Durant’s observation of Plato’s insights emerge as a significant canvas against 
which one may examine the current quandaries of our age, where politics and 
statecraft remain the office of those whose skills appear limited to securing 
votes. The problem of political philosophy and the problem of ethical philosophy 
were perhaps the early thoughts heralding the discourse of political economy.  
Some of these earlier thoughts of just rule, ethics and individual fulfilment 
resurrect later in Adam Smith, whose most well-known text was An inquiry into 
the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (1776), abbreviated to Wealth of 
Nations. The questions of ethics and individual fulfilment are, however, 
addressed in Smith’s earlier and lesser known text, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759), while the Wealth of Nations came to be seen as an inaugural 
text in the discourse of political economy. Political economy then came to be the 
study of wealth creation and wealth distribution.  
However, the contemporary shifts in the disciplines may be reflected in Adam 
Smith’s unyoking of the science of wealth creation from moral sentiments and 
issues of distributive justice. Neoclassical economics in this sense gave rise to 
the modern discipline of economics, a science centrally focused on the creation 
of wealth within a nation-state, with little consideration for distributive justice or 
Smith’s Moral Sentiments. 
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Thus the great divide arose separating ‘pure economics’ which was 
mathematical, statistical and value neutral, from political economy which 
tempered the view of economics with considerations of history, ethics, and just 
rule by way of men pursuing “the thing to which [their] nature is best adapted” 
(Stumpf and Abel 2002, 463). If Adam Smith inaugurated the field of political 
economy, then Karl Marx must certainly be acknowledged for populating it. Marx 
remains ever relevant in the field of political economy, as his conceptual legacy 
of historical materialism, ideology, the labour theory of value, and 
commodification and commodity fetishism came to be applied to contemporary 
economic analyses in addition to media and communication. Echoes and 
adaptations of his legacy emerge across most of the more contemporary figures 
in the field, therefore a more detailed account of Marx’s contribution is not 
pursued at this stage as it is deemed more useful to consider the adaptations 
and applications of Marxism/neo-Marxism by earlier and contemporary theorists.  
While the field of political economy of communication was advanced through 
considerations of Marxist theory, the early figures of Theodore Adorno and 
Harold Innis seem somewhat neglected, or summarily dismissed, and should be 
revisited to acknowledge the contribution they made to the political economy of 
communication and media.  They may be seen as the pre-contemporary figures 
of influence of the political economy of communication. 
  
Key figures (pre-contemporary era) 
This section begins with considering two early theorists of the Frankfurt School: 
Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer; it is their contribution to the conceptual 
building of a political economy of communication that is considered. Other 
theorists (not of the school) are reviewed as theorists of influence featuring in the 
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pre-contemporary era: Harold Innis, Antonio Gramsci, Dallas Smythe, Paul 
Lazarsfeld, Louis Althusser and finally Marshall McCluhan, once hailed by 
Playboy magazine as ‘the metaphysician of the media’ (Playboy Magazine, 
March 1969).  
The Frankfurt School and others 
Much has been written about Adorno’s brooding pessimism over the decline of 
high art and independent artistic endeavour due to the development of a 
capitalist-controlled industrial mass culture generating mass conformity. Some 
works dismiss Adorno as being elitist at best or irrelevant at worst. Adorno was 
part of the Frankfurt School, a highly influential institution regarding the 
development of a political economy of culture.  
Arguably Adorno’s most known work was the 1944 book Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, written with Horkheimer. The most significant chapter for our 
purpose is, “The culture industry: enlightenment as mass deception”. This could 
arguably also be the most rejected of Adorno’s work. Even so, echoes of Adorno 
and Horkheimer’s critical perspective inherent in this work may be found in 
recent analyses of the communication industry, post-convergence: The Middle 
Mind (2003), Amusing Ourselves to Death (1985), Cult of the Amateur (2007), 
and The Shallows (2010) are four relatively current titles that continue to 
investigate the demise of “culture” and the problems of cultural conformity and 
mediocrity as a result of mass culture. These themes also feature strongly in the 
latest trajectory of media studies – surveillance studies.   
Robert E. Babe (2009) resurrects some of the salient parts of Adorno’s 
contribution in a recent and extensive review of political economy and cultural 
studies. Babe also reasserts Adorno’s Marxist-inspired contribution as an 
important one towards a political economy of communication. Adorno was really 
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the first theorist to introduce the analytical construct of culture industries which 
connected communication processes and products to wider systems of political 
and economic control. After the first experimental radio broadcast in 1910 (Web 
15), mass media was extended beyond the press and an industrialized media 
gained traction. Many believe that it was Hitler’s manipulation of the media and 
perhaps even Roosevelt’s ‘fireside chats18’ that stimulated Adorno’s thesis on 
culture. Whatever the catalyst, Adorno’s experience of mass culture in America 
led to a few rather ominous projections19.   
Culture is a paradoxical commodity. So completely is it subject to the law of 
exchange that it is no longer exchanged; it is so blindly consumed in use 
that it can no longer be used. Therefore it amalgamates with advertising. 
The more meaningless the latter seems to be under a monopoly, the more 
omnipotent it becomes. The motives are markedly economic (Adorno, Web 
16). 
Adorno saw a ‘sameness’ within cultural production in America and linked this 
uniformity in cultural products to systems of political and economic control. He 
was also the first to clearly focus on and articulate the notion of cultural goods as 
commodity forms. The commodification of culture was therefore capital’s 
extension into leisure time and individual desire, both subject to capital’s 
rationalization, unification and “negative integration”.  
The culture industry, which involves the production of works for reproduction 
and mass consumption, thereby organizing ‘free’ time, the remnant domain 
of freedom under capital in accordance with the same principles of 
exchange and equivalence that reign in the sphere of production outside 
leisure, presents culture and the realization of the right of all to the 
gratification of desire while in reality continuing the negative integration of 
society (Babe 2009, 19). 
The notion of culture as a commodity brought with it a range of other imperatives 
identified by Marx. Cultural commodities, like all other commodities, have 
exchange value superseding their use value. This process in turn leads to the 
                                               
18 In 1945 President Franklin Roosevelt addressed his nation, explaining over the airwaves how they 
were going to collectively recover from the multitude of crises plaguing the American people. This event 
was one of thirty one radio shows referred to as “Fireside chats”.  
19 The pessimistic approach of Adorno was aligned to the Frankfurt School’s approach to the nature of 
modernity as a whole (Habermas 2006, 168). 
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manufacture of false consciousness where, “pseudo-individuality replaces 
individuality, pleasure is confused with happiness, consensus is mistaken for 
freedom” (ibid). 
 Adorno viewed the inception of cultural conformism as a sort of fascism that was 
not simply a benign allocation of leisure time, but a process that instilled a sort of 
psychological dependency which promoted passivity in audiences, removing any 
possibility for critical engagement: “No machinery of rejoinder has been devised” 
(Web 16). 
Adorno’s assessment of culture was to be highly contested by the more current 
cultural studies theorists. It is this factor that Mosco takes into account when 
delivering a set of conceptual tools for a political economic analysis, deliberately 
including the concept of structuration as a means of accounting for the dynamic 
play of human agency within structures of dominance (Mosco 1996, 212-245).  
 Adorno’s thesis extended to the portals of power as he argued that cultural 
industries, in spite of the circulation of vast sums of money, were not omnipotent 
as they depended on the “real holders of power” who are defined as the nexus of 
political, financial and industrial interests. Culture industries were subservient to 
this nexus of power and were agents carrying out the mandate of manipulation 
and control of the masses. These were the early days of the culture industries 
but Adorno’s conception of culture industries’ dependency on the powerful elite 
does need to be modified as media industries – often global conglomerates - are 
now being included as major elements of the economic, but his central question 
regarding power relations remains significant as ever: “No mention is made of 
the fact that the basis on which technology acquires power over society is the 
power of those whose economic hold over society is greatest”  (Web 16).  
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In the current age media organisations are powerful entities in their own right and 
the telecommunications revolution has led to the emergence of global economic 
empires. Jill Hill’s Telecommunications and Empire (2007), deals with the 
increasing drive by powerful nations to centralise control of the 
telecommunications industry and bypass the presiding international bodies 
regulating the industry. Innis was the first to pursue the link between 
communication and the dominant power blocs within societies (See pages 55-
56).        
Though not part of the Frankfurt school, Gramsci greatly clarified and expanded 
the notion of culture as being bound up by and in power relations. In his seminal 
Prison Notebooks (1929-1935) (Web 17), Gramsci invigorated the concepts of 
ideology and hegemony, observing that class rule can be affected and 
maintained by the circulation and dominance of a certain set of ideas or 
ideologies that are professed to serve perhaps a greater end or express a 
normative status quo (representing the way things ought to be) but in reality only 
serving the ends of the ruling elite. These particular sets of ideologies are 
promoted as the societal norm and are actively pushed towards acquiring a 
‘universal status’. This concept becomes extremely relevant as we shall later see 
when considering the technologically deterministic discourses informing 
regulation and consumption of ICTs.  
The terrain of culture was for Gramsci vitally important for the reproduction and 
contestation of capitalist domination, as political revolution depended upon 
cultural transformation among the subaltern classes. For Gramsci, class struggle 
did not only take place on the factory floor, but also within the mass media, 
where everything depended upon the struggle over meaning, that is to say the 
competing world views of the elite and the people.  
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Paul Lazarsfeld and Dallas Smythe  
Paul Lazarsfeld (1941) was an interesting contemporary of Adorno, though not of 
the Frankfurt school. While Lazarsfeld’s contribution strictly speaking was not 
directly to the political economy trajectory of media studies, he did offer a sort of 
binary opposition within the field which clarified further what it was and what it 
was not. He distinguished between what he called “administrative research” and 
“critical media research”. Administrative research of the media dealt with 
servicing the media industry itself: conducting research into how to make radio 
advertising more effective; establishing trends in media taste culture; and 
research into audiences or reception. Critical media research, on the other hand, 
dealt with the media within a social totality, taking the historical context into 
account and deviating from value neutrality (Babe 2009, 17 -25). Lazarsfeld’s 
offering was important and remains an influential marker of contemporary 
political economy of the media. Current theorists in the field are often at great 
pains to declare the “critical” in their media research, which in turn brings with it a 
rich historical tradition and a very distinct field of inquiry.  
Dallas Smythe was probably the first actually to teach a communication course in 
the critical tradition. In 1949 he taught a course on the political economy of 
communication and so brought forth the American tradition of critical media 
studies (however marginalized). A key article emerged from Smythe in 1960, “On 
the political economy of communications”, which centrally distinguished Adorno’s 
concept of “culture industries” from what he coined as “consciousness 
industries”. In media and communications industries, Smythe argued for the 
creation of audiences as the primary commodity which was hitherto neglected. 
His 1981 text, “Dependency road” was the next seminal text contributing to the 
American tradition of political economy of communication and in it he developed 
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early ideas of the audience as commodity and the extension of capital into 
leisure activity (i.e. the consumptive labour involved in media entertainment).  
Harold Innis 
Babe makes a strong case for including Innis as a key contributor to the early 
conceptual framework of the political economy of communication. Innis did not 
occupy the center in many respects perhaps due to being Canadian and 
developing the history of the communications industry in Canada. He was 
centrally known for his work Empire and Communication (1950). Contrary to 
some of his contemporaries and those writing after him, Innis presented a case 
for the incredible power of communication, “the sword and pen worked together” 
(Innis 1950, 8). He argued that shifts and advances in communication affected 
the dominant power bloc within a civilization, ancient or modern. Thus he put 
communication firmly at the center, as a prime mover of social change with the 
capacity to bestow power and wealth and creating new classes of ruling elites 
(Innis 1950, 6).   
Innis is known for the Staples thesis and Medium theory. The Staples thesis, 
simply put, refers to the way in which the rise of a new staple (Innis offers the 
examples of fur and wheat) gives rise to shifting or new relations of power (1950, 
5-6). He proposes communication and changes in the mechanization of 
communication (knowledge) as ever emerging new staples which like their 
tangible counterparts, effect new modes of social organization and new power 
relations. When Innis considers the Greek, Egyptian and Roman empires, he 
concludes that management of large empires depended much on the ‘efficiency 
of communication’ (1950, 13-140). Their decline can be traced to shifts in the 
mechanization of knowledge which necessarily affected ‘monopolies of 
knowledge’ (another useful construction Innis offers). A clear example is the rise 
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of printing presses at the end of the fifteenth century in Europe which led to the 
rise of the authority of printing presses and publishers, and also marked the 
decline of the ‘spoken word’ and the dominance of the Church (1950, 91).  
The impact of printing was evident not only in the philosophy of the 
seventeenth century but also in the rise of parliament. It contributed to the 
efficient conduct of business in the parliamentary system (ibid).  
The birth of the printing press and the subsequent freedom of the press, the 
freedom to publish, and the growth of the media industry promoted a particular 
monopoly of knowledge. The lowered prices towards the end of increased 
circulation led to a decline in the rights of owners (publishers), many of whom 
over time were squeezed out of the market. Apart from narrowing the 
marketplace of ideas and producing the commodification of news, this led to 
fewer independent voices, the rise of a legal and intellectual property rights or 
copyrights framework, and greater advertiser control as the need for more 
advertising increased (Babe 2009, 35-42).   
Innis’s contribution especially in terms of framing the mechanization of 
communication and its effects becomes quite salient when considering new or 
digital media, and his final words remain significant: “The ability to develop a 
system of government in which the bias of communication can be checked and 
an appraisal of the significance of space and time can be reached remains a 
problem of empire and of the Western world” (1950, 07). 
Marshall McLuhan 
“The more sophisticated technology becomes the more it disengages us 
from life…” (Henry Skolimowski, 1984).  
Marshall McLuhan gained tremendous popularity during the 1960s – 1970s. 
Such was his fame that he was featured on the cover of Playboy magazine and 
even appeared in the 1977 film by Woody Allen, “Annie Hall” (Web 18). He 
rapidly gained popularity in the public and entertainment sphere due to repeated 
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pithy aphorisms on the changing media of the time. Perhaps most recognised is 
his analysis of media both in relation to content and form, “The medium is the 
message” (Branston and Stafford 2010, 239 – 260). McLuhan was at times 
deterministic, at times deeply insightful, and finally equivocal and contradictory. 
The “medium is the message” became a media studies mantra and signified the 
importance of analysing the form of media as a shaping agent of consciousness. 
For McLuhan, the hidden power of the media is not the content but the way in 
which it affects and transforms society and social practise.   
McLuhan introduced concepts like “remediation,” referring to the way in which 
one (older) medium gets incorporated into another (usually newer medium). The 
form, social significance and techniques of old mediums are delivered via new 
mediums in an innovated way. This occurs so rapidly in current times that the 
term has even become passé (ibid).  
He also suggested the subliminal effects of media consumption: “We become 
what we behold. We shape our tools and then our tools shape us (Web 19).” 
Given the ubiquitous nature of media today, this idea is now even more relevant. 
McLuhan updated his early mantra to “the tedium is the mass-age”, meaning that 
the dominant media of an age shapes how individuals will think, feel and act in 
addition how society will reorganise itself. McLuhan also commented on the 
electronic media saying that “electronic communication means the end of 
secrecy and hence any monopoly of knowledge” (ibid). This remains to be seen 
in our current hyper-electronic age, yet McLuhan’s idea of media’s provision of 
artificial perceptions and arbitrary values to individual consciousness rings true 
when considering the pervasive and ubiquitous nature of new media: “In this 
electronic age we see ourselves being translated more and more into the form of 
information, moving toward the technological extension of consciousness” 
(Fourie 2007, 151-153). 
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Overall there are mixed reactions to McLuhan, some finding his thoughts far too 
contradictory to apply while others seeing his contribution as fundamental in the 
field and hence ever relevant. McLuhan’s ideas of the subliminal effects of media 
mark the start of a very significant trajectory of the political economy of 
communication.  
Thus ends the cursory glance at the pre-contemporary era of political economy 
of communication. It serves as a brief history of the field, paying homage to a few 
pioneering thinkers, outlining the deep, critical and valuable history of enquiry in 
the field. The following section reviews contemporary theorists in the field 
drawing on a few key concepts that frame contemporary methods of analysis.  
Contemporary political economy of 
communication (post-convergence) 
Crossing the divide? 
The great debate of 1995 amongst four prominent scholars of political economy 
and cultural studies is revisited by Babe (2009, 97-111) in the search for 
theoretical integration, a necessary integration given the evolution of and 
consequent complexity of digital media today. The debate raged over economic 
determinism, class, consciousness, ontology, production, and reception.  
The cultural studies theorists argued against economic determinism emerging 
out of the continued application of Marx’s base/superstructure model. Lawrence 
Grossberg and James Carrey (both part of the colloquy) and later others like 
Stuart Hall and Angela McRobbie argued for a deficiency existing in political 
economy approaches (ibid), particularly the over-emphasis on the defining 
authority of economic power over consumers (subjects are viewed as obedient 
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and subservient to the system) and hence the under-emphasis or total neglect 
altogether of the potential of consumers of cultural goods to have interpretive 
and hence resistive capacities (Web 20).  
From the political economy side Nicholas Garnham and Graham Murdock (also 
part of the colloquy) argued that cultural studies had over-emphasized the free 
agency of individual subjects without consideration of agency only ever existing 
within an economic and political framework of power (Web 21). Free agency 
implied empowerment emerging out of the resistive pleasure derived from 
consumption and even production of cultural goods. In this sense cultural 
reception/production was viewed as oppositional. Political economy theorists 
railed against what they considered to be a wholesale categorizing of all 
reception and now production or pro-sumption as oppositional or resistive. Babe 
(2009, 99) offers Grossberg’s rather useful submission which clarifies the 
contested idea of false consciousness and resistive practices, though not 
employing the former term itself: 
Cultural studies does assume that people live their subordination actively; 
that means, in one sense, that they are often complicit in their own 
subordination, that they accede to it, although power often works through 
strategies and apparatuses of which people are totally unaware. Be that as 
it may, cultural studies believes that if one is to challenge the existing 
structure of power, then one has to understand how that complicity, that 
participation in power, is constructed and lived, and that means not only 
looking at what people gain from such practices, but also at the possibilities 
for rearticulating such practices to escape, resist, or even oppose particular 
structures of power (Grossberg quoted in Babe 2009, 99). 
Garnham did concede that cultural studies provided a rich contribution to 
clarifying the site of individual consciousness, consent and resistance via 
“sophisticated theories of textuality…extending the notion of domination from 
class to gender and to race” (Babe 2009,101), and now even disability, ethnicity 
and sexual orientation. Grossberg emphasized that the weakness of political 
economy was having neglected reception/consumption (and now pro-sumption), 
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having little to say about the surrender of consent to particular modes of power, 
while attention to this aspect by cultural studies finally accounted for its strength.  
Babe concludes that Garnham’s agreement with Grossberg “is surely not to 
support the continued segregation of political economy and cultural studies, but 
rather to press for reconciliation” (Babe 2009, 101). He goes further to find nodes 
of unity such as Hall’s concept of articulation and rearticulation which suggested 
the possibility for ideological warfare (where signifiers from a dominant system 
were disarticulated and rearticulated with other signifiers) to occur at the site of 
language.  
While political economy would view articulations in the context of macro-
economic power, Babe maintains that cultural studies also considers 
articulations relationally to a broader dominance and dependence. Babe’s 
concluding thoughts demonstrate a cognizance of oppositional fault lines within 
cultural studies itself and he argues that the greater possibility for reconciliation 
between the approaches would be between the cultural materialism strand of 
cultural studies and political economy, as the former tends to relate articulations 
back to sutures of power (Babe 2009, 110-111). 
Contemporary political economy 
Vincent Mosco concluded in the 1996 text, The Political Economy of 
Communication, that political economy can no longer be separate but must 
instead take up challenges from its borders, namely cultural studies and later 
policy studies (1996, 246 - 249). A review of contemporary political economy 
reveals interdisciplinarity, a necessary interdisciplinarity given the current 
complexities compounding analyses of the digital age.  
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Mosco is also a key contributor to the field who resurrects the historical 
preoccupation with materialist perspectives. Mosco clarifies ‘critical’ political 
economy as a focus on material relations, examining the role of power in the 
production, distribution and exchange of communication. It unearths and 
addresses the conflict that arises over who benefits from control over 
communication and technological resources. 
The rise of the media industries in the twentieth century led business to take 
a close look at the economics of communication. The result was research 
on everything from how to produce and market radio and television 
receivers to how to sell products to mass audiences. The growth of critical 
political economy was built in part on an effort to understand this process 
critically, i.e., to connect mass marketing to wider economic and social 
processes and to criticize them from a range of humanistic values (Mosco 
1996, 12). 
Calabrese highlights the vital pivot on which Mosco’s work revolves, marking a 
return to the preoccupations of classical political economy.  
Of more importance at this historical moment is the attention Mosco pays to 
the political in political economy, noting how the discipline and language of 
contemporary economics have evolved to profess value neutrality. Unlike 
political economy, contemporary economics tends not to explicitly engage 
moral considerations and political questions that have historically been 
central to political economists (2004, 2).  
This pivot has become more significant as neoliberalism’s reach has extended to 
developing contexts bringing with it the supporting ideologies of technological 
determinism and a manifestation of value neutrality. McChesney, another 
resolute political economist, clarifies critical scholarship as a healthy scepticism 
towards societal systems, as opposed to a naturalizing tendency towards leftist 
assumptions and perspectives.  
In my view, critical scholarship is predicated not on socialist principles, but 
on liberal and democratic principles. It is committed to political 
enfranchisement, freedom of speech and intellectual enquiry, and social 
justice. It grows directly out of the Enlightenment experience…A critical 
approach, then, will by definition question the dominant interests in society. 
In the case of the United States, and the world today, that means coming to 
grips with the market and neoliberalism. Critical research does not 
presuppose that capitalism is evil and unacceptable; there is simply 




McChesney (2004) reflects on the importance of understanding how power 
operates within and through culture to influence the macrostructure. He states:  
…a delimited social group, pursuing economic or political ends, determines 
which meanings circulate and which do not, which stories are told about 
what, which arguments are given prominence and what cultural resources 
are made available and to whom (2004, 165). 
Louis Althusser, writing some decades after Gramsci, vitally clarified the 
processing of ideology as it were. He asserted that ideological state apparatuses 
which included the mass media functioned to create a field of representations 
which interpellated individuals into conformist subjectivities in accordance with 
the interests of capital (Lee 1993, 137 – 142). Both Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony and Althusser’s of ideological state apparatuses gained much 
currency in new media debates as enormous power and importance was given 
to culture, ideology and the mass media.  
In the 2000’s several theorists took stock of the field and arrived at a few defining 
characteristics of contemporary political economy (Payne 2006 and Youngs 
2007). The contemporary research agenda of political economy delineates itself 
along four sub-themes. International political economy deals with issues of 
globalization which is concerned with neoliberalism as it relates to the spread of 
market capital. Comparative political economy focuses on policy discourses and 
governance which includes the consideration of legal and regulatory frameworks. 
The theme of political economy of development is concerned with questions of 
equality and distributive justice and conjoins with comparative political economy 
as one cannot deal with regulation in a developmental context (for example 
South African) without raising questions of equality and distributive justice. 
Normative issues of universal access, pluralism, diversity and the public sphere 
are also relevant within this theme. The fourth sub-theme is the political economy 
of the environment which focuses on ecological sustainability (Payne 2006, 6). 
While Payne’s research agenda remains very useful as a lead into political 
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economic analyses, it is important to note the porous nature of these 
categorizations. This thesis is dominantly located in the paradigms of 
international political economy and political economy of development.  
Finally it is Mosco’s co-ordinates for a framework for a political economy of 
communication that prove comprehensive and most useful. These co-ordinates 
are ‘built on the entry processes of commodification, spatialization, and 
structuration’ (Mosco 1996, 42). More than a decade later, this triad still retains 
applicability and remains the best entry point to communication issues, 
incidentally parallel to all four sub-themes of Payne’s contemporary research 
agenda. For the purposes of this study, Spatialization (which incorporates much 
of Globalization theory) remains the fundamental entry point and will be explored 
as such, while commodification and structuration will be considered as 
complimentary. Globalization is a vast field and hence precedes framing in some 
ways the discussion of spatialization and the other entry points. The only addition 
to or extension of Mosco’s entry points is the idea of ‘the digital divide’ which was 
taken up in the literature review section. Thus the theoretical framework moves 







Globalisation as a phenomenon defines, shapes and impacts on almost all 
sectors of society and individual experience, yet remains very elusive to 
definition. Littered across globalization theory there ranges a cacophony of 
perspectives such as: the pro-globalists; the anti-globalists; the traditionalists; the 
transformists; the hyper-globalists; the sceptics and the media imperialists. There 
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is even contention with regard to what period exactly refers to globalization. 
However, there is agreement that ‘contemporary globalisation’ has created a 
more compressed world where time and space are condensed and productive 
relations defy some of the former classifications. Disagreement still abounds as 
to whether this is a positive or negative phenomenon.  
Contemporary globalization has undoubtedly changed the relationship 
between time and space and, in the process, rendered the world a more 
compressed place. But opinions as to its consequences are sharply divided, 
especially in respect of cultural globalization. It is proposed by some as a 
thoroughly progressive and liberating phenomenon, opening up the potential 
for greater human connectedness and the spread of human rights, 
democracy, health care and improved inter-cultural understandings world-
wide… Conversely, it is widely attacked as heralding in a new and voracious 
phase of Western capitalism and the imposition of Americanized culture (in 
the form of television, videos, pop music, films and adverts and other 
Western goods) on vulnerable communities unable to protect themselves 
from the sheer volume and intensity of foreign imports. The talk is of 
electronic imperialism through the unequal flow of media, such as 
entertainment (building on English’s unique position as a global language) 
from America as the world’s sole superpower and the growing disparity 
between the world’s (technology-owning) ‘information rich’ and ‘information 
poor’ (Beynon and Dunkerley 2000, 2). 
 
Guillen introduces some over-arching issues in the field of globalization and 
while he asserts that these are not exhaustive, they remain central. He raises 
four questions in relation to globalization which addresses the mythical nature of 
globalization, the authority of the nation state, convergence and global culture 
(2010, 4-19). Ritzer offers an almost comprehensive account of the ‘globalization 
phenomenon’ (2007, 2010a, 2010b, 2011) distinguishing these debates under 
Political economy and Culture respectively. For the purpose of this study, the 





Political economy and globalization 
Ritzer (2010) is prolific in the range of sub-sections explored under political 
economy and globalization. However, only five areas are deemed most relevant 
to the project: 
 Origins 
 Empire and the Nation State 
 Neoliberalism 
 Informationalism 
 Normative challenges 
 
Origins, definitions, demarcations  
As with most topics within the field of Globalization, there is dispute as to its 
origins. Some argue that Globalization began at the dawn of civilization when the 
earliest recorded trade across continents started to occur. Others argue that 
globalization is a myth asserting that it is simply an old project of the divine right 
of kings continuing into this compressed and terribly fast era.   
Roland Roberston, Arjun Appadurai and Manuel Castells offer useful 
conceptions of Globalization. Robertson’s chronology marks the different phases 
of early globalization until its current form. Appadurai offers conceptual 
demarcations of the field and Castells usefully extends thinking into the new 
modes of productive relations, from industrial capitalism to informational or 
networked capitalism (dealt with under empire).   
In Robertson’s chronology the earliest phase of globalization predates modernity 
and the rise of capital. The early phase was between 1400 and 1750 marked by 
global exploration, mapping and the Roman Catholic Church (Robertson 1992, 
9). Francis Bacon identified three inventions in roughly the same era that he 
stated would alter the face of the world. These were the printing press, gun 
powder and the compass (Eisenstein 1980, 43-45). Bacon’s pronouncement 
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appeared prophetic as these three inventions came to represent the matrix of 
power in the globalized world. Gun powder represents the power of compulsion 
and force emanating out of sophisticated weaponry, the printing press 
representing the centrality of global communication which depends on access 
and speed, and finally the compass representing mapping of first the 
geographical and natural boundaries to the calculations involved in measuring 
the human or individual via biometrics. Thus in this early phase the seeds of the 
globalized world were sown.  
Robertson indicates the ‘take-off’ phase as 1875-1925 during which time most of 
the world came under a common time zone and date line with the global 
adoption of the Gregorian calendar (Robertson 1992, 9). During this phase the 
communication advances increased political and economic connections. Sirus 
Field’s ‘Great Atlantic Sea Cable’ is one example, linking America to England. In 
addition the first radio broadcast occurred in 1910 which really paved the way for 
the electronic mass media of latter decades (Jones 2005). 
Robertson indicates the final period of Globalization as 1969 to date, marked by 
the end of the Cold War, space exploration, the emergence of global institutions 
and the rise of the debates globally around race, ethnicity, sex, gender, sexuality 
and human rights (Robertson 1992, 16). 
Other theorists relate globalization firmly to the growth of capital.  Giddens 
asserts that globalization is directly related to modernity and the growth of 
industrialization, distinguishing the current phase of globalization as ‘high 
modernity’ which signifies modernity moving to a global stage (Giddens 1990, 8).  
Lash and Urry (1987; 1994) call the current phase ‘post-fordist disorganized 
capital’. Here capital’s drive moves to the global arena to seek out and exploit 
new markets for the maximization of profit. Lash and Urry highlight a few key 
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characteristics of globalization which are interesting as they echo aspects of 
spatial agglomeration (to be discussed later in the Spatialization section): 
More inter-state connections and the decreasing effect of state policy; the 
development of increased transnational communication and activities; a 
decline in the importance of the nation state; the emergence of global 
political, economic and cultural organizations and bureaucracies; the 
emergence of what King (1990) aptly terms ‘global cities’ (like London, New 
York, Paris and Tokyo) as local sites of global interaction; a huge increase 
in the flows of commodities and cultural products; and the world-wide 
spread of Western-style consumerism. 
“Postmodernity is capitalism in its post-Fordist guise, hungrily creating new 
opportunities, arenas and areas in which to operate, but still driven by profit” 
(Beynon and Dunkerley 2000, 12). In this post-modern phase, culture and 
consumption are key sites as it is here that a significant contestation occurs 
between commodification and ‘prosumption’ (produser)20. 
Waters (1997, 5-6) adds to these key characteristics. He asserts that apart from 
increasing speed and volume, shrinking space and permeable borders, 
reflexivity21 and risk and trust are important features of contemporary 
globalization.  
Massey (1994, 17) argues that cross-cultural transfer has occurred throughout 
the ages but the compression of contemporary cultural globalization has 
accelerated this process. As a result of new media technology being central 
agents of contemporary globalization, western consumer culture is assured of 
having an almost viral reach across the globe.  
The question of agency (and the individual) must necessarily surface when 
investigating contemporary globalization. Robertson (1992, 36-7) opposes the 
imbalanced approach of viewing globalization as a ‘macro-scale’ affair. The 
                                               
20 Cultural Studies theorists view the labour of consumption as an important site of resistance (Marshall 
2004). 
21 Reflexivity refers to the occurrence of greater global intercultural communication which has resulted in 
like-minded citizens responding to instances of atrocities or injustice in alternate parts of the world. 




individual and the question of agency are equally important to understand the 
paradoxes of globalization such as: localization or glocalization; centralization 
and a simultaneous decentralization; and permeable borders and stronger 
national identities. He conceives of a subjective and objective globalization, 
where the latter refers to the play of the global economy within the 
telecommunications and media infrastructure. Subjective globalization refers to 
the experience of globalization which has resulted in the unpredictable and 
complex identity formations which sometimes reposition themselves, rooting in 
stronger ethnic and religious (sometimes fundamentalist or even new age) 
foundations.  
Appadurai’s contribution is extremely useful to map the texture and range of 
globalization. He (2002) offers a useful method of analysis and description. He 
introduces six metaphorical ‘landscapes’ to define six broad areas of 
globalization. These are the “Technoscape, of diffusion and adoption of 
mechanical and informational technologies” which has resulted in the birth of the 
concept of real time and instantaneous movement of communication. This 
intersects with the “Financescape of global capital”, creating an inextricable 
global economic grid that subjects all nations to its ebb and flow. Appadurai 
brands the increasing acceptance of citizenship and rights as the “Ideoscape” 
which includes political discourses of democracy and human rights. Ideoscapes 
also refer to the counter ideologies currently prevalent. “Ethnoscape” refers to 
the movement of people in terms of tourism, migrancy, refugees, exiles, and 
guest workers. The “Mediascape” refers to the “movement of images and 
narrative reality bites.” Finally, Appadurai cites the Sacriscape which refers very 
generally to “religious ideas and their associated values” (2002, 37-38). 
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Most political economists generally concur on the parallel movements of 
globalization and the consolidation of economic power. This is dealt with in the 
following section. 
Empire 
Empire is a term encompassing discussion around the nation-state and shifting 
power relations in a globalized information age, and also signifies a shift from old 
notions of imperialism. The sovereignty of the nation-state has been challenged 
in the information age what with permeable borders, industry operating across 
borders (if not continents), and the rise of global discourses with the power to 
supersede local discourses. Despite the challenges, the nation-state has 
endured; however, the key question remains as to its longevity and the 
constitution of its power.  
The idea of the global community of nation-states emerged in 1659 with the 
Treaty of Westphalia referred to by Strange as the ‘Westfailure system” (Strange 
2010, 161). She asserts that the state structures are a mismatch for managing 
global crises of the information age. This idea also emerges with Whitaker (1999) 
who sees the current infrastructure as largely Victorian in nature, grown in 
industrial capital, but ill-suited for informational capitalism. Strange demonstrates 
that the nation-state has shown a lack of capacity (in her words an ‘abject 
failure’) to deal with a few very serious problems like the economic crises of the 
last two decades and the demands of social equity. The two are related as the 
problem of the former, the inability to control excesses within the economic 
system within national boundaries, is further complicated by economic agents 
operating trans-borders, hence not within the control of any single nation-state 
(Strange 2010, 161-164). 
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Levine (2010, 159 - 162) introduces a few factors that account for the decline of 
the nation-state, one of which is shifting allegiances from the nation-state to the 
sub-national (which is local), or the transnational via multinational corporations, 
and finally the supranational (Levine 2010, 159). This certainly applies at the 
macro level, but consideration must be given to the play of the individual in an 
information age. New media and systems of information have unyoked personal 
interaction from face-to-face, geographically-bound communication, affording a 
plethora of possibilities for new relationships to emerge across the lines of simple 
social networking, the heady range of sub-cultures, and fandom, in a sense 
fulfilling McCluhan’s prophesy of new media retribalising the world beyond 
geographic boundaries.  
Weiss (2010, 172-3) raises an important assumption as regards the primacy of 
the nation state, arguing that theorists tend to exaggerate its past power and 
reach in order to over-emphasize its current weakness. Weiss also questions the 
myth of powerlessness of nation states as some were facilitators of globalization 
(as is the case of the Thatcher-Reagan administrations dealt with under 
Neoliberalism), while others may be constructed as victims. Therefore Robinson 
(2010, 179-181) insists on a paradigm shift from studying nation states to the 
multidisciplinary study of the world as an object of knowledge. This is echoed by 
Sklair (2010, 184) who advocates a ‘global systems theory’ as  a means of 
understanding the contemporary world due to changes in power relations 
between state and non-state actors.  
In the South African context, prominent state actors have in the recent past 
sustained the imperialist ‘victim’ construct very much on imperialist terms. Post-
colonial, post-Apartheid South Africa has via various forums, articulated a need 
for greater self-determination. Former presidents of South Africa, the late 
Mandela and Mbeki have, within the context of the African Renaissance, 
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acknowledged the importance of Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICTs) as a focal point in the transition to stable and sustaining democracies, as 
well as towards self-determination. At the fiftieth national conference of the ANC 
(December 1997) President Mandela summarized principal development aims as 
the need, “to strengthen, the genuine independence of African 
countries…enhancing our collective role in the determination of the global 
system of governance in all fields, including the economy, information.., science 
and technology” (Mzamane 2001).  Following on from the late President 
Mandela, former President Mbeki embraced the grand narrative of the African 
Renaissance, popularizing its political, economic and cultural ideals via various 
state addresses and through his foreign and domestic policies (Mzamane 2001).    
In an age of globalization, every country needs, in Mbeki’s words, to create 
capacity in the area of communication and information technology or face 
the risk of permanent global marginalization of our countries and peoples. 
We cannot begin to be fully integrated into the global economy if we do not 
develop the necessary skills to participate in the increasingly knowledge 
based communication society (Mzamane 2001).  
While ICTs as a whole have been identified nationally as key catalysts to 
development, communication appears to be consistently marginalized in global 
development analyses (Warnock, Schoemaker and Wilson – Web 89). A further 
factor constraining the debate is the material reality of South Africa and other 
developing nations, what Moore refers to as a ‘premodern reality’ beset in part 
with primitive accumulation and sovereignty construction (2010, 215). 
Communication becomes a contentious site as it is sometimes charged with 
bringing the cultural manifestation of imperialism.  
Mbeki cautions against ‘succumbing to “Coca-Cola culture” at the expense 
of our own cultures, identities, and national heritage’. The pervasive 
dominant culture denies that there are other solutions to our challenges 
other than those imposed by the dominant culture (Mzamane 2001).  
Mzamane sees the pursuit to self-determination and independence as a 
conundrum due to keeping South African doors open to Western capital, on the 
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one hand, and keeping out the cultural baggage that comes with capitalism and 
consumerism, on the other hand. The sentiment is very much along the lines of 
the Cultural Imperialism thesis, which came to the fore in the 1970’s, drawing 
attention to the strong economic dominance of the North Atlantic region, 
particularly America. The effects are multifarious, ranging across the economic to 
the cultural and technological. However, the thesis does not take into account 
fully the complex interplay of the forces of globalization and individual agency 
which has resulted in some instances as a cultural hybridity. The counter points 
to the thesis have surfaced mostly in Latin America, Japan and India, indicating 
the complexities to achieving cultural homogeneity via Western products in these 
regions.  
Cultural imperialism is often interchanged with or nuanced with alternative terms 
such as media imperialism, structural imperialism, electronic colonialism and 
communication imperialism. These terms simultaneously reflect the common 
thrust of the thesis and some gradations of difference. The common thrust is that 
the flow of information occurs unequally across the globe. This is seen as 
problematic as certain nations (the West, particularly America) dominate in 
disseminating information in the form of cultural content: programming, news, 
and other products like food, clothing, music, electronic goods and lifestyles. 
The general consensus is that this dominance manifests as a foregrounding of 
lifestyles and choices that may not be appropriate or even healthy in every 
context around the world. Developing countries do not have the means to 
compete with the mass onslaught of these products. This results in what is 
argued to be a cultural dominance as locals are less able to participate on an 
equal footing by disseminating their own messages and having some self-
determination in communication and information.  
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One of the off-shoots, structural imperialism, refers to the economic structures 
dominated by the North Atlantic region. Policies favoured are said to be 
neoliberal in nature designed to loosen the hold of government or national 
control and increase the freedom or independence of the market. The continuity 
of the status quo is ensured by internationalization.  
McPhail refers to ‘Electronic colonialism’ as the dependency relationship 
established by the importation of communication hardware, foreign-
produced software, along with engineers, technicians, and related 
information protocols, that vicariously establish a set of foreign norms, 
values, and expectations which, in varying degrees, may alter the domestic 
cultures and socialization processes (White 2003). 
Internationalisation simply put, refers to ‘teaming arrangements’ and strategic 
trade alliances between different nation states (Mosco 1996, 203). Among 
globalization theorists, a small fringe deems globalization to be something of a 
myth. While they do acknowledge global shifts in time, space and productive 
relations, this is understood simply as the internationalization of neoliberal 
policies, most aggressively driven by the Thatcher-Reagan administrations of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. Following the oil crisis of the 1970s, Thatcher coined 
the ideological acronym TINA There is no alternative, to promote and defend the 
expansion of neoliberal policies across the developing world. These theorists, 
who see globalization simply as internationalization of particular fiscal policies, 
also regard with great scepticism the promise of ‘greater human connectedness 
and the spread of democracy and human rights’ etc. Those in this camp view 
globalization to be shrouded in new garb: Neoliberal globalization (to be 
discussed next).   
Internationalization is a very significant process as it has developed new 
measures that enable the more powerful nations to exert a tighter control 
over global communication policy. These have brought about significant 
changes in international policy-making, including the decline of UNESCO (a 
site of the major support for the NWICO) and the opening of the 
International Telecommunication Union, to considerably greater private 
sector participation. These organizations are either less powerful or are 
transformed to reflect new power balances that all but eradicate equal 
representation among the world’s nations (Mosco 1996, 204). 
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Sklair (2010, 184-212) states that asymmetries across the globe could in the 
past be attributed to Western imperialism; however, this approach is dated, 
losing its theoretical efficacy as globalization moves away from state-centric 
manifestations of power.  
It is interesting to note that at the turn of the new millennium politicians, 
bureaucrats, and intellectuals in France were still displaying great suspicion 
about American influence in Europe. In the late 1990s France was the first 
government to break ranks on the OECD-sponsored Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment, and social movements against globalization, McDonald’s, 
and le fast food were thinly veiled attacks on the Americanization of Europe. 
This populist rallying loses some credibility when it is discovered that the 
entrepreneur Ong Beng Seng from Singapore owned Planet Hollywood; 
Silas Chous of Hong Kong owned Tommy Hilfiger; Vincent Tan and Khoo 
Kay Peng, both from Malaysia, owned Kenny Rogers Roasters and Laura 
Ashley respectively. Western icons; Asian owners – such are the fruits of 
the global marketplace (Sklair 2010, 186-7). 
Thus in recent times, imperialist theory (including cultural imperialism) is quickly 
dispensed with as the concept of empire is quite a bit more flexible and inclusive; 
even though some theorists do maintain that a level of US imperialism remains in 
evidence (Barkawi and Laffey 2010, 228-234).  
One of the ways of conceptualizing empire is by comparison. Hardt and Negri 
(2010, 214-219) link imperialism to modernity and the centrality of the nation-
state with all its attendant and localized mechanisms of control. Empire is 
decentered, where power and dominance exist but not manifested in the same 
ways as imperialism. Empire is deterritorialised, and reterritorialised via global 
flows (Sklair 2010, 208). Empire also pursues differentiation of individuals who 
are then subject to new hierarchies of global power operating via the virtual world 
of new media technology. Thus for Hardt and Negri, ‘empire is both everywhere 
and nowhere’ (2010, 214).   
A new kind of juridical power lies at the center of empire, based on notions of 
order, ethical truths and the tricky concepts of ‘right and wrong’ which may be 
invoked even to wage a military encounter.  
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Empire lacks not only territorial but also temporal boundaries…It also can 
be seen as lacking a lower boundary in that it seeks to expand its control 
down into the depths of the social world. That is, it seeks not only to control 
people’s thought, action, and interaction, but also, via biopower, to control 
people’s minds and bodies. All of this makes empire far more ambitious 
than imperialism (Hardt and Negri 2010, 214).   
Sklair attempts to discontinue the binary logic emerging out of the lens of 
imperialism(s) by offering the paradigm of transnational practices, which are 
defined as a result of cross border activity but do not emerge from any state or 
state-ist institution. Sklair (2010, 185) argues that in this sense globalization or 
empire is pushed by the transnational capitalist class (TCC) as opposed to the 
modern state. These capitalists are not traditional in the Marxist sense as owners 
of the means of production as in empire, as owning the means of production is 
not a prerequisite for entering the circuit of capital. She identifies four groups that 
form the transnational capitalist class: 
 TNC executives as the corporate fraction 
 State bureaucrats that form the state fraction 
 Globalizing professionals that form the technical fraction 
 Merchants and media forming the consumerist fraction   
 
The common features across all four groups are that they share global and local 
economic interests as long as it intersects with individual interests. These groups 
are often inhabited by people from different parts of the world who flirt with the 
idea of global citizenship and share the consumption of luxury goods and the 
high-end lifestyles their positioning affords.  The central aim would be to create 
the right conditions to further TCC interests across the transnational or global 
and as it filters down to the local (2010, 188). 
On the surface, this construction tends to appear unmovable within the matrix of 
powerful global interests. It is interesting to note that most theorists writing about 
empire take into account structuration theory (to be discussed at the end of the 
theory chapter) even if they do not refer to it as such. Hardt and Negri indicate 
that ‘the sources of both our major problems and our liberation exist at the global 
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level. It is also more likely because while control is through communication and 
ideology, it is through that communication and ideology that the revolutionary 
potential of the multitude will be expressed, and it will be manifest globally’ 
(2010, 215).  
And Sklair (2010, 185) states that,  
the fundamental in-built instability of the capitalist global system, and the 
most important contradiction with which any theory of the global system has 
to grapple, is that the dominant ideology of the system is under constant 
challenge. The substantive content of the theory, how those who own and 
control the transnational corporations harness the transnational capitalist 
class to solidify their hegemonic control of consumerist culture and ideology, 
is the site of the many struggles for the global system. Who will win and who 
will lose these struggles is not a foregone conclusion. 
Concepts of empire are yet to be fully formed, however they offer a useful lens 
through which one may consider the play of citizens, consumption ideologies, 
and the operations of state agents as they interrelate with local industry which 
are at once also transnational. Empire is also a useful lens because it observes 
and accounts for seeds of contestation. It is the best of emerging political 
economy paradigms as it gives credence to individual agency and 




Neoliberalism is a hybrid combining social liberalism with market liberalism; 
hence its roots lie in the Enlightenment and Classic Liberalism as well as in the 
1950’s with the key figures of Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek (Ritzer 
2011). The early movement marked the struggle against the tyranny of feudal 
systems as it failed to accommodate emerging. It was also in part a response to 
the effects of industrialization which created a range of commodities and 
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changing ownership patterns which called for some corresponding regulation. 
The strong emphases in the earlier discourses were on individual rights and the 
development of contracts and property rights. Classic liberalism via Adam Smith, 
John Milton and John Stuart Mill accounted for civil libertarianism, an ideology 
that later became firmly yoked to twentieth century market liberalism.  
 Peters (2004, 78-80) argues that the ideals of classic liberalism have been 
attached to ideas of market liberalism, problematically articulating notions of 
freedoms related to the individual with freedoms related to industry; conferring an 
‘ideological camouflage…lending business interests a democratic patina and 
venerable intellectual lineage’ (Peters 2004, 65). He warns us about the kind of 
people and society we would become if ‘marketplace values of getting and 
spending alone prevailed’ (ibid).  
Neoliberal globalization 
Friedman’s Chicago school served as the conceptual center (post-world war two) 
of the neoliberal approach, one that Klein (2007) calls the shock doctrine, 
pushed to the global stage as ‘structural adjustment’. At the heart of the 
neoliberal ideology lies the conviction that the key driver of economic growth is 
the market – private market forces unimpeded by national regulation (an idea 
loosely based on the self-righting principle) (Ritzer 2011, 39). Neoliberalism thus 
refers to a way of managing or regulating a national economy. A set of economic 
policies are generally associated with neoliberalism, and the global expansion of 
these policies is referred to by some as Neoliberal Globalization. Neoliberal 
globalization was promoted as a natural progression or growth of economic 
systems and carried with it an ideology of naturalness22. Castells (2000, 145) 
argues that “neither technology nor business could have developed the global 
                                               




economy on its own. The decisive agents in setting up a new, global economy 
were governments and, particularly, the governments of the wealthier countries, 
the G-7.”  
A few interrelated policies created the foundation for neoliberal globalization. 
These were deregulation of domestic economic activity; liberalization of 
international trade and investment; privatization of publicly controlled companies; 
and reductions in nations’ spending on social welfare programs. Deregulation 
refers to a reduction in the protective laws surrounding national industries, and a 
lowering or removal of regulation in relation to trade barriers and imports and 
exports. Liberalization refers to direct state intervention to promote and increase 
competition, via the introduction of new ‘players’ in the respective fields. 
Privatization refers to when state enterprises are sold off in an attempt to 
liberalize the market and increase competition.  
Neoliberal globalization hence signifies a particular trajectory in globalization 
theory which foregrounds the neoliberal nature of the financescape (Appadurai 
2002, 37-38). In this phase of late capital, the dominant ideology of the day is the 
free market, dominated by global monopolies in the form of giant trans-national 
corporations.    
The foundation of the theory was the self-righting principle or self-regulation. 
Within this framework, it was deemed probable that individuals’ economic activity 
is driven by self-interest and if they were allowed to act from this motivation 
without any state barriers, the best result would naturally emerge (e.g. In trade, 
consumers would consistently choose the best products and services. This 
consistent choice would naturally advance good businesses and inefficient or 
bad businesses would conversely suffer a natural atrophy due to a consistent 
lack of discerning consumers choosing inefficient or bad businesses). Thus any 
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privileges or restrictions ought to be discarded in order to give every individual 
the freedom to trade (Duncan 2007, 13-44). 
The impetus for contemporary Neoliberalism emerged from the 1970s, due to a 
variety of simultaneous developments, the first of which was the oil price shocks 
which affected the US economy. The second factor was the decline of 
Keynesianism and the difficulty of developing public understanding and consent 
for this economic model. A third factor was the heat of the Cold war which 
resulted in any concept of collective action and too much state intervention 
signifying communism. A final factor perhaps was to tip the balance of power 
back in the hands of business who were at the time smarting from a working 
class with too much power (Couldry 2010, 52-64).  
The central tenets of neoliberalism came to be ‘income distribution’ and 
‘aggregate employment determination’.   
Income distribution refers to how Neoliberalism asserts that factors of 
production (labour and capital) get paid what they are worth. This is 
achieved through the supply-demand process – payment depends on a 
factors scarcity and its productivity which affects demand…Aggregate 
employment determination refers to how Neoliberalism asserts that free 
markets will not let valuable factors of production – including labour – go to 
waste. Prices adjust to ensure that demand is forth-coming – economies 
adjust to full employment (Duncan 2007, 39).   
The neoliberal tools of privatization, liberalization and deregulation, were 
designed to, “weaken institutions of social protection; reduction of public and 
social expenses; weaken labour unions; reduce government intervention; cut top 
tax rates; open international goods and capital markets and abandon full 
employment goals” (Duncan 2007, 42). While the Thatcher-Reagan regime 
engineered the first wave of neoliberal globalization in the late 1970s to early 
1980s, the Washington Consensus endorsed and promoted these standard 
neoliberal tools in a second wave (late 1980s – 1990s). The Washington 
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Consensus detailed a set of ten policy prescriptions23 that were promoted as 
economic reform for the developing world. These prescriptions came from 
Washington based institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and the US 
Treasury department and was thus referred to as the Washington Consensus, 
hereafter synonymous for market fundamentalism.  
Governments, especially in the developing region, are under enormous pressure 
from global companies to liberalize, privatize and deregulate their domestic 
environments. Developing regimes are eager to comply as they fear the very real 
threat of disapprobation if they act against the (flow of the) global ‘financescape’. 
The fear is primarily of disinvestment or capital flight and speculative attacks on 
domestic currency (the Indonesian crisis is a good example).  
Deregulation and financial liberalization have accelerated the movement 
towards an integrated global market economy with serious implications for 
domestic macro-economics and foreign policy formulation. Technological 
advances are making national frontiers more porous as the movement 
towards a borderless world gains momentum, regardless of what states do 
or do not do (Magubane 2000, 274). 
Another problematic assumption underlying neoliberal economics is that of 
perfect competition. The efficiency of the market rarely occurs in an environment 
of perfect competition. Neoliberal globalization has lead increasingly to the 
monolith of large transnational corporations signifying monopoly capital gone 
global. Within this environment the conditions of perfect competition are not 
really manifest.  A further assumption is that ‘income distribution’ and ‘aggregate 
employment determination’ occurs neutrally, without any of the coercive 
influences of various types of industry power.  
                                               
23 The ten prescriptions were: fiscal policy discipline; redirection of public spending from 
subsidies to broad based provision of key pro-growth , pro poor services like primary education, 
primary health care and infrastructure development; tax reform – broaden the tax base; market 
determined interest rates; competitive exchange rates; trade liberalization; liberalization of foreign 
direct investment; privatization of state enterprises; deregulation – especially with regard to any 




The tendencies of Neoliberalism 
One of the earliest critics of neoliberalism was Polanyi (1944). Castells echoes 
his thinking, revealing the glaring contradiction of a proposed natural order to the 
free market system. Polanyi points out that laissez faire economic systems 
emerged out of tremendous state intervention and globally were engineered by a 
few powerful individuals24. Ritzer states that its continued existence is due to the 
state (Ritzer 2011, 44). Harvey (quoted in Ritzer 2010, 102) indicates that 
contrary to many theorists’ predictions of the decline of the nation state in a 
globalized world, ‘the institutions and practices of the state have been 
transformed to better attune them to the needs and interests of the neoliberal 
market economy’. Posner (2009, 41-48) describes how the market crash of 
2007-2008 was created by a poorly regulated financial market sanctioning sub-
prime loans and other types of irresponsible lending. However the bailout, in the 
region of $700 billion came from (could only come from) government.  
Polanyi, Klein and Harvey, writing at different times, are all critical of the 
neoliberal doctrine and indicate the danger of basing economic systems solely 
on ‘self-interest’ (Ritzer 2011, 101). Harvey points out the results have been a 
series of financial crises throughout the world, and Klein’s critique reveals the 
terrible and unfair toll these policies have had on the world’s poor (Ritzer 2011, 
103). 
Dunkley (2004, 3-9) argues against the ideology of free trade on the basis that it 
is over-simplified and based on questionable myths and assumptions. He states 
that a key oversight with neoliberal doctrine is that it disregards a range of 
important non-economic considerations, while encouraging structural changes 
                                               
24 An interesting parallel with neoliberal ideology is patriarchy in Victorian England, where ‘natural 
characteristics of femininity’ were laid out by men, who then set up social structures accordingly to hold 
women to account. What remains unquestioned (until feminism) is whose interests were being served by 
these ‘inherent characteristics’ and if they were ‘inherent’ and ‘naturalised’, why were they not naturally 
occurring? (i.e. without any masculine intervention).  
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that are non-consensual, at times undemocratic. Often market efficiency is pitted 
against social protection and social benefits, using the guise of sophisticated 
econometrics. Given this sophistication, Posner (2009, 252-268) poses the 
interesting question of why so many academic economists and those economists 
in the system failed to predict the financial crisis.25 He also makes the point that 
financial journalists and the general press were ‘more alert to the impending 
crisis than economists were’ (2009, 267).  
Posner, Harvey, Klein, Dunkley, Polyani, Ritzer and a host of other theorists in 
different ways highlight an important crisis of legitimation of neoliberalism. 
Tournois (Milliot and Tournois 2010, 242) refers to this as a ‘systemic crisis’ 
where trust no longer exists amongst the interrelated global financial players. He 
states that, ‘bankers and financiers have become sorcerer’s apprentices, 
inventors of unimaginable alchemies, causing devastating explosions. This is the 
fact of paradoxical behaviours of rational bankers who have lost their minds’ 
(2010, 240). 
Ritzer (2011, 44) argues further that neoliberal ideology ‘obscures the social and 
material interests of those who push such an economic system with its 
associated technological, legal, and institutional systems’. Giroux (2011, 101 - 
108) criticizes the dominant media as ‘a form of moral anaesthesia and political 
firewall’ that legitimates a corrupt system while concealing the true workings of 
‘casino capitalism’. For Giroux, the political system has been corrupted by 
associations with a powerful matrix of control over the ‘military-industrial 
academic complex’, where public and social values are merely a hindrance to a 
market economy.  
                                               
25 Posner does mention a few intellectuals who did anticipate the crisis, but they were mostly ignored 
(2009, 252).  
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Dunkley (2004, 4) overturns the heart of the neoliberal doctrine, i.e. that trade 
and economic improvements are natural human instincts. He refers to this as the 
‘Smithian Propensity’. While he agrees that the ‘Smithian Propensity’26 could 
arguably be a part of human nature, Dunkley persuasively argues that equally a 
part of human nature is to ‘seek preservation of worthwhile traditions and social 
institutions and natural environments.’ Dunkley refers to this as the ‘Ghandian 
propensity’, which forms a wonderful counterbalance to the overriding vein of 
self-interest running through neoliberal doctrine.  
 Some South African considerations 
Liberalization as applied by the South African government followed the Bretton 
Woods reform models27. Under these models, liberalization encompassed the 
three-pronged approach of privatization, competition and independent regulation.  
Allison Gillwald of the LINK Centre28 (personal interview, Johannesburg, 2004) 
argued that these models, which were based on the European and American 
experience of telecommunication reform, have limited applicability in the 
developing context. In some cases adoption of these liberalization models 
impacted negatively on access and development. Reform strategies need to be 
uniquely tailored to the specific demands of each development environment. 
Gillwald argues further that these models have emphasized privatization over 
other reform mechanisms such as effective regulation and competition. Effective 
regulatory strategies are vital to meeting development and growth objectives. 
                                               
26 There are many versions of Smith’s conclusions on human instinct and free trade. 
27 The Bretton Woods Project works as a networker, information-provider, media informant and 
watchdog to scrutinise and influence the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). By 
encouraging information exchange and debate, it seeks to move the Bretton Woods institutions 
(World Bank and IMF) away from simplistic approaches to development. Priority areas include: 
World Bank and IMF roles; structural adjustment & poverty reduction strategies (PRS); the 
environment; social issues; the World Bank as a knowledge bank; governance and accountability; 
country operations (Web 22). 
28 The Link centre is funded in part by the department of trade and industry and carries out research in 
the telecommunications sector in the SADC region.  
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The cost of not establishing or generating proper regulatory mechanisms is the 
widening of what is popularly termed as the “digital divide”. Jane Duncan (2007, 
163) in her seminal account of the South African broadcasting climate argues 
further that the adoption of neoliberal policies that resulted in the 
commercialization of the public service mandate has comprised its delivery.  
The general effects of Neoliberal policy is to create ‘pockets of growth’, leaving 
vast areas of poverty unaddressed. This kind of policy promotes labour market 
deregulation which in turn allows the proper value of minimum wages to fall 
(often under the guise of ‘workers being paid what they are worth’). The balance 
of power rests firmly in the hands of business and the general climate of 
employment insecurity lends itself to undermining the power of unions.  
South Africa’s legacy of apartheid delivered decades of racially based 
oppression which still permeates the current economic and social climate. The 
underlying assumption of Neoliberalism is the existence of a level playing field. 
This is not the case, for most of the developing world, especially not South 
Africa. Thus Neoliberal policies super-imposed on an existing apartheid-based 
framework, tends to further entrench these inequalities. 
Apart from the massive unemployment made incrementally worse by the global 
recession, there are several national questions that need to be addressed. The 
divisive ideology of apartheid created racially-based identities that were also 
framed as economic identities. In order to progress into a healthy democracy, 
South Africa needs to move to identifying with something of a national identity 
that is both cohesive and inclusive. National identity is linked to root growth 
rather than pockets of growth. This cannot occur if material conditions created by 
apartheid and further entrenched by neoliberalism, are so different for different 
parts of the populace. All aspects of information and communication (New media 
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technologies: NMTs) are overlaid on apartheid’s economic and geographic 
frameworks, thus all citizens do not share a common pool of information. This 
has consequences for the ideals of responsible citizenry, democracy and nation 
building, making meaningful transformation more difficult. While the constitution 
enshrines rights of access, and rights to produce media and the like, these ideals 
towards bridging the digital divide and universal access are legislated but 
simultaneously compromised by neoliberalism (Duncan 2007, 137). 
The role of government is crucial in a developing nation as regulation forms the 
key to ensuring transformation. As was the experience of 2008-9, governments 
particularly in the North Atlantic region played a crucial role in rectifying the 
effects of market failure by stabilizing the business cycle. Government also is key 
to the provision of essential direct services like health, education, safety and a 
climate of stability for job security and economic growth.  
Governments in the developing world surely have an onerous task providing a 
meaningful democracy for its entire citizenry. The citizens’ mandate requires 
stability, unity, peace and equality – essential ingredients for a progressive 
society. Thus developing-world governments must necessarily be service-driven, 
much more than market-driven.  
Lastly, neoliberalism has not had a proven track record in combating harmful 
competition, nor does the market generate counter-incentives for the scourge of 
bribery and corruption. South Africa particularly has been rocked by the rise of 
‘tenderpreneurship’.  
At the heart of the workings of neoliberalism is the corruption of concepts of 
liberty or freedom. Monbiot (2012, 31) explores this idea of the perversion of 
freedom by those who wish to exploit without restraint. Libertarianism was once 
a noble impulse but neoliberalism has made it synonymous with injustice. 
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Neoliberalism promotes free markets as a key driver of economic growth but 
what is always left by the wayside are key concerns around distributive justice, 
the environment, equity and other social issues:  
Modern libertarianism is the disguise adopted by those who wish to exploit 
without restraint. It pretends that only the state intrudes on our liberties. It 
ignores the role of banks, corporations and the rich in making us less free. It 
denies the need for the state to curb them in order to protect the freedoms 
of weaker people. This bastardised, one-eyed philosophy is a con trick, 
whose promoters attempt to wrong foot justice by pitching it against liberty. 
By this means, they have turned “freedom” into an instrument of oppression 
(ibid). 
  
Neoliberalism favours business, leaves its citizenry at the mercy of market forces 
and tends to relegate social delivery to charitable organizations and other 
benevolent bodies. The fundamental problem lies in the fact that the core 
character of neoliberalism is seldom normative in nature, servicing capital more 
than people, under the guise of “freedom”.  
Informationalism 
The information category 
When it comes to emergent notions of information, terminology is abundant with 
theorists rearticulating terms in order to unearth how meanings related to 
information are ideologically repositioned for mass adoption, consumption and 
consent (Hassan 2008, 35). Terms such as informationalism, credentialism, 
data, knowledge, technocracy, intelligence, surveillance and dataveillance are all 
richly rearticulated with ideologies unearthed for scrutiny; therefore information 
deserves some attention as a theoretical category.  
Awareness of information as a category developed traction post world war two. 
This may be attributed to the advances in communication technology as well as 
in the mathematical and allied scientific fields. In 1948-9 Claude Shannon wrote 
The Mathematic Theory of Communication in which he outlined that information 
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was the quantitative measure of communicative exchanges, clarifying further that 
information was the resolution of uncertainty created by distortions as messages 
were transmitted over communication hardware of the era. This radical 
redefinition of the concept of information (as compared to more qualitative pre-
existing meanings) took firm root in the communication industry when new 
networks of communication were being developed, as the primary occupation 
was the measurement of communication, or bits of information, which had to 
then be matched to appropriate bandwidth with enough carrying capacity. “The 
information resource in short, is different in kind from other resources...Not 
subject to the laws of thermodynamics, information is expandable, compressible, 
substitutable, transportable, leaky, and shareable. These inherent 
characteristics, Cleveland argues, ‘divulge the vital clue to information’s 
mounting economic importance” (Cleveland in Schiller 2007, 7). 
Schiller asks, ‘What if, however, we suppose that information in not inherently 
valuable? What if only a profound social reorganisation can permit information to 
become valuable?’ (2007, 7) He proceeds to explain that information ideologues 
in economic theory created a supposedly new field and with it an analytical 
distance from history or the contested terrain of lived experience. In this sense 
information as a post-industrial economic category was reified with the scientific 
accents of value neutrality, the promise of progress and endowed with 
technological determinism (2007, 7 – 28).  
Schiller argues that when information is taken on as a commodity form, its study 
necessitates the inclusion of historical context, material culture, individual 
experience, and hidden power relations, basically all the things post-industrial 
information excludes. Following the dot.com boom in the 1990’s, information 
became increasingly central to the production and distribution cycle of capital. As 
big US companies expanded into information-type business, otherwise known as 
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‘information resource management’ (Schiller 2007, 3), the notion of information 
took on particular importance in the cycle of capital. Heralded as the catalyst to 
reinvigorating a sluggish world market, information evolved into a commodity.  
The panopticon 
The panopticon, emerging from Jeremy Bentham’s moral reformist thinking in the 
late 1700s, was energised by Michel Foucault (2001) to focus on modern 
hierarchies and infrastructures of control. Bentham famously conceived of a 
prison structure in the round, many cells packed next to each other, above and 
below, with the only illuminating feature being the guard house (or controller’s 
space) in the centre. The lights illuminating the central controller’s space are 
meant to render any prisoners’ vision of it hazy and indistinguishable. As a result, 
prisoners would only ever be able to assume the presence of an all seeing eye 
(the guard) as opposed to actually perceiving the guards. Bentham’s idea was to 
create certain psychological conditions of self-regulation without the added cost 
of too many extra guards. Nothing really came of Bentham’s designs until 
Foucault resurrected it for modern application. Foucault (Rabinow 2001, 451) 
argues for the “trap of visibility”, i.e. where modernist preoccupations were with 
capital expansion to the global markets, post modernism sought to rationalise the 
modern nation state – especially the control of its citizenry. Current surveillance 
theorists argue that the trap of visibility is created by informational mechanisms 
of hardware, software and hegemony. Schiller states that the ‘means of 
anchoring mobile connectivity to an increasingly authoritarian capitalism via 
location based tracking of individuals has already been glimpsed...We are 
moving from batches of information about operations to continuous 
visibility…Surveillance practises are likewise being chillingly extended and 
normalized’ (Schiller 2007, 172-173). The current panopticon is digital in nature; 
end users occupy and populate their individual devices which are connected to 
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centralised hierarchies of power. There are possibilities for scrutiny of individuals’ 
digital activities from within the hierarchies of power, but no possibility of 
individuals returning the gaze. Scrutiny takes the form of locating consumers or 
dissenters; the former perhaps more benign than the latter which unequivocally 
embodies the threat of force.  
Whitaker (1999) argues that intelligence gathering has been going on for 
centuries (the second oldest profession); in the defence of nation states, 
monarchies and governments would gather information covertly about bordering 
nations’ intentions, arms and ammunitions. He distinguishes between 
intelligence as a by-product of mental effort and ‘intelligence’ as a systematic 
and purposeful acquisition, sorting, retrieval, interpretation and protection of 
information. He insists that ‘intelligence’ is necessarily covert and protected, 
predicated on hostility while intelligence is more open source and works on a 
competitive but co-operative model (1999, 8). Whitaker argues further that the 
outward ‘intelligence’ gathering gaze of nation states has now turned inward 
partly as a result of the digital infrastructure affording it these possibilities. There 
has never been the possibility of having access to an entire nation state until the 
birth and evolution of informational infrastructures. Information or intelligence no 
longer needs to be covertly sought. Ironically it is tacitly surrendered by end 
users. While this intelligence is more robustly used by marketing companies 
seeking more consumers and sometimes a better understanding of consumptive 
practices, citizens are also subject to infringements by power brokers in different 
ways. These kinds of information practices are referred to as ‘dataveillance’.   
Morozov (2011, 143 – 178) indicates that surveillance or ‘intelligence’ 
organisations are particularly keen for the individual’s consumption of social 
media as social media sites are incredibly efficient at collecting information about 
individuals, groups, trends and even moods. The added bonus is that the 
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technology is cheap as opposed to the expensive older forms of surveillance 
technology needing extensive hardware and monitors (people). 
Apart from the intrusive nature of a panopticon state, Køien and Oleshchuk 
(2011, 85 – 98) emphasize the importance of personal privacy in the face of an 
increasingly sophisticated ‘informational intruder’. They compare the intruder of 
two decades ago to the one operating a decade ago to current intruders and they 
project into the future (2020) that cellular systems will face a number of different 
kinds of attackers and adversaries: “in 2020 we expect the power of the intruder 
to have grown significantly”. Moore29’s law alone would give an increase in 
processing power by about 256 times (2011, 85). Hence they argue that the 
system architecture must provide firm support for personal privacy.  
Drahos and Braithwaithe (2002, 150) question ownership patterns in the 
information society and imagine a sort of feudal order in which biogopolies and 
infogopolies predominate. The main tendencies are to secure monopoly (or 
cartel) control of knowledge that is related in some way or form to commerce and 
to reduce the cost of intellectual property rights to industry. Drahos and 
Braithwaithe refer to the chemical cartels like Monsanto and the entertainment 
cartels that restrict trade and engage in price fixing. ‘The authority and coercive 
apparatus of the criminal law is brought in to legitimate a morality of ownership 
which completely ignores the communal origins and value of knowledge’ (Drahos 
and Braithwaithe 2002, 186).         
Feenberg explores the process of technocratic legitimation in social life.  
Technology need not impose a specific value based ideology vulnerable to 
critique on factual grounds. Rather it relies on consensus (social cohesion 
depends on technical prescriptions as social life is mediated by 
technological objects) that emerges spontaneously out of technical rules 
and tasks in modern organisations. Meanwhile, the underlying technical 
framework is sheltered from challenge. Technocracy thus succeeds in 
                                               
29 See page 17 - 18. 
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masking its valuative bias behind the facade of pure technical rationality 
(Feenberg 1999, 102-103).  
Morozov (2011) extends Feenberg’s point as he refers to the tensions that arise 
out of the technocratic “solutionism” aggressively promoted by Silicon Valley 
(Listening post, 21 July 2013). He states that it is important to remember that not 
all social problems need technocratic solutions. Philip refers to this as a 
‘valorized dialect’ (2000, 13). Philip states that capital is involved in the valorized 
dialects of law, politics and now technocracy (2000, 13). These dialects 
legitimate expertise and expertise legitimates power in society (2000, 18). 
Therefore it becomes vital to challenge such ideologies by unearthing the 
subterranean discourses of individual use of cellular telephony as it relates to 
issues of commodification, privacy, intellectual property rights, the panopticon 
and finally what I loosely refer to as an information commons.  
Normative Challenges 
Normative questions 
Held et al raise two issues which are highly pertinent to our purposes: 
First, while the processes of globalization may be uniting the globe 
physically, it is not necessarily inculcating a sense of global community and 
citizenship, a prerequisite for any future democratic global government. 
Second, what kind of politics is required in the emerging global order? 
(2002, 11) 
To answer Held, we must look to the global and local normative discourses30. 
The UN Millennium development goals31 demonstrate an authentic will by the 
participating nations to address inequity across the globe. The goals focus on 
supporting and sustaining the implementation of pro-poor polices, which would 
include:  
                                               
30 These discourses were dealt with in the literature review.  
31 The millennium development goals refer to an initiative by the United Nations Development 
programme which garnered support from 189 nations to commit achieving eight development goals by 
the year 2015.  
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improved material conditions for everyone; greater equity in access to the 
world’s natural resources and wealth; improved realization of human rights, 
freedom and security; improved choices, self-determination and power to 
influence one’s own life and conditions; and sustainability (Warnock, 
Schoemaker and Wilson – Web 89).  
The normative values of the communications industry are complex because as 
was mentioned earlier, media is not exactly like any other business. The social 
responsibility imperatives which legitimate its existence mandate media 
industries to meet certain “civic” obligations. The flux of change in technologies 
and the organization of business itself complicate the nature of the social 
obligation and regulation. A few foundational premises pertain though, one of 
which is that Communication is a basic human right.  
The Millennium development agenda acknowledges the strong role 
communication can play in achieving the eight goals. Thus media industries have 
to cognize this basic right and view the supply of adequate media products within 
this framework. Perhaps another way of envisioning communication rights is in 
protecting the industry by forming a counter- point to the over-arching tendency 
towards a rationalization of communication to only capital’s ends. Robert Reich 
asks,  
So who is us? ... Neither the profitability of a nation’s corporations nor the 
successes of its investors necessarily improve the standard of living of most 
of the nation’s citizens. They are becoming disconnected from their home 
nations (Mosco 1996, 180). 
Mosco goes on to clarify that the question of whether companies retain a 
national base for the advantage of “preferential legal, regulatory and investment 
policies” is less relevant, “because, from a societal viewpoint, the issue is not 
where is the base, but, wherever it is, do companies create jobs, produce 
socially useful products and services, and can their behaviour be regulated in the 
public interest?” (Mosco 1996, 181) 
While business has been rocked by unsteady waves of mergers and alliances, 
coupling and decoupling, it is important to note the important place of the media 
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industries. These industries (while separate business entities in themselves) 
provide the crucial hardware, software and marketing expertise to move products 
to potential consumers. In a way, the media industries form the gateways of the 
“global electronic services marketplace” (1996, 194). Thus there still lurks the 
danger of monopolization where a tight oligopoly controls the flow of 
communication, information and entertainment. Jeffrey Chester of the Center for 
Media Education (quoted in Mosco), states: “Unless there is a public outcry and 
it becomes a populist issue, we won’t be able to prevent these media monopolies 
from controlling the paths to the home” (ibid). This control effectively translates 
into control over the very communications messages that enter our homes.  
A quick example of what Chester is referring to is the phenomenon of ‘electronic 
red-lining’ which describes a process where cable companies set up and allocate 
a greater provision for bandwidth in affluent areas only, and a much smaller 
capacity for poorer areas (if at all). This is a sort of infrastructural marginalization 
that becomes more apparent when one takes a closer look at spatial 
agglomeration.  
In South Africa the residual effect of apartheid geography lingers as a sort of 
collateral damage, an automatic marginalization of non-nodes of power. Red-
lining technology manifests across the rural-urban divide and also within the 
urban areas splitting the affluent from the urban poor. This technological 
geography as it were is only further complicated by an in-built exclusion of areas 
needing basic services first – who rather than leap-frogging play into an eternal 
catch-up. Cell phones by far have held the greatest promise for leap-frogging 
within these marginalized areas, but connectivity and capacity remains poorer. In 
such areas other complications that manifest is recurring cable theft. Illicit 
companies dealing in the use of copper for sale or other purposes often pay 
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locals for copper wiring embedded in fixed line cables32. Known instances of 
recurring cable theft have occurred in the Inanda (specifically lower Inanada) 
area of Durban – KwaZulu-Natal; in Giyani (near Polokwane) – the Northern 
Province and the Midlands in KwaZulu-Natal (Magubane 2012).  
Though in different provinces and quite far apart, these two regions share a rural 
texture and consequently an erratic connectivity. Cell phone reception was 
reported to be very poor in these regions and therefore did not contribute much 
to alleviate the problem of basic first generation connectivity (The Witness 2012, 
6). One set of respondents from the Inanda area complained that the consistent 
lack of connectivity as a result severely limited their domestic communication 
and also their business activity – being small scale vegetable farmers. 
Respondents from the Giyani region worked at a local school. Apart from the day 
to day administration and management of the school, curriculum and curriculum 
development were negatively affected as teachers were unable to access the 
internet or teach basic literacy classes. Here again, cell phone reception 
remained patchy, erratic and unclear. One can also presume that the lack of 
domestic connectivity in the region resulted in frustration and perhaps limited 
business transactions as well.  
A Midlands farmer reported that cable theft occurred four times in one year which 
resulted in a repair bill of R 86 000 (Ngqulunga, 2012). In the Underberg, Bulwer, 
Ixopo and Highflats area (Midlands, KwaZulu-Natal) approximately five 
kilometers of telephone cabling was stolen. The Telkom spokesperson did not 
respond to e-mails and did not answer his phone when affected citizens 
attempted to get some clarity on how to resolve this ongoing problem. 
Respondents in these affected regions state that the lack of connectivity has 
                                               
32 The researcher gathered data from a basic interview with respondents from these areas as these 
respondents were available for comment on the issue.   
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become a mounting problem that fixed line monopoly (Telkom) refuses to 
address.  
The source said that affected people would have a lengthy wait to have their 
phone lines restored, depending on where they were (Magubane 2012). 
A farmer in the Howick area said phone cables to his farm were stolen a 
year ago and Telkom told him it would not be replacing the lines. “We are 
really battling. We can’t do anything, and even our Internet service is very 
poor” (Magubane 2012). 
 
This small piece of seemingly anecdotal evidence does not imply that the 
problem of cable theft is limited only to the two locations of Giyani and Inanda. 
The researcher did not have more resources to investigate other rural regions 
more thoroughly. Given the attendant problems of poverty in rural areas and a 
desperate need for some means of survival, the offer of purchase from 
opportunistic though illegal copper related industries in these areas have created 
an environment ripe for recurrent cable theft.  
As reports indicate, the fixed line (very nearly) monopoly Telkom refuses to 
address the problem. The effect is the structurally embedded cultivation of a 
freshly marginalized class referred to as Data trash, “made up of the discarded 
groups in any culture who are not connected to the new structures and machines 
of information” (Marshall 2004, 35).  
There is a banding of the middle classes in many countries that begins to 
resemble their counterparts in other parts of the world. The experience of 
new media culture in the way we have described it is fundamentally banded 
and branded with this socio-economic divide (Marshall 2004, 35). 
In attempting to construct normative values it becomes apparent that these 
values are tied into (perhaps aggravated by) economic systems and economic 
tides. In articulating values, policy must also articulate the various contexts that 
frustrate the achievement of these values.  Another aspect that impinges on 
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normative values is that of space due to its ability to define and shape human 
experience.  
Space 
The quality of time and space are so mutually dependent. It is difficult to speak of 
one without inadvertently constituting the other. Spatial agglomeration simply put 
refers to urbanization, and the way in which space is divided into economic and 
political hubs which seem to control the vast ‘other spaces’ responsible mainly 
for agricultural production and other types of ‘early manufacture’. The information 
and communication revolution being not so time and space bound held the 
promise of destroying barriers of time and space, reducing centralized nodes of 
power, and thereby heralding a new dispersed equilibrium of connectivity across 
the globe. However the promise of decentralization remains unrealized. Mosco 
states:  
In addition to corporate restructuring, changes in the spatial patterning of 
business activity also prompt a rethinking of business concentration. 
Specifically, and contrary to forecasts that telecommunication would 
necessarily decentralize business activity, the concentration of business 
activity in New York, London, Tokyo, and other international cities provides 
grounds for thinking about spatial agglomeration as a major form of 
business activity (Mosco 1996, 199). 
Mosco thus extends the thought around corporate concentration to spatial 
agglomeration and proximity. While proximity only brings with it the possibility of 
connectedness, isolation or remoteness certainly guarantees little or no 
possibilities for networks and for such connections to flourish as a there is no 
conducive environment. This has implications for governance as those sectors 
falling outside of the “power-geometries” or “economic-political nodes” would 
need very careful regulation in order to guard against further marginalization that 
would naturally occur due to these sectors lack of ready or easy access to, 
among others, information, connectedness to lobbying groups (political power), 
and the means of self-definition.  
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Spatial agglomeration, as well as ownership agglomeration, is a significant 
form of business concentration. It brings together companies, whether 
connected or unconnected by ownership ties, in dense networks of 
producers, suppliers, and customers whose mutual dependence, 
consolidated geographically in global cities and dispersed electronically 
across the globe, creates significant forms of concentrated economic power 
(Mosco 1996, 199). 
The significance of ‘concentrated economic power’ becomes apparent when one 
witnesses MNCs exerting a strong influence over government via direct 
injections of cash or striking favourable business collusions. This influence is in 
the main to loosen the hold on tight regulatory frameworks and potential 
enforcement. The significance of concentration of economic power manifests 
further in the divergence of individual experience itself. The spatial divide is an 
extension of the digital divide – the result being vastly different experiences of 
space. For example for the more upwardly mobile knowledge worker in the IT 
field there is automatic access to a virtual world which abounds in ease, 
convenience and the various capacities to recast her/his identity in the digital 
space via social networking and other such sites.  
These conveniences range from banking to purchasing groceries to selling used 
goods, arranging travel, mobility with work and even searching for work. Such an 
individual is also privileged in the global workforce and gains geographic mobility 
as s/he possesses skills that are sought after. As a result her/his identity is 
recast from migrant worker to guest worker, which has implications on ease of 
mobility into and out of nation states. Depending on how one is cast, the 
experience of migrancy could be traumatic coupled with time-consuming queues 
at home affairs departments or alternatively work permits being fast-tracked by 
government offices privileging particular types of workers. In which case, the 
experience of migrancy would be relatively quick, trouble and queue free! This 
kind of daily experience of access to digital space lies in stark contrast to one 
locked out of the virtual world, perhaps having at most cellular connectivity for 
basic first generation telephony. An example could be a domestic, refugee or 
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migrant worker who must battle queues for each and every one of the 
transactions mentioned above and there is little or no possibility of engaging in 
any kind of identity reconstruction in the virtual space. There are success stories 
but these are largely anomalous as they reflect the exception to the rule as 
opposed to mainstream experience.  
Vast differences of experiences are not necessarily negative in themselves. 
However, if a population is divided in terms of access to the knowledge pool i.e. 
that certain people have access to certain types of (more valuable) information 
while others remain locked out, this muddies the possibility of a more cohesive 
society as the experience of space is so vastly divergent. Another aspect 
relevant to the developing context is that if differences of experiences are a 
result of inequality, one cannot really anticipate social cohesion.  
Therefore the idea of communication as a human right must expanded. The 
provision of basic telephony is certainly a start but there must be a strong 
commitment by policy makers, development agencies and civil society groups to 
extend the idea of the basic right to communication to wider access to the 
(national) knowledge pool.  
Duncan locates the answer to the question of a cohesive nation in broadcasting; 
however, her sentiments echo across the communication media – to telephony 
and all its potential:  
The protection and enhancement of broadcasting should not be undertaken 
merely for gratuitous reasons: they have a crucially important role to play in 
South African life. Ongoing inequities with respect to media access have led 
to accusations that South Africans do not share a common pool of 
information: there are, in effect, ‘information haves’ and ‘information have-
nots’ living together in the same country. The development of a common 
nationhood rests on the removal of these and other, disparities. In South 
Africa, it has been controversial to speak of ‘the nation’ on any level, as it 
has been prevented from coming into being by statutes defining and 
separating different ‘races’, ‘national cultures’ or ethnic identities. These 
identities have been used by apartheid ideologues to argue that South 
Africa actually consists of a constellation of nations. It has long been 
recognized that these apartheid-fostered identities have been intimately tied 
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up with economic wealth and oppression, as structures of patronage and 
privilege have depended on their continued existence. As a result, only a 
radical nation building project that removes these class inequalities will 
ensure the coming into being of a truly South African nation: the goal that 
millions of South Africans struggled for and many died for…It should almost 
go without saying that the national question cannot be resolved without 
people having the ability to communicate with one another (Duncan 2007, 2-
3).    
Duncan argued further that the achievement of this kind of access would serve 
national cohesion, as it is currently impossible for a society to be stable and solid 
when there are such vast differentials across earnings, lifestyle and access to 
information and communication. The experience of one respondent 
(Sewchurran, personal interview) is particularly pertinent. This domestic worker 
lives in a small village near New Hanover. The village is of course rural with at 
most a thousand people. In this village nobody can afford laptops or other 
communication devices except that of cell phones. This village has electricity but 
no fixed line connectivity. Cell phones are used extensively even though the 
network is patchy and erratic. This remains so simply because the tendency of 
communication companies is to focus dominant attention on commercial rather 
than domestic clients. This is exacerbated by the assumption that these 
particular clients would only be able to afford and therefore only need basic first 
generation connectivity. Access affects the entire range of human experience 
and potential. As was stated earlier, space is inextricably linked to time and 
consequently labour. These two concepts will be explored together given their 
relation.      
Time and Labour 
Shifts in spatial dimensions after globalization and the communication revolution 
occurred as a result of capital managing the constraint of space, or more 
precisely, reducing the constraint of space on labour and the circuit of capital 
(see page 112). Understanding the changing experience of time is rather tricky in 
that it is relative - located in specific experiences, and coded by the individual 
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mental climate. However, there are shifts in the general notions of time as we 
enter what Harvey (1989) refers to as a new ‘accelerated’ wave of time-space 
compression.  
The early notions of time were perhaps related to marking seasonal and climatic 
changes which evolved together with closely aligned religious rituals. With 
capitalism, time becomes central to labour productivity, with Taylorism (later 
Fordism) and even Stalinism. In 1929, Stalin attempted to increase productivity 
and reduce ritual religious observances by introducing an uninterrupted work 
week with a rest day every six days. On the Western side, Taylor introduced the 
almost mechanistic, scientific organization of work based on measuring working 
time to the smallest movement in the assembly line. Fordist thinking tested and 
improved this idea by increasing productivity by work being reduced to the 
repetition of smaller movements in the assembly line (Web 23).  
Both Eastern bloc and Western thought focused on the constraint of time, 
seeking to master it towards the end of greater productivity. These were perhaps 
the early moves from time as a signifier of experience to time as source of 
economic value and as a resource to be managed. This shift proved crucial to 
industrial capitalism. Needless to say, labour was inextricably linked to the 
evolving notions of time and time had to be reconceived in order to free up 
labour from rest, leisure, spiritual or other activity which had no direct relation to 
productivity (ibid).  
The next major shift occurred in the changes signified by clock to digital time. 
Clock time seemed to signify modernity and a twelve hour reality dictating work 
patterns. Digital time seemed to signify post-modernity: a twenty-four hour 
number representation which together with the telecoms revolution unlocked the 
twenty-four hour virtual (work-leisure) space. Here again, leisure or rest time is 
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freed up as it were and recoded for the possibility of productive time. As the 
twelve hour clock goes digital, work cycles are increasingly blurred and 
communication technology frees up space so as to make possible anytime 
anywhere communication which translates into anytime anywhere work (ibid).  
Leisure or respite is more encroached on and the work cycle is increasingly 
blurred across a new twenty four hour day. Advertising of technology in particular 
demonstrates or rather promotes this unabashedly. Wireless, seamless 
connectivity is accompanied by appropriate portable machinery to support it. The 
familiar scenes across the advertising space is an individual fishing in a tranquil 
setting while also having a laptop or tablet on to watch over work related issues 
like checking the stock market or being at some fabled holiday destination with 
family and never being out of touch because of the use of a Blackberry or some 
interchangeable device. Such advertising portrays the ease and convenience of 
connectivity that unlocks the global market place from one’s bedroom while other 
harsh productive realities remain hidden.  
While time and space are reduced as constraints of capital and it appears to free 
up labour for anytime anywhere productivity, there are great pressures and great 
uncertainties with the new imperative of flexible labour. In the new globalized 
configuration labour takes on a new individualized flexibility promoted in the garb 
of ease, convenience and power; but in reality an old configuration is recreated: 
the surplus pool of labour Marx talked of over a century ago which he asserted 
was necessary for both for the circuit of capital and the extension of capital (Web 
24).  
Neo-marxist feminists in particular utilized Marx’s thesis to good end. They 
applied capital’s need to create a surplus pool of labour to be pulled in during 
high demand and pushed out when not needed to the great wars. During world 
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war two women were pulled in to the workforce (even munitions factories) as 
most of the traditional male work force was engaged in warfare. This was 
ideologically encouraged by the themes of ‘standing by your man’ and promoting 
imagery of strong women in the service of their country (Web 25).  
Post-war saw soldiers returned to a market place flush with labour. Thus there 
needed to be a very strong directive to push women (who served as the flexible 
component of labor) back into the domestic sphere and out of the work force. 
This was achieved via the resurgence of traditional notions of femininity and the 
negative construction of independent, strong women for example cast in the 
image of the cinematic femme fatale. These films in different ways identified 
strong, independent women finally as dangerous women and represented a 
strong push towards family values highlighting the primacy of the domestic role 
for women (Web 26).  
Labor having taken on the pressures of individualized flexibility, now also must 
deal with the demands of twenty four hour access or reach-ability/availability. 
This kind of flexibility of labour is needed to service just-in-time markets (J.I.T). 
This further reduces the constraint of labour on the extension of capital.  
If in the not so distant past, time signified economic value; now profit making 
depends on it. The new imperatives of this wave of time-space compression are 
speed and seamless connectivity. Connectivity points to a range of platforms 
such as different technologies (made possible by convergence); different nation 
states; different languages and cultures and different economies. However, with 
this level of seamless connectivity, different economies are being rationalized 
into a unified global economy. The new market, sometimes referred to as the 
currency market, exhibits split second capital transactions which determine huge 
monetary gain or loss:     
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Capital is shuttled back and forth between economies in a matter of hours, 
minutes and sometimes seconds. The electronic casino – the currency 
market where computer wizards and financial analysts play games with 
millions of dollars – enabled by deregulation, the opening up of domestic 
financial markets and a sophisticated ICT network (investment banks, 
pension fund managers, multinational corporations) (Giroux 2011, 102). 
Contrary to any gloriously optimistic visions of globalization and its concomitant 
compressions, the implications of this kind of financially based connectivity and 
speed are harsh. The 2008-9 crash is a most recent example of recurrent 
monetary crises, which have wreaked havoc with the stability of companies; 
employment stability; and investment and pension fund stability. Labour is hard 
hit by this kind of ‘global gambling’ as jobs are lost without any relation to 
performance.  
These developments are part of a wider process in which companies adopt 
new organizational structures that combine the power to command 
resources and the flexibility to respond to changing markets. According to 
the economic geographer David Harvey (1989, 147), this form of 
restructuring rests on flexibility with respect to labour process, labour 
markets, products and patterns of consumption…Finally, it leads to what he 
calls a new round of ‘time-space compression’ – the time horizons for 
decision makers shrink while declining transport and communication costs 
make it possible to spread decisions over a wider and more diverse space 
(Mosco 1996, 198). 
This new virtual / digital time therefore not only cultivates flexi-time and variable 
work hours but also shrinks the ‘time horizons’ in which key decision makers 
must determine the framework of the future. Life-cycles are blurred by 
compression and technology that may be used to escape constraints of time-
space itself. Digital time affords the privileged few the capacity to almost escape 
time.  
However there remains serious marginalization caused by time-space 
compression. Invisibility in economic terms seems to also translate into invisibility 
in terms of new time-space constructions. Digital time appears to be forward 
looking. Those excluded from the digital economy appear to live in the, “…‘no-
time’ of starvation economies where the need for sustenance that is just not 
available is the over-riding concern” (Paehlke 2003, 59). Global warming and 
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climate change complicates this experience of time which follows subsistence 
farming according to seasonal changes. The looming crisis in terms of food 
security is a critical issue; however for the purpose of this thesis, pursuing this 
line would fall more under the political economy of the environment.  
Unevenness of experience: the speed and intensity of the digital era forces 
us to look more and more to the future, while the poorest sections of the 
global economy are forced backwards to pre-industrial – agrarian culture: 
time is the daily struggle for survival (Paehlke 2003, 60).  
With the variables of time, space and labour, one observes a rationalization 




Spatialization theory necessarily involves much of the debates within the vast 
field of globalization. However, it does remain relevant offering key terms and 
units of analysis which operationalize spatialization and some aspects of 
globalization theory.  
Spatialization as a term intuitively implies a focus on understanding space as it 
relates to human dynamics. Many theorists have explored the spatial aspects of 
power and control over the flow of information and communication. An extension 
of this is the idea of understanding how capital diminishes factors constraining its 
expansion. Some theorists argue that space has been annihilated, others argue 
that is has been transformed. Mosco once stated that media studies as a field 
must borrow unashamedly from other more established disciplines (AMIC 
Conference: 13 July, 2009). This is quite apparent when looking at the roots of 
spatialization theory, as it was crossover geographers and sociologists who 
developed the early literature on space and communication. Perhaps Marx is the 
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earliest radical political economist, whose thesis on capital and space retains a 
certain currency, condensed in his famous, oft quoted observation: Capitalism’s 
tendency is to annihilate space with time (Web 24). 
In the phenomenon of globalization, while time and space appear condensed, 
the most significant site of investigation is that of transforming productive 
relations. The decline of physical space gives way to what Castells’s calls (2000, 
406-409) ‘space of flows’. This refers to, “the deployment of the functional logic 
of power-holding organisations in asymmetrical networks of exchanges which do 
not depend on the characteristics of any specific locale for the fulfilment of 
fundamental goals”. The ‘space of flows’ are essentially arranged around 
information-generating units and communication systems. Telecommunication 
industries are the primary drivers of the ‘space of flows’, which necessitate the 
intersection of technology and finance. These complex spatial, technological and 
financial relations could be related to Massey’s ‘power-geometries’ (Mosco 1996, 
174). Within the ‘space of flows’, power-holding organizations consolidate and 
expand their reach through various forms of concentration. Corporate 
concentration raises particular concerns for the developing regions, as it tends to 
promote anti-competitive behaviour, which ultimately affects end users in a 
negative way.  
Conversely, concentration is said to have some advantages when industries are 
able to create benefit from economies of scale33. It is further argued that natural 
monopolies34 become the default position as they remain the only players 
capable of costly role out to under-serviced areas. It remains to be seen what 
                                               
33 Economies of scale refer to the economic advantage of the increase in scale or quantity of production 
resulting in a decrease in average per unit cost. 
34 Natural monopolies refer to the scenario where a company exists as a single supplier of a commodity 
or service. This may be as a result of successful economies of scale, making it difficult for other players 
to enter the market. It could also be as a result of being an ex-government owned utility which had 
resources other new players would have access to, thus making entry into the market difficult.  
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balance between monopolies and competition best suits service provision for the 
end user in the telecoms sector.  
It is important to note that development states are invariably not socialist states; 
hence development agendas must fit neoliberal frameworks, co-opted into the 
dominant hegemony as part of the marginalized discourse. As Harvey pointed 
out, “institutions and practices of the state have been transformed to attune to 
the needs and interests of the neoliberal market economy” (Harvey in Ritzer 
2010, 104). Therefore it is ineffective to consider socialist models which do not 
encourage competition and diversity. As neoliberalism remains the dominant 
ideology, it must be evaluated in terms of its own assertions of competition and 
diversity.  
Corporate structure and behaviour 
Political economists focus on “ownership as the primary defining element in 
media concentration” (Mosco 1996, 182). The seeming obsession with media 
ownership patterns is simply because concentrated ownership could affect the 
nature and circulation of information. Corporate concentration occurs in a variety 
of ways, with the aim of establishing some sort of competitive advantage that 
would allow the organization the capacity for cross-subsidization; a 
rationalization of operations; the benefits of economies of scale and scope35; and 
more control over the potentially volatile variables involved in production and 
distribution (Web 27).  
The more formal relationships are commonly identified as vertical, horizontal and 
diagonal integration. The less formal relationships are categorized as synergies; 
strategic alliances; direct and indirect interlocks; and teaming arrangements. 
Within the South African context the concepts of fronting, poaching and 
                                               
35 Economies of scope refer to the decrease in average production costs as a supplier diversifies in the 
range of products or services. 
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allocative and operational control have become extremely significant factors to 
consider when examining concentrations. 
Another aspect that compounds / complicates the issue of concentration is the 
disputes that occur over definitions. Seen by some as more than neutral 
descriptors, these definitions are evaluated in terms of the ideological weight 
invested in them, thus foregrounding their contribution to hegemony. “For Schiller 
(1993), ‘synergy’ is a glossy term for corporate control over the entirety of 
consumer images and a product…‘Synergy’, is formulated for its public relations, 
as much as for its analytical, value” (Mosco 1996, 192). These issues will be 
unpacked in the policy section of the theoretical framework. For now, I have 
adopted Mosco’s definitions as a standard set of political economy terminology 
as he discusses in great detail the ‘ideological (and practical) weight’ behind 
each term.     
Horizontal concentration refers to the strategy of industry to consolidate 
ownership and control of similar businesses. A local example is Media24 (a 
major media company in South Africa) acquiring a local newspaper, The Witness 
(Web 28). Media24 has a string of newspapers apart from other related media 
businesses. Mosco asserts that horizontal concentration can also refer to when 
“a firm in one line of media buys a major interest in another media operation, not 
directly related to the original business, or when it takes a major stake in a 
company entirely outside of the media”36 (Mosco 1996, 175 - 193). 
Vertical integration refers to the way industry seeks to control all the variables in 
the process of production. This activity is further clarified as forward and 
backward integration. An example of backward integration would be when the 
New York Times bought paper mills in Quebec. Forward integration refers to 
                                               
36 A local example of this phenomenon could be when the banking sector integrated with internet 
companies in order to offer online banking etc.  
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when industry expands further along the circuit of production. Finally a strategic 
alliance unites businesses in a variety of ways. Businesses could merge or 
specific units of these businesses could come together for one or more projects 
without any change in the ownership pattern (Mosco 1996, 175 - 193). 
While vertical and horizontal integration, strategic alliances and synergies 
highlight formal relations between corporates, other forms of consolidation also 
occur. These are ‘teaming arrangements, corporate partnerships and 
merchandising agreements’.  Merchandising agreements refer to the 
connections that grow out of the joint marketing of media and other hitherto 
unrelated products. Other agreements expand advertising through ‘product 
placement’ and links promoting media products like films or music to disparate 
products.37 Mosco argues that these arrangements also work towards 
consolidating corporate power into nodes or networks (Mosco 1996, 194). 
The legalistic and economic schools tend to view concentrations in more easily 
measurable terms. That is to examine ownership in and of itself, and to link this 
concept of ownership to a measure of diversity in the market. Thus 
concentrations are measured in terms of market share. The changing nature of 
media businesses have led some theorists to renounce this as a ‘mechanistic 
and narrow view’ riddled with some serious inadequacies. Media industries have 
always been seen as businesses with a difference due to the normative 
imperatives underlying their existence. Wasko (quoted by Mosco) indicates that 
market share measures are certainly easier to accomplish, however they reveal 
little in terms of qualitative diversity:  
A broader conception of concentration takes into account the market, but 
shifts attention to the degree of ownership concentration that enables firms 
to make use of resources based on operations in a range of markets. 
Moreover, it shifts the focus from the sheer multiplicity of product to its 
                                               
37 A local, current example of this could be the local KFC and the promotion that was done with the local 
band The Parletones. 
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diversity. For example, this approach weighs more heavily the ability of 
Manhattan Cable, the unit of Time Warner that provides cable television to 
part of New York City, to draw on the resources of the various divisions of 
the parent company for product, financing, and political lobbying power. 
Manhattan Cable is thereby a fundamentally different firm from one that 
lacks these connections. Yet, for the purpose of a market-specific analysis, 
it is treated like any other discretely owned entity. Moreover, the broader 
form of concentration analysis shifts attention from the sheer number of 
conduits into a market, to the diversity of content provided by whatever 
number of channels. It follows from this view that one cable firm with an 
ownership monopoly in a market, but also with a wide range of different 
voices reflected in its various channels, constitutes less concentration than 
a market with several newspapers that, though under different ownership, 
offer essentially the same point of view.  Proponents of the broader view 
grant the difficulty of measuring such forms of concentration, but argue that 
the more narrow view, with its indices of market share, provides a 
mechanistic and inadequate barometer of concentration. Moreover, they 
also maintain that the narrower view falls short on how to expand access to 
the widest range of information and opinion, one of the major policy goals of 
concentration analysis (Mosco 1996, 183 - 185). 
Towards the end of a more qualitative concentration analysis, the focus is shifted 
to the corporate board of directors as the primary movers of a company’s 
direction. The power of a business is largely vested in the board of directors and 
the allocative decisions made in this forum. Allocative control refers to the power 
to determine the direction and the overall policy and goals of the organization. 
This is often distinguished from operational control, which refers to a lower level 
of power vested in middle managers who would manage the day to day running 
of a company. A further distinction lies in the differential power base of “inside 
members” and “outside members”. Insiders are part of management while 
outsiders could be executives from allied industries and rarely include members 
from civil society.   
Mosco (1996, 189) refers to “direct and indirect interlocks” which links firms via 
common board membership, in the first case with one company on the board of 
another; and in the second case, via joint membership on a third board. The 
more crucial spaces, also more difficult to penetrate, are the “nodes in networks 
of class power”. These are professional associations, clubs, golf courses 
(popular in South Africa) and social organizations that require entry fees that are 
prohibitively high. These effectively exclude other members of society that may 
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well have a vested interest in the deals that are brokered in this space. “This 
texture, made up of the many daily occasions for contact and interaction, gives 
concentration the quality of hegemony, a taken-for-granted belief in the right to 
use power” (Mosco 1996, 189). 
Concentration across the globe allows companies to avail the advantage of 
flexible labour and currency fluctuations, while their vertical and horizontal 
integration affords them unprecedented economic control. However, the 
‘conglomerate form’, while displaying signs of immense flexibility also at times 
displays the bureaucratic rigidity of large institutions. The over-reliance of 
conglomerates on government and other loans, has led to debt-ridden 
institutions which is disquieting especially in the face of the global economic 
crises, where one questions the capacity of these conglomerates to survive the 
economic downturns.   
Mosco (1996, 179-180) argues that the conglomerate form, while wielding 
immense economic power, may not be the most ideal form in the ever rapidly 
changing business environment. Flexibility is key to responding to changing 
technologies, changing consumer demands and fluctuating markets, where “the 
pace of corporate restructuring, the process of formal and informal coupling and 
decoupling, has speeded up and become more unstable”.  
Another factor of flux is the state in which corporates operate. The role of the 
state has changed, with the traditional categories of regulation and policy 
apparatuses being eroded. This adds to the flux of change affecting business 
currently in progress toward the “global electronic services marketplace” (Mosco 
1996, 198). 
There is a tendency towards naturalizing business perspectives as if it exists 
only for its own end.  To counter-act this dominant tendency born out of a 
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neoliberal economic framework, political economy always anchors analyses of 
industry firmly within a normative framework (within normative values). These 
counter ideologies are taken up in the first part of the analysis section.  
3. Commodification 
If we were sensibly materialist, in that part of our living in which we pursue 
things, we should find most advertising to be of insane irrelevance. Beer 
would be enough for us, without the additional promise that in drinking it we 
show ourselves to be manly, young at heart, or neighbourly (Williams 2006). 
 
Commodities are central to the circuit of the modern capitalist economy. The 
cyclic nature of the exchange of commodities, leading to the realization of profit 
and re-investment of that profit into production of more commodities, only falters 
in the event of market crashes, wars or natural disasters. 








Commodities depend on a manipulation of use and exchange values. Use values 
refer to the value of an item strictly in relation to its use. Exchange values refer to 













from food for days but one would feel the adverse effects of abstaining from 
water for even a day. Water is vital for basic survival so it is high in terms of use 
value and relatively low in terms of exchange value. Conversely as a commodity 
perfume may not be high in terms of basic survival and hence use value but is 
high in terms of what it can fetch in the marketplace and hence it is high in 
exchange value. Marx referred to the distortion or manipulation of use value and 
exchange value as commodity fetishism.  
Needs, culture and ontology 
Marx focused on the priority of needs. He highlighted humanity’s need for more 
than physiological and subsistence satisfaction asserting that humanity 
possessed the unique quality for its own ontological self-realization and 
advancement through the production of its means to life. Marx also predicted that 
“although production rates would rise, so would the degree of alienation from our 
own human nature, from economic products, and from other social beings. In 
terms of individuals’ psychic condition, things would not get better, but would 
grow torturously worse” (Kelly 1994).   
Needs beyond that of basic physiological survival were understood as culture. 
Culture is not “just a symbolic echo of economic activity but a meaningful 
expression of human life and social relations” (Web 29). Culture therefore is an 
inextricable part of productive relations and the manifest expression of culture is 
the commodity or material artefact. Marx quoted by Mosco (1996, 122) argues 
that “the material artefact holds a central space in the determination of the 
ontological health of individuals and society generally.” 
In pre-capitalist societies the inherent value of commodities was limited to its 
use-value for consumption. In modern capitalist economies, the production of 
use values for consumption transforms into a means to create variable exchange 
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values, not strictly based on its original use value. Use values and exchanges 
values are not equal and exchange values eventually dominate over use values. 
“When people produce goods for the market, the value of those goods is set not 
by their usefulness, but by their ability to be exchanged for other things” (Web 
24).  
Exchange values become of paramount importance as it is the value of what the 
object can be traded on that is more significant than the actual utility of the 
object, hence Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism. Commodity fetishism 
refers to the way in which commodities evolve from having a functional utility to a 
value determined within the market place. This exchange is not based on the 
actual cost of manufacturing but on how much it may be exchanged for in 
relation to other commodities in the marketplace. Objects – or now – 
commodities get ascribed a life of their own and seem to operate outside of the 
bounds of human design and control and what especially becomes invisible is 
the human labour that produced the commodity. Objects are assigned, via 
advertising and branding with qualities not innately inherent in them and thus 
take on an almost religious life.  
Branding has evolved from the early days of simple advertising, where products 
were simply named. Manufacturers now move from a passive stance to being 
much more active, communicating directly to consumers. While they initially 
communicated functionality, later the commodity was aggressively linked to more 
intangible, ephemeral qualities. Branding here after refers to the promise 
machine of business, filling the lacuna created by commodification between 
producer and consumer (Morgan, guest lecture, August 2008). 
Baudrillard (Web 30) states that commodities function as signs and symbols in 
the sphere of consumption. Jhally (Web 31) adds that while commodities have 
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use values and exchange values, they are consumed symbolically, imbued with 
social meaning or as a cultural good. The symbolic and cultural dimensions that 
are supplied to consumer goods by advertising have triumphed over the ability of 
goods to function as material use-values. What we consume, therefore, is not the 
object of consumption itself, but its meaning and sign value. The cultural 
meanings of goods lie not in their material composition but in free floating 
symbolic illusions based on desires and ideological fantasies. Berger’s ideas 
endorse Baudrillard and Jhally as he also indicates that the language of, 
“sexuality, power, guilt, envy and glamour appeal form the field that appeals not 
to reality and the fulfilment of the promises but to daydreams” (Berger 1990, 89).   
 As a result of taking on these ephemeral qualities, the commodity is exchanged 
not in terms of its own utility, nor in terms of the actual cost of manufacture, but 
in terms of what it can fetch in relation to other commodities in the marketplace, 
firmly located in Berger’s field of daydreams. This distortion of exchange value 
often inflates products astronomically. Make-up and perfume can be cited as 
good examples which easily demonstrate the point. A high level executive at a 
leading cosmetics brand was reported to have said: “We’re not in the business of 
selling make-up. We sell hope” (Morgan, guest lecture, August 2008). 
It is thus in the market, via branding and exchange, that commodities acquire 
their extrinsic nature. Labour and productive processes also changed under 
capitalism in that the producer is separated from the product of labour. The 
actual sites and processes of manufacture are separated from the end product. 
Thus labour relations are obscured.  
Labour-power is exchanged for the abstract token of value to be found in 
wages – not the satisfaction of the worker’s needs in itself. Workers become 
detached from the means of direct need satisfaction. Wage-labour has 
disunited labour from need so that labour is now no longer an act of need 
satisfaction but merely the means to need satisfaction (Web 24). 
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The hidden source of the commodity masks the labour relations that went into 
producing the object, even though it is a matter of social interest. Consumers, 
while being brand conscious, are developing awareness of the hidden level of 
branding. The terrible working conditions of manufacturing in the developing 
world where labour is cheaper has become important to small groups of socially 
conscious consumers who refuse to consume these particular products. There is 
a growing pressure from consumers on manufacturers/retailers to make visible 
both their supply chain and production chain. Branding always seeks to mask 
this chain. Hilfiger and Nike are merely engaged in the business of branding 
rather than manufacturing. While this in itself is not necessarily problematic, the 
value relation between the products of labour which stamps them as 
commodities have absolutely no connection with their physical properties and 
with the material relations arising there from. The inflated returns it gets for 
branding, versus the return factory workers get for their labour is far too 
divergent to be socially acceptable (Klein 2000, 42).  
In addition it creates volatile and uncertain markets and market crashes which in 
turn results in societies being subjected to extremely harsh economic conditions 
not of their own making. Two such examples highlighting the point are Argentina 
and Indonesia. Speculative currency attacks resulted in the Indonesian rupiah 
devalued overnight by half. This meant that the big brands linked to sweat shops 
within this region got a fifty percent ‘discount’ overnight and made no attempts to 
redress the terribly low living wage. People have to be efficient by eating only 
twice a day as a result of their already ‘below the breadline salaries’ being halved 
overnight.  
In the case of Argentina, a corrupt regime brought a wealthy country to its knees 
in the crisis created by the Menem government of the 1990s as a result of 
adopting a wholesale package of WTO ‘reforms’ such as privatization and 
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deregulation (Web 22). Here again the currency was devalued and factory 
owners shut down factories because they deemed it unprofitable to maintain 
production. Workers being jobless took charge of their fate and combated 
unemployment by trying to occupy factories in which they worked. This 
occupation was towards worker controlled production. 
These examples illustrate the great myth of neoliberalism that individuals as a 
resource within capital will not go to waste, will be utilized and will get paid what 
they are worth (income aggregation).  
Could commodities themselves speak, they would say: Our use-value may 
be a thing that interests men. It is no part of us as objects. What, however, 
does belong to us as objects, is our value. Our natural intercourse as 
commodities proves it. In the eyes of each other we are nothing but 
exchange-values (Mosco 1996, 138). 
Branding also tends to make much more of incremental innovations than 
necessary. The old commodity would function just as well, but newer and newer 
‘innovation’ which is merely incremental and does not really add to the actual 
utility of the object, is branded as ‘new and improved’. Thus via planned 
obsolescence, consumers are pushed into consuming more of the ‘old-new’ 
commodities. In a survey of EU mobile narratives (Lillie 2009) it was found that 
among mobile marketers, “there is also a perceived need to hype up the newest 
and “best” models, thereby encouraging customers to replace older products 
with more expensive models that “do much more,” including elevating 
companies’ profit margins.”  
In a short but funny and fascinating article cited earlier, Kelly (1994) extends the 
understanding behind planned obsolescence. He refers to this as ‘the technology 
of uselessness’.  
For example, consider the existence of a chip which allows a VCR38 to be 
programmed for a month in advance; this is actually nothing more than a 
                                               
38 While Kelly’s examples are dated, hence the use of VCR – Video Recorder, his argument remains 
relevant and applicable to current technology – in particular the cellphone. 
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homage to the useless. It simply exists in and of itself, having no real life 
function. Most programming information is not generally available a month 
in advance, and even if it were, why would someone need to tape a month’s 
worth of television programs, and who would remember the appropriate 
times to insert new blank tapes? 
…First, the perverse desires that consumers associate with utility should not 
be underestimated. Driven by spectacularized engines of desire, consumers 
want more for their money – even if what they get is something that will 
never be used. The corporate answer is to meet a cliché with a cliché: Give 
customers what they want. Consequently, the marketing departments of 
corporations, in their struggle for market share in the electronics industry, 
force their engineers and designers to create new products laden with extra 
features. One main selling point: Our machine has the most features for the 
money. The question for the consumer is: “Did I get a good deal [i.e., the 
most for the money]?”  The question of “Can I actually use what I buy?” is 
never raised. The corporations know of the desire for the useless (a desire 
that can never be fulfilled), and comply by heaping on their products as 
much useless gadgetry as possible in order to seduce the bargain-hungry 
consumer. And so the cycle starts (Kelly 1994).  
The cycle is perpetuated by the neoliberal economic framework technology and 
production occurs within thus new gadgetry is marketed as new and improved 
laden with a host of (incremental) new features, rendering the old (still usable) 
but obsolescent.  
In a way Kelly proves Marx’s point that with commodity fetishism production 
appears to control labour rather than the converse, which intuitively ought to be 
the rightful order of control. Thus it appears that commodities have an 
independent status; independent of those who produced them and also 
independent of control within the marketplace. Hence economists and others 
tend to bemoan the volatility of markets ascribing not just an independent or 
objective character but almost a God-like (untouchable) status to commodities. 
The social, productive relations that created these in the first instance appear 
erased. Marx quoted by Mosco states,  
…when the proportions of exchange between commodities reach a stability 
(by custom) – it appears to arise from the commodities itself naturally so. 
The social relationship that creates their equal value [the amount of labor 
which they embody] disappears from our consciousness. Thus commodities 
appear to be independent of the people that produce them — and appear to 
rule over them, according to 'natural' laws (1996, 140). 
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In the maturation of late capital, commodification extends from tangible 
commodities to leisure activity and finally the individual self. Literature abounds 
on the commodification of leisure time and the work of audiences through 
‘eyeballs’ – as networks sell audiences to advertisers.  
Lifton (1993) comments on how culture and shared experience are being pulled 
into the media marketplace and are being revamped along commercial lines 
where culture itself becomes a commodity. The central critique in this respect is 
that commerce commands all areas of life including popular consciousness. This 
establishes a global bourgeoisie, but normalizes the order through a 
contradictory double speak of selling commercialization, free market ideology 
and democracy in an inextricable package.  
When culture starts to be mined for commodifiable products, the toll on lifestyle 
and culture itself is unacceptably high. Marx foresaw years ago and Lifton adds 
that humanity living under this globalized environment results in great uncertainty 
and a threatened identity. In his book, The Protean Self: Human Resilience In An 
Age Of Fragmentation Lifton asserts,  
…three historical forces that have brought about the release of proteanism: 
historical dislocation, the mass media revolution, and the threat of 
extinction---are inseparable from the modern and postmodern state and are 
related to our surging technologies and our equally surging ideas and 
feelings of self (Lifton 1993,14). 
He goes on further to state that because of these forces, individuals are 
rendered fluid and many-sided (protean) like the Greek god Proteus, who was a 
shape shifter able to adapt himself to every changing situation and survive 
whatever crisis faced him (Lifton 1993, 14). Like Proteus, Lifton argues that 
individuals today are fluid and many-sided as a way of managing the identity 
crisis and search for authenticity and meaning. Commodification within the 
framework of new media changes the nature of the relationship between the 
once distinct realm of the media image and the realm of social life. As soon as 
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one adds a commercial tag to the private sphere, there also must be a resultant 
commercial tag to individual experience and identity. This is increasingly 
problematic as the commercial imperative distorts the personality subscribing it 
to the contradictory pressures of neoliberalism and profit. As a result as Marx 
predicted ontological health is disturbed even more. 
Greatly contributing to...the protean self are certain vicissitudes having to do 
with loss or absence, as well as with perceived threat.  The first category 
includes feelings of fatherlessness, homelessness, and the absence of clear 
mentorship---feelings that can be painful but are at the same time necessary 
to the protean self. That sense of being personally adrift renders one, in 
turn, vulnerable to perceptions of threat to personal and collective existence, 
which cause the protean self to take on much of the psychology of the 
survivor.  These vicissitudes can lead to confusion, and certainly to 
restlessness and flux.  Yet they also provide strong motivation, and a certain 
content, for the self's quest for form.  That quest can never quite be 
completed, but it can result in the achievement of what I call integrative 
expressions of proteanism (Lifton 1993, 14). 
Public education becomes a highly charged incubator for creating the new 
consumer, the new citizen, and the new liberal. The kind of marketing that goes 
on at schools extends to influencing food choices among the range of other 
lifestyle categories. 
The goal of cultural capitalism is to commodify human 
relationships…catching them young, cultivating and servicing their every 
need, deploying something called R (relationship) technologies. Marketing is 
the means by which the whole of the cultural commons is mined for valuable 
potential culture meanings that can be transformed by the arts into 
commodifiable experiences, purchasable in the economy. Culture, like 
nature, can be mined to exhaustion (Lifton 1993, 41). 
4. Structuration 
Structuration refers to the process by which political, economic and even cultural 
structures are constituted out of human agency, even as they provide the very 
‘medium’ of that constitution. Structuration was introduced by Giddens (1990) in 
order to bridge the gap between theories which emphasize structure as a central 
determinant (functionalism, institutionalism and structuralism) and those theories 
that emphasize agency. The aim of structuration is to understand ‘goal-
orientated action’ against the backdrop of how ‘sutures of power’ operate. 
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Giddens refers to structure as a duality containing both: “enabling resources and 
constraining rules…Structure constitutes action and is reproduced by it” (Mosco 
1996, 192). Giddens also rejected the extreme strands of Cultural Studies that 
looked at agency in an isolated way, totally independent of any link to structure. 
Thus the construct of individuation is a free one to an extent, however 
inextricably bound by a matrix of social relations and positioning’s, identity, class, 
race and gender:  
Individuation refers to the redefining of social actors, capital and labour 
particularly, as individual actor subjects whose value is connected to 
individual rights in voting, and individual rights of consumption. These 
actions, taken in the name of the state, but bound up with the exercise of 
class rule, isolate individuals from one another, from their social identities, 
and from those with the power to carry out individuation. The process of 
structuration constructs hegemony, defined as the taken-for-granted, 
common-sense, naturalized way of thinking about the world, including 
everything from cosmology, through ethics, to social practises, that is both 
incorporated and contested in everyday life (Mosco 1996, 195). 
As was discussed earlier, the concept of hegemony was developed in Antonio 
Gramsci’s prison writings (Web 13) where he observed that class rule can be 
affected and maintained by the circulation and dominance of a certain set of 
ideas or ideologies that profess to serve perhaps a greater end or express a 
normative status quo (representing the way things ought to be), but in reality only 
serves the ends of the ruling elite. These particular sets of ideologies are 
promoted as the societal norm and are actively pushed towards acquiring a 
universal status.  
However, the functioning of hegemony requires incorporating elements of the 
values of oppressed groups, as they are articulated back into the dominant 
hegemony, and drawn affectively into it. Hegemony becomes very important in 
the context of telecoms. Without pre-empting too much of the data, ruling class 
ideology has over the last two decades driven telecoms in South Africa and like 
all hegemonic ideology, it serves the power-brokering ruling class.  
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Those theories emphasising structure as a central determinant tend to focus on 
constraining rules. While those theories emphasising agency as a central 
determinant tend to focus on enabling resources within a given political 
economic structure. A limitation of this thesis is the heavy focus on sutures of 
power in the form of industry and policy, which essentially represents 
government; and a very light focus on the individual agent39.   
Political economy is always accused of being a little static with an overarching 
focus on the macro forces of government, industry and the economy. 
Structuration allows an account of the dynamic play of individual agency in 
various forms of resistance, compliance and consumption. The next section 









                                               
39 As the methods section indicates, a survey was conducted to address this aspect, attempting to discern 
how individuals were negotiating cellular telephony. 
122 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY 
“Undertaking research at all is both an ethical and political decision” (Deacon et al 2007, 359). 
Introduction 
The cell or mobile phone is a curious ambassador of the information age, at once 
the site of communication, technology, economics and culture. The cell phone is 
also an embodied artefact of the information age, perhaps more so than any 
other technological device currently. It is born into a conceptual and discursive 
field; however, so much of social life is mediated by it that is creates a 
technocratic legitimation, a consensus that emerges spontaneously out of the 
modern ways of ‘doing’. Hence deeper ideologies, discursive and conceptual 
fields are masked (Feenberg, 1999, 102-103). The central purpose of this thesis 
is to discover the deeper discourses at play around cellular telephony within a 
South African context.    
Without dwelling too much on the differentiation and distinctions between 
administrative and critical research, it is perhaps worth noting that the 
distinctions remain relevant in the contemporary climate of corporatisation at 
academic institutions. In this chapter, I will illustrate how I attempted to embed 
and realize ‘the critical’ in each aspect of research design and operation.     
Discourse analysis 
Discourse analysis is an umbrella term for a multidisciplinary set of theoretical 
methodological approaches. One category of discourse analysis is that 
employed mostly by linguists which scrutinizes communication between people. 
This involves recording interactions and then a close and repeated study of the 
transcriptions (Tracy and Mirivel 2009, 153). Another category of discourse 
analysis refers to unearthing the social processes of making and reproducing 
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sense (O’ Sullivan 1994, 92). This category developed mainly through the work 
of Foucault and deals with making visible the ‘unspoken, lived notions 
surrounding power’ (Babbie et al 2001, 495).  
Foucault’s extensive work in this regard was in the area of illness and 
punishment, where he delved into language use and the way in which language 
mobilizes sets of meanings, understanding and practice, what counts as 
legitimate knowledge, and what is actively excluded from such discursive 
formations. For Foucault discursive formations refer to the things that may be 
legitimately said about a field or area of social life which carry authority in the 
interests of existing power structures. In this sense discourse and social life 
come into being together and Fairclough states that discourse analysis is then, 
‘an attempt to show systematic links between texts, discourse practices, and 
sociocultural practices’ (Deacon 2007, 151-2). It is the latter category of 
discourse analysis that the thesis employs.  
Babbie et al (2001, 495-498) list seven criteria for distinguishing discourses. 
They expand on each of the criteria with ways of mapping discourses. These 
criteria may be seen as a way into operationalizing discourse analysis and 
without pre-empting the study, what follows is a short account of how the seven 
criteria are realized in the thesis.  
Firstly discourses are realized in texts and policy documents: newspapers, 
articles and data collected from a survey were all analysed. Secondly discourses 
are about objects: in this case the cell or mobile phone was chosen because of 
the central place it occupies in consumption currently. Thirdly, discourses contain 
subjects and here industry owners, government and regulatory officials were 
included in the analysis; in addition, end users and their individual experience 
were also taken into account. Fourthly discourses are systems of meanings, 
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generating concepts peculiar to that specific discourse. Some of these systems 
of meanings such as technological determinism and neoliberalism were first 
discerned in the theory chapter and literature review, which linked to the 
analysis. Here the fifth criterion was also realized, i.e. that discourses reflect their 
own ways of speaking. This refers to the language, terminology and phrases 
generated which is specific to a particular discourse. One example that arose 
was legal language or jargon that is invoked and utilized in the consumption of 
cellular telephony, called on to defend and sometimes obfuscate industry 
practices that may be deemed unfair from a consumer perspective. Again these 
instances were discerned in the theory and linked to the analysis. The sixth 
criterion is that discourse is historically located and in the case of neoliberalism 
this was found to be firmly in the late 1980s – early 1990s at the time of the 
dot.com revolution. The final aspect is that discourses refer to other discourses, 
and the thesis grapples with this criterion quite seriously because part of its 
impetus is to offer alternate discourses challenging hegemonic communication 
discourse (Babbie et al 2001, 495-498).   
 Kuhn and ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’   
In 1962 Thomas Kuhn wrote ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’. This 
seminal text offered the natural sciences up to the social and human sciences, 
by showing science as a socialized power emerging not necessarily out of the 
dispassionate search for facts but rather mundane things like faculty squabbles 
and funding sources. Kuhn’s work moved science from the impervious space of 
‘unimpeachable fact…to a text composed of representations’, rich with ideology 
and laden with immense power and prestige, hence subject to necessary 
scrutiny (Grant and Kelly 1998, 66-68). 
125 
 
Heise (2004, 148) states that several theorists assert the crisis in legitimation of 
science in the late twentieth century. She raises Lyotard’s, Postmodern 
Condition: A report on knowledge (1979) in which it is argued that science lost 
two crucial metanarratives in the twentieth century central to its persuasive 
force,40 as such contemporary science is no longer a “coherent truth-oriented 
pursuit of facts, but an assemblage of a variety of independent language games 
in which facts no longer count, but performativity.” Given that facts carry 
ideological weight and are “theory laden, not discovered but created by scientific 
procedures,” the authority assumed by scientific discourses need scrutiny (Heise 
2004, 152). In spite of these crises or perhaps alongside them science became 
important to neoliberal capital and Grant observes that this is not due to 
innovation and new ideas but the new relationship cultivated between science 
and capital that depends on technological advancement.  
Science can no longer afford to be the disinterested quest for the truth about 
nature, since its economic survival is bound up with the production of new 
technologies: science cannot simply desire to know, it must perform. This 
‘techno-science’ is the principal vehicle for the evolution of capitalism in 
postmodern societies…Capitalist techno-science is devoted to the 
maximization of efficient  just as capital itself is devoted to the maximization 
of profit at any cost: minimum in (labour costs, machinery,  maintenance, 
administration and regulation), maximum out (productivity, self-regulation, 
progressive automation and profit). Science therefore survives on the basis 
of its contribution to this regime: in the postmodern condition, owing to the 
collapse of grand narratives, science can no longer justify or legitimate its 
practices by appealing to the innate value of ‘knowledge of self’, since 
knowledge in itself is not a saleable commodity. On the contrary, scientific 
knowledge must be translated into economic success, making techno-
science commensurate with capitalism and aiding thereby the reduction of 
all language games to the single rule of profit (Grant 1998, 75-76).  
Techno-science or technocracy is the central discourse that the thesis 
investigates. It is important to analyse that which lies beneath the ‘innocent’, the 
‘objective’, and the ‘neutral’ within technocracy (Micocci 2009, xi). This is 
                                               
40 These are that ‘the human spirit itself progresses over the course of history and the expansion of 
knowledge is one of the most visible tokens of that progress, and the Enlightenment belief that the 
acquisition of knowledge contributes to the liberation and emancipation of individuals and 




especially important as Greenberg asserts that commercial values tend to 
contaminate research and affect, “an infusion of entrepreneurial goals within the 
academic environment” so as to compel all within it to ‘inhale commercial values’ 
in all that they do (Greenberg 2007, 13). 
Methods 
The dominant methodological approach employed by this study is qualitative. 
Following Mosco’s call to engage with the borders of the discipline, policy studies 
and cultural studies, the research lays a political economy framework which 
borrows from both policy studies and cultural studies, in order to analyse cellular 
telephony in South Africa. While traditional political economic approaches 
provide a materialist perspective, they are criticized for emphasizing a broad 
overview of material relations as a grand narrative, without exposing the 
multiplicity of perspectives and lived experiences.  
Paula Saukko (2003) exposes “blind spots” in political economic approaches. 
She argues that such an approach creates problematic binaries that sometimes 
exclude dissident or marginal voices. The consequent dichotomy cast between 
the ‘big bad forces of globalization’ against the ‘poor little self’, disempowers 
marginal voices, revoking any possibility of individual agency. Saukko offers 
Edward Soja’s41  notion of spaces as a more encompassing methodological 
framework. Soja argues for three dimensions of space. First space refers to 
material qualities and relations. Second space refers to popular, political and 
intellectual discourses and images we have of space. Third space refers to the 
lived dimension of space. All three dimensions of space are useful as entry 
points, in the attempt to work against binaries that may emerge and as a method 
of unearthing other (lived) perspectives. Although useful as entry points, it is not 
possible to delineate the analysis according to these sub-sections as each is 
                                               
41 A critical geographer.  
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inextricably linked to the other; therefore the analysis (though utilizing the entry 
point of ‘spaces’) follows the theoretical categories.  
In relation to the first space or discourses of commerce, Soja (quoted by Saukko 
2003) identifies the arena of technological and material relations where the 
central objective is to narrativise the field in which the emergent patterns of 
(telecoms) ownership and control will be analysed. In relation to the second 
space, the arena of intellectual discourses on ICTs, the central issue is to 
unearth the policy discourses. With regard to the third space, case studies 
reflecting individual experience have been utilized in addition to a survey. The 
survey was conducted along the ethical guidelines as laid out by the institution 
within which this research was conducted42. This means that participation was 
voluntary, anonymous and informed consent was sought. The purpose was not 
to statistically measure subjects’ exposure and interaction with cellular 
telephony, but to gain a sense of what their experience is. The purpose is to 
construct a lived narrative that filters through structural findings in order to 
expose deeper nuances, differences and dissident voices and experiences. 
Through this research design it is envisaged that the researcher would be able to 
extract a thick discourse materially, ideologically and ‘individually’ on mobile 
telephony in South African and on South Africans – the end users.  
The thesis utilizes both primary and secondary research. The primary research 
was a survey conducted by the researcher. A survey of twenty five questions 
was administered over a three month period (July 2013 – September 2013) in 
Glenwood, Durban. One hundred and ninety five respondents completed the 
survey. The survey was anonymous and contained no questions of a sensitive 
nature to warrant ethical concerns. The questions were dominantly of a 
categorical nature, with only two questions inviting a longer written response. 
                                               
42 See UKZN ethical guidelines for research and also appendix 1.  
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The questions focused on demographics; consumption of mobile telephony and 
regulation; and finally invited opinion about sector-related issues that were 
highlighted in the survey.  
The respondents were between the ages of 18 and 25. They were selected as 
‘mature’ users of mobile telephony. This age range falls into the ‘Generation Y’ 
category (within the South African context – ‘the born frees’), exhibiting a few 
particular characteristics. The survey was collated and data was captured by L. 
Msholo between (March 2014 and May 2014) and it was checked by the 
researcher.  
Secondary research was extracted from the following sources:  
 A five year review of four South Africa newspapers was conducted (The 
Mercury, The Witness43,The Mail and Guardian, and The Sunday Times44)  
 Link Centre resources 
Institutional documentation derived from the various websites: Vodacom; 
MTN; Cell C, Telkom and Virgin mobile 
 Institutional documentation derived from the various websites: ITU, DOC – 
SA, ICASA, Statistics South Africa, The South African Constitution, Other 
relevant legislation 
 Technology shows (such as Tech@work and the Listening post on Al 
Jazeera) 
 Public Lectures 
 Technology websites  
 Relevant discussions and informal interviews with public 
intellectuals/academics 
Questions of meaning and evidence 
Deacon et al state that the analysis of documentary sources must address 
questions of meaning and questions of evidence.  Meaning refers to content 
– what is actually being said. Evidence refers to how much weight to give to 
the sources – are we justified in citing them as evidence? (2007, 20)  
The documentary sources were approached via the constant comparative 
method. After a year of the comparative method categories started to emerge at 
which point axial coding was employed to review the data in an iterative and 
analytical way (Babbie et al 2001, 498- 501). As to the question of evidence, all 
                                               
43 Daily regional newspapers 
44 National weekly newspapers 
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sources are derived from the public domain such as newspaper articles, 
websites and public lectures. The sources have been chosen as they are 
relevant to the field in that they supply statistical, reliable data and case studies, 
both of which are extremely useful. These sources have also been chosen as a 
reflection of public discourses related to the field. This covers the general 
approach to the topic, but more specifically, the key areas the methodological 
design must necessarily address are validity, generalisibility and relevance.  
On Validity  
Just as a surveyor takes measurements from a number of vantage points to fix 
the ‘true’ position of a particular point on the ground, so researchers check the 
full range of available sources to build up the most accurate and comprehensive 
account possible. I have attempted ‘triangulation’ in this less rigorous approach 
by consulting a range of sources, each set representative of a different vantage 
point. Indeed the approach to the topic from these three spaces is itself 
illustrative of this form of triangulation. However it could be more likened to 
Faulkner's ‘triad approach’:  
In 1982, Faulkner presented what he called the ‘Triad method’ as an 
innovation: it is now taken for granted that approaching a problem from 
several different directions can enrich research (remembering that using a 
‘triad’ of research approaches is not the same as triangulation to establish 
validity) (Bertrand and Hughes 2004, 122). 
Bertrand and Hughes (2004, 239 – 240) clarify triangulation as, “the use of two 
or more (usually three) different research approaches (of data gathering, or of 
analysis and interpretation) to the same question”. The definition of triangulation 
is more refined by Hornig Priest as:  
using substantially different methods to study the same problem, such as a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches. Achieving parallel 
results with different methods increases the researcher’s confidence in the 
results (2009, 254).  
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In these definitions Bertrand and Hughes and Hornig Priest clarify that the 
purpose in triangulation is precisely validation of findings. It is important though 
to note Silverman’s (quoted by Bertrand and Hughes 2004, 239 - 240) difficulty 
with the assertion that triangulation achieves validity.  
But, more importantly, it may still not provide the validation you seek: There 
is a logical fallacy in the idea that if two or more people say something it is 
more likely to be true that if only one person says it: after all, they may have 
all obtained their information from the same false source. It follows that, if 
validity exists at all, it is inherent in each piece of research, independent of 
every other piece, so triangulation will just require the researcher to test the 
validity of three separate pieces of research – added work for no measure of 
increase in confidence. Most social science and humanities research 
constructs its objects of study and context in the course of the research. 
Under these circumstances, there is no external standard of ‘truth’, against 
which the research conclusions can be measured. The argument would hold 
only if the different methods were measuring exactly the same thing, but 
different measures and methods are used precisely because they add new 
dimensions to the research. In both these cases (respondent validation and 
triangulation), this is not an argument against the method, which can 
certainly produce new insights into any research problem. Rather it is an 
argument against depending on such methods as a measure of validity. 
Given the difficulties associated with trying to establish some sort of validity, I 
have chosen to incorporate Silverman’s approach to enhancing validity in and 
through my research. Silverman suggests five ways to achieve this end: “the 
refutability principle; the constant comparative method; comprehensive data 
treatment; deviant case analysis and using appropriate tabulations” (in Bertrand 
and Hughes 2004, 177-85).  
The constant comparative method (with the follow-on axial coding) was found to 
be extremely useful and was most consistently utilized. This method is clarified 
as, “developing categories from the data in a qualitative study rather than 
defining them in advance based on the researcher’s preconceptions. As new 
data are analysed, the categories are continuously reviewed” (Hornig Priest 
2009, 240). The constant comparative method proceeds with a set of themes or 
categories which are tentatively suggested by the data itself. This is reminiscent 
of the open coding used in grounded theory methods. New data is tested against 
the first set of tentative themes and so the research process evolves by adding, 
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eliminating, or refining categories and conclusions as each set of new data is 
compared with the old themes (Babbie et al 2001, 499).  
The approach for the constant comparative method is inductive. Induction refers 
to, “reasoning from the specific to the general; the development of theory based 
on observations rather than through testing hypotheses” (Hornig Priest 2009, 
244).  
Strelitz (2005, 65) states,  
The applicability of the concept of validity…does not depend on the 
existence of some absolute truth or reality to which an account can be 
compared, but only on the fact that there exist ways of assessing accounts 
that do not depend entirely on features of the account itself, but in some 
way relate to those things that the account claims to be about.” [Strelitz 
goes on to clarify that], “validity includes ‘descriptive validity’, which means 
that researchers should not make up or distort what they saw or heard, and 
‘interpretative validity’ – the accuracy of the concepts used by the 
researcher in relation to the perspective of the individuals included in the 
account. The core issue regarding validity in qualitative research is whether 
or not we are providing a valid description of what events, utterances and 
behaviours mean to the people engaged with them.  
In order to achieve descriptive validity, the researcher has been assiduous in 
keeping a hard and soft record of all documentary sources (which could be 
useful for other research endeavours as it spans a good length of time) and 
recording and transcribing the few interviews that were conducted, and storing 
hard and soft copies of the survey. Most of the documentary sources were in the 
public domain and there is therefore less of a problem with the issues of 
descriptive validity and interpretative validity. Therefore the researcher saw no 
real need go back to interview journalists, public intellectuals or policy makers for 
the purpose of respondent validation.45With regard to the survey, respondents 
were asked to participate anonymously therefore the question of respondent 
validation does not arise.  
                                               
45 Respondent validation is taking tentative conclusion back to the research subjects for their response. 
This is an extension of the usual assumption that research subjects know more than the researcher, so 
their judgments should be given more weight (Bertrand and Hughes 2004, 238). 
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Warburton (1996) brings an important clarification to the fore by laying out the 
difference between validity and truth in the strict philosophical sense. “Validity 
should not be confused with truth. Validity is always a quality of the structure of 
arguments; statements are true or false. Arguments can never be true or false; 
statements never valid or invalid” (Warburton 1996, 128).  
Generalisability 
The debate on validity leads one to the issue of generalisability. If a research 
design and structure of argumentation is deemed valid, the question one could 
pose is if the findings can be applied to a larger context. Strelitz (2005, 67) offers 
those using qualitative approaches a useful ways of thinking around 
generalisability. He firstly divides the term into internal and external 
generalisability. 
Internal generalisability refers to generalizing within the community, group or 
institution being studied to persons, events, and settings that were not 
directly observed or interviewed. External generalisability refers to 
generalizing to other communities, groups or institutions. Qualitative 
research seldom makes claims for external generalisability.  
Reflecting on his own recent study, Strelitz states (2005, 67): 
I was aware that these students did not represent the full range of South 
African youth and that this would raise the issue of the applicability of my 
research findings to the rest of the population. However, like most 
qualitative researchers facing this problem, I believed that the critical issue 
would be the cogency of my theoretical reasoning, couched in terms of 
generalisability of cases to theoretical propositions, rather than the 
population as a whole. I would use my findings among a particular set of 
youth groups to reflect on the debates within media studies concerning the 
relationship between texts and audiences, rather than trying to provide a 
comprehensive picture of media consumption patterns among South African 
youth…Thus the criticism of the lack of generalisability of case studies 
misses the central point that the critical issue is the cogency of the 
theoretical reasoning. Qualitative research should be judged by the 
generalisability of cases to theoretical propositions, rather than to 
populations or universes. 
My research is limited to internal generalisability, and I have adopted Strelitz’s 
lead in using findings to reflect on debates within Media studies around the 
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dissonant narratives in relation to ICTs (specifically cellular telephony) in South 
Africa.  
Relevance 
Having surveyed the literature on cellular telephony, I have concluded that it is 
the single most important, intrusive, useful device that will insinuate itself further 
into our everyday lives in the future. This itself makes the study of cellular 
telephony worthy of investigation. Given its proliferation and the homogenizing 
effect of the mass media, it is now more relevant than ever to pursue questions 
around technocratic discourses and citizenship if we ever to talk of individual 
agency in a meaningful way.    
Conclusion  
Difficulties faced and limitations 
While the research design proved useful at inception and during the course of 
data collection, it was difficult to keep the analysis separate as originally 
envisaged. This is because with each issue raised, all three spaces are 
impacted. Therefore the analysis encompasses a dialogue across all three 
spaces, rather than the imposition of artificial borders which may require 
repetition in each separate section.  
A limitation of this study is the weaker focus on individual experience and the 
end user. A second survey would have been very useful but there were limits to 
time and resources. While the researcher intends to pursue this in future studies, 
a stronger line of enquiry in this regard would have yielded very interesting 
results. The researcher found that another limitation was the unwieldy field itself. 
The telecoms sector is evolving and changing so dramatically that almost as 
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soon as one completes a study, it will soon be dated. However, there are 
perennial themes that have emerged transcending the rapidly evolving sector. 
A final point would be that a study of telecoms currently is complex and requires 
complex skills or rather multi-disciplinary skills, perhaps not only limited to what 
Mosco recently called for, which was engagement with the borders of the 
discipline: policy studies and cultural studies. It seems that telecoms related 
research in the future will necessitate the inclusion of law; psychology; 
linguistics; and finally technology itself. Thus researchers in the field may be 
under pressure to retool along multidisciplinary lines in the future. In the final 
section, Recommendations and further study, I have made suggestions for 
further research from a Utopian space, i.e. with unlimited resources at one’s 









CHAPTER FIVE: OWNERSHIP 
AND CONTROL 
Introduction 
In 1994 South Africa transformed from an Apartheid regime to liberal democracy. 
Apart from opening up the franchise to all South African citizens, a key focus was 
historical redress across the various social sectors. The importance of the media 
was discussed in the literature review (see pages 10-15) as a lynch pin to 
delivering the real freedoms outlined by Sen, “the capacity for people to 
participate in a diverse range of decisions that affect them…Enabling greater 
numbers of people to speak, engage and respond to one another is ultimately 
equipping them to take political responsibility, which is a key ingredient to 
establishing deep and sustainable change” (Warnock, Schoemaker and Wilson – 
Web 89). Telecommunications forms an important part of the media as the 
media is increasing accessed via the telecoms network. In the analyses that 
follow, it is necessary to take into account normative frameworks and debates 
laid out in the theory and literature review chapters. Mosco stated that critical 
political economy was built on an effort to understand the communication 
industries and its relationship to wider economic and social processes and he 
emphasized that these industries needed to be criticized from a range of 
humanistic values (Mosco 1996, 12). In this chapter the South African 
telecommunications industry will be analysed from a range of humanistic (or 
normative) values. This means that investigations into ownership and control, 
empire, neoliberalism and surveillance must at each point revert to debates 
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around distributive justice, development, universal access and the digital 
‘underclasses’.  
The South African telecommunications landscape reflects a tight oligopoly in 
terms of cellular telephony and a near monopolistic fixed line environment. There 
are adept sector performance reviews from research houses like the LINK centre 
(Web 32) – these are quantitatively strong and will be referred to and may be 
relied upon for statistics and an overall survey of the field. The purpose of this 
chapter is to explore ownership structures of the mobile industry, reflect on 
emergent ideologies and review the ‘scenes of global telecoms’, particularly of 
the global south. As was clarified in the Methodology chapter most of the primary 
data reflected in this chapter emerges from websites, magazines and 
newspapers. The researcher was unable to obtain direct interviews with 
company managers and it has often been the experience that managers are 
reluctant to avail themselves for research, often times ignoring requests 
altogether. A few key issues emerge with an in depth view of cell phone 
companies in South Africa. The analysis first deals with spatialization and 
structuration, raising questions around ownership and control, to anti-competitive 
power geometries, ideology and representation in terms of race, gender and 
nationality.  
Introducing the players and their vital statistics 
In the South African context, even though there are a seemingly diverse range of 
players in the telecoms arena, two dominate the mobile market. The mobile 
operators in South Africa are Vodacom, MTN, Cell C, Virgin mobile and Telkom 
(8ta) Heita (with Telkom itself as the fixed line monopoly). The following table 
and diagram indicates the small movements in market share over a three year 






2011 2012 2013 
Vodacom 50.9% 45.6% 43% 
MTN 33.6% 37.3% 36.8% 
Cell C 13.2% 14.3% 17.2% 
Telkom 8ta 1.8% 2.2% 2.3% 
Virgin Mobile 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 
 
MARKET SHARE OF THE MOBILE INDUSTRIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
While different cites (including company annual reports) offer slightly different 
statistics, these reflect a fairly accurate approximation of mobile market share in 
South Africa. It may be noted that Vodacom and MTN may be seen as the 
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dominant players in South Africa, with Vodacom on its way to becoming a super-
dominant operator given its recent bid to buy a controlling stake in Neotel, South 
Africa’s second national operator for fixed line, which also has spectrum and 
capacity in wireless connectivity (Web 34). 
Vodacom 
Vodacom was technically the earliest mobile operator in South Africa, going live 
in March 1994. Vodacom operates on GSM (Global system for mobile 
communications) 900 and launched GPRS (General packet radio service) and 
MMS (Multimedia messaging service) in the latter half of 2002. The company 
has enjoyed phenomenal growth in South Africa which has enabled it to expand 
into Africa, operating in Mozambique, Congo, Lesotho, Tanzania, Nigeria, 
Zambia, Angola, Kenya, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire and Cameroon. Vodacom was fifty 
percent owned by the British mobile operator, Vodafone and fifty percent owned 
by the South African telecommunications (fixed line) group Telkom, in which the 
South African government held a majority stake. In 2008 the government sold 
fifteen percent of its share of Vodacom to Vodafone making the British company 
the majority stakeholder in the South African mobile operator. Currently, 
Vodafone owns sixty five percent of Vodacom, with government owning 
approximately thirteen percent and the remaining twenty one percent is owned 
by small independent consortia (Web 35).  
While this description of Vodacom’s ownership appears simple enough, it is not a 
complete picture as Vodacom also has holdings in Tanzania (sixty five percent), 
Democratic Republic of Congo (fifty one percent), Mozambique (eighty five 
percent), Lesotho (eighty percent) and Nigeria (a hundred percent) (Whalley and 
Curwen 2013, 3-8). Whalley and Curwen argue that the organizational structure 
of mobile operators is complex and these kinds of structures detract from 
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understanding important aspects of the ownership and control wielded by these 
companies.  
The following graphic, taken from the company website (Web 35), maps 
Vodacom’s business interests in Africa. While the map indicates Vodacom’s 
African interests, it fails to reveal Vodafone’s ownership structure as well as 





Vodafone operates on all continents but Antarctica which amounts to twenty one 
countries including South Africa. This is what Whalley and Curwen allude to 
when they assert that ownership information ought to be more freely available in 
a less complex form in order to reveal business and controlling interests. This 
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becomes especially significant for the South African context which is a 
developmental context and mobile operating licenses were granted on the basis 
of companies addressing developmental goals, such as universal access and 
competitive tariffs.     
Vodacom’s ownership structure is a good exhibit for Sklair’s (2010, 208) thesis 
on empire (deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation). In a way, Vodafone has 
leapt beyond national boundaries and even beyond a trans-national company. 
Operating across six continents and twenty one countries, it earns enormous 
revenue and hence wields enormous power across the globe, demonstrating 
‘empire’ in the early creation of new hierarchies of power. This new hierarchy of 
power stands as a sort of Goliath in the face of local discourses of development 
and it is increasingly difficult for the nation state to challenge such a global 
company (see chapter on Neoliberalism). Here Strange’s (2010) concern 
becomes extremely relevant with regard to the lack of capacity shown by the 
nation state to deal with problems like corruption and industry cartels as well as 
failing at social equity within a nation state. Strange argues that these problems 
are further complicated by economic agents operating trans-borders, hence not 
within the control of any single nation-state (Strange 2010, 161-164). 
 
Board structure – dominance of Vodafone players 
Mosco states that political economists tend to pay a good deal of attention to the 
key sites of power. These sites are the executive structures and the company’s 
board of directors, who together define and drive the institution’s agenda. These 
individuals are significant in so far as they bring their own connections politically 
or from employment histories to bear on the organizational management.  
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Vodacom’s board consists of twelve directors. The CEO of Vodacom as of 
(2012) is MSA Joosub, the Chairperson46 is MP Moyo. Both are South African. 
Five of the board members are foreign (British, Turkish, Egyptian, Dutch and 
American) and seven are South African. Of the seven South African members, 
two are women. This is immediately interesting as the Vodacom site displays 
three women on the board even though one is not South African. It is interesting 
to note that more of the male members of the board have defined titles such as 
‘Chairman’, ‘CEO’, and ‘CFO’ while the female members have ‘non-executive 
director’ status. This lack of definition betrays a show of compliance with the 
goals of gender equity in leadership, an ideological manufacture of public 
acclamation (Vodacom annual report, March 2014 – Web 87).  
In terms of direct and indirect interlocks, board members are also directors with 
the Nedbank group; Amabubesi Group; Liberty Group; the Auditor General’s 
offices; Willis South Africa; Edcon; Coal of Africa; Kutana Investment group, 
Knorr SA; Absa Bank; Aveng Group; Development Bank of South Africa; Brait 
SA; Vodafone Africa; BP SA; ACSA and SAPREF. Findings on the way in which 
the direct and indirect interlocks impinge or enhance the company’s positioning 
is limited as it is notoriously difficult to make contact and persuade board 
members and executives to discuss their work. Even so, some conclusions may 
be inferred.   
The shared directorship of several companies points to the microscopic power 
geometry operating in management of cellular companies and other key 
industries in South Africa. Once an individual enters the level of executive 
management (as a director, non-executive board member, CEO etc.) of any of 
the key industries in South Africa or key political positions, they also enter the 
‘executive pool’. There appears to be an easy mobility between analogous 
                                               
46 It is interesting that in the company’s annual report, the title is referred to as ‘Chairman’.  
143 
 
industries and this tendency to look within the pool acts as a barrier to entry for 
possible incumbents from outside this pool (i.e. non-political or industrial elites). 
This qualifies as an almost hegemonic texture to the way power is consolidated 
and maintained.  
Three of the board members held senior positions in international companies 
such as Vodafone Spain (Joosub); Pricewaterhouse London (Dittrich) and Exxon 
Mobile (Brown). Sklair (2010, 185) argues that empire’s agenda is pushed by the 
transnational capitalist class (TCC) as opposed to the modern state. These 
capitalists are not traditional in the Marxist sense as owners of the means of 
production because in empire, owning the means of production is not a 
prerequisite for entering the circuit of capital. Sklair identifies one of the groups 
that form the transnational capitalist class: TNC (transnational corporations) 
executives or the corporate fraction. This group is often inhabited by people from 
different parts of the world and the central aim would be to create the right 
conditions to further TCC interests across the transnational or global terrain and 
as it filters down to the local (2010, 188). This translates into creating the right 
conditions for capital within a local market, rather than holding industry 
accountable for normative conditions in favour of end users and citizens.  
 The exception to easy mobility occurs when industry seeks to maintain control of 
where staff migrates. This is certainly demonstrated in the Knott-Craig migration 
mentioned below. With regard to easy mobility, in terms of the telecoms industry 
Jeffrey Hedberg initially started at Cell C as CEO for three years and then was 
the acting CEO of Telkom, managing Telkom’s Nigerian subsidiary, and then 
came to Telkom 8ta after which he left to Altech (Web 36). Alan Knott-Craig, 
former CEO of Vodacom for over a decade, moved to head up Cell C as the 
CEO after the expiry of a restraint of trade agreement between Vodacom and 
Knott-Craig. After Knott-Craig left Vodacom, he was still paid just under five 
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million rands a year as a consultant and this is allegedly due to Vodacom 
executive fears that Knott-Craig would be recruited by Telkom to move its 
cellular business forward (ibid). Another example perhaps would be Nadia 
Bulbullia who was a counsellor for ICASA47 and then moved to Cell C as a 
regulatory consultant. Paris Mashile, a former chair of ICASA moved to the 
position of CEO of a division of Vunani technology (Web 37).     
Some argue that this kind of executive migration is not necessarily a negative 
phenomenon if the ebb and flow of expertise remains within the country. Given 
the pressure to comply with Black economic empowerment equity goals, such 
moves become problematic if companies pursue members within the pool simply 
as a means of rubber stamping their BBBEE48 score cards. This has the negative 
effect of creating an artificial demand which in term inflates the value of labour at 
senior management levels. The result also is fronting, which refers to when 
companies engage in token appointments in order to meet affirmative action 
imperatives. Thus we arrive at a curious juncture – where variables of race and 
gender in relation to labour are artificially inflated and simultaneously 
disempowered. At the global level, a level of executive shuffling is also present 
where executives within the communications industry moved fluidly between 
countries. Strange referred to this as the problem of economic agents operating 
trans-borders, hence not within the control of any single nation state. It is 
certainly disconcerting that there is not even token representation from civic 
organizations or from the public sector representing the consumer, the individual 
user and citizen rights. Vodafone has a very strong representation on the board, 
its composition further pointing to the allocative control Vodafone wields over 
Vodacom South Africa.  
                                               
47 ICASA refers to the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa, the regulatory body 
governing the communications industry.  
48 BBBEE refers to broad based Black economic empowerment.  
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The consolidation of power is certainly maintained when one considers the 
mobility of executives across companies. One may argue that within the South 
African industry the mobility of executives (with certain key skills sets) is 
important. The problem arises as positions with too much power and money 
lends themselves to abuse and cronyism – as a means of maintaining or 
consolidating power acquired in the first place. The Knott-Craig nepotism story 
appeared in the public domain, and despite this, he was still able to take up the 
position of CEO at Cell C.  
Among the charges levelled against Knott-Craig snr are that his son, Alan 
Knott-Craig jnr, was given office space and millions of rands to build and 
promote his businesses; that a company owned by his niece and nephew, 
and which was on the verge of bankruptcy, was awarded an exclusive multi-
million three-year marketing and advertising contract without a proper 
tender process; and that he arranged for Vodacom to pay tens of thousands 
of dollars for a call center employee to be trained as a magician (Mtshali 
and Piliso 2010, 1).  
The flagrant excess of control and power stands in stark contrast to the concerns 
raised perennially by COSATU49 amongst other unions and civic groups. Many 
decisions in the industry are marketed as making good business sense, however 
the resultant effects reveal benefits to the hands of only a few. Going back to the 
Knott-Craig (senior) nepotism saga, Vodacom’s purchase of a ten percent stake 
in Wireless Business Solutions (of which Knott-Craig junior was the MD) was at 
an unnecessarily inflated value. In addition failing businesses were given capital 
injections courtesy of Vodacom (Mtshali and Piliso 2010, 2).  
Prior to the Vodafone acquisition of Telkom’s fifteen percent stake of Vodacom, 
COSATU raised objections, the threat of a nationwide strike and a court interdict 
to prevent the sale on grounds of public interest and job protection (Stokes 2009, 
43). COSATU also alleged that the deal apart from resulting in job losses would 
only benefit a few key politicians linked to the breakaway party Congress of the 
People (COPE) (Gedye and Letsoalo 2009, 8). However the interdict was 
                                               
49 COSATU refers to the Congress of South African Trade Unions. 
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overturned and the sale went ahead. Two years later, in 2011 the 
Communications Workers Union (CWU) sought an interdict in addition to 
threatening strike action as a result of Vodacom’s plan to outsource call centers. 
CWU claimed that the move to outsource call centers would mean a shedding of 
jobs and a cut in salaries.  
Vodacom employs about 2000 people at four call centers in South Africa, 
depending on workload and season. Maurice (Vodacom’s chief corporate 
affairs officer) said there would be no changes to their remuneration. 
However Business Report has seen minutes of a meeting in April between 
Vodacom and the CWU in which Vodacom said that the workers managed 
by the new outsourced firm would have to take a R 500 pay cut…Vodacom 
was unable to explain the salary cut (Speckman 2011, 17).         
 
Gender equity and disability (employment quota and assistive 
technology) 
Vodacom makes many claims with regard to its ethos and commitment to the 
development goals of equity across race, gender and disability. It is an important 
theme as it dissects the way in which cellular companies engage in branding and 
publicity – ideologically manufacturing public acclamation, while engaging in very 
contradictory business activities. In the developing context, it is important to 
recognize these dissonances as caveats of the real agenda companies pursue, 
thus making an all the more important case for strong and effective policy and 
regulation.         
Further research of a strongly qualitative nature must be conducted in order to 
ascertain how female employees and black female employees manage their 
work environment. This could be to discern how much line managers do (are 
encouraged to do) to facilitate an enabling work environment; how promotions 
occur and if fronting persists in gender appointments. Navigating the Vodacom 
site one finds the following statements:  
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Black representation among executive directors rose from 63% in 2007 to 
73% in 2008. Unfortunately, there is no representation by black women 
among executive directors on the Vodacom SA Board...Retention of black 
women employees, and in particular black female employees, remains a 
challenge. The current attrition rate of the black designated group is 37% of 
all leavers (Web 38).  
Exploring these two statements serves as a barometer of Vodacom’s real ethos. 
The grievance is subtly levelled against Black female employees for the attrition 
rates rather than against the work environment. In terms of disability 
employment, Vodacom reports a rise from 0.5% in 2007 to 1.2% in 2009. The 
company indicates that the aim is to reach 2%. Further research of a strongly 
qualitative nature must be conducted in order to ascertain how employees with 
disabilities manage their work environment. This could be to discern how much 
line managers do (are encouraged to do) to facilitate an enabling work 
environment and to discover if fronting occurs in the disability sector.  
Vodacom must however be commended for pioneering the addition of ZOOM 
software for partially sighted mobile users in late November this year. ZOOM 
software magnifies text so that partially sighted users may navigate their cell 
phones with greater ease.  
The Zoom’s full screen magnification capability enables users to magnify 
the text on the cell phone screen such as the menu, soft keys, messages 
received or battery indicator to up to 16 times its original size. It also has a 
‘distributed views mode’ which divides the cress into several areas, enabling 
users to view all important elements simultaneously (ibid). 
Vodacom also promotes itself as the foremost in launching ‘speaking phones for 
the blind’. However, the Zoom software may prove to be more lucrative as 3 out 
of the 4 visually impaired people are partially sighted.       
Vodaworld offers customers a truly unique one-stop shopping experience. 
For all your cellular, data, electrical or home appliance needs, visit 
Vodaworld and get everything under one roof - from hands-free and radio 
car installations, cellular upgrades and repairs to the very latest Apple Mac 
Laptops and Flat Screen TV’s. However, despite the convenience of having 
it all under one roof, choice has not been compromised: Vodaworld is home 
to all the top cell phone manufacturers and Service Providers in South 
Africa. Here, unique specials are offered, exclusive to Vodaworld 
customers…In addition, the warmth and efficiency of the staff at Vodaworld 
provides the reassurance that you're dealing with professionals who will go 
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the extra mile to see to your individual needs. No matter how limited your 
technological knowledge, our consultants will discuss your requirements 
and provide useful, comprehensive advice and assistance…Should you 
come to Vodaworld on a weekend, bring your children to the Kiddies 
Corner, where they will be entertained and supervised by a professional 
child minder giving you a chance to browse. Once you are done with your 
shopping, enjoy a meal or drink at our on-site House of Coffees…And for 
those who are looking for the ideal location for a private or corporate event, 
Vodaworld is also home to versatile five star conferencing and events 
facilities including the highly acclaimed Vodadome. For an elegant cocktail 
party or gala dinner, an exhilarating music concert, an exciting corporate 
(ibid).  
The extract from the Vodacom website indicates the way in which the brand is 
constructed to be incorporated into as much of one’s life as possible. It 
represents a maturation of Althusser’s ideological apparatuses, manifesting the 
symbolic universe and creating tangible sets of representations for individuals to 
interpellate. As was discussed earlier, the technological apparatuses of NSMI 
gave rise to twin hegemonic discourses; one ideological and coercive; the other 
repressive. The technological apparatus of coercion creates familiarity with new 
technology via a set of representations designed to create an environment of 
adoption of NSMI and manufacture consent for a world of digitally based 
consumption, as Marshall aptly puts it: ‘producing us as technological subjects’ 
(2004, 33). The following extract taken from the Vodacom website indicates the 
company’s further branding of itself.   
Vodacom will be one of Africa’s most admired companies. 
VODACOM is a winning company where everyone is imbued with a spirit to 
win, to be passionate in whatever we do, to be the best, to never give up, to 
work harder than anybody else, to know that our best is better than anybody 
else’s best. 
VODACOM is a respected company where honesty, trust, good faith, and 
professionalism are the cornerstones of how we do business. 
VODACOM is a caring company that cares about what it does and how it 
does it, which is always fair, and that respects every single person. 
Sincerely caring about everything we do every minute of every day, is our 
way of life. 
VODACOM believes that it can enhance people’s lives and empower them 
by making it possible for all people in Africa to have access to mobile 
telecommunications. We have the will and the means to do so, and will 




VODACOM will seek out the impossible to do in mobile communications, 
which have been made possible by the most innovative technology in the 
world. Technology will continue to develop and make possible things we 
cannot even dream of today. We will remain the most competent and 
innovative of all in this Information and Communications Technology (“ICT”), 
to not only dream the dreams but to make every dream come true (Web 38). 
 
This extract from the site is interesting on many levels. It indicates the way in 
which the company has branded itself in terms of market positioning locally and 
across the continent of Africa. It also reveals what Vodacom’s philosophy or 
ethos is branded as. Apart from strongly asserting the ethical aspects of 
business such as professionalism, trust, honesty and good faith, the site claims 
to be a stronger contributor towards the res publica or empowerment: “We will 
democratize telecommunications.” While this very strong declaration is preceded 
by the belief that access is empowerment, it does not really go into too much 
detail about how this rhetoric is to be realized.  
The branding of Vodacom as a “winning company” is rather intriguing as a 
means of articulating market dominance. It also seems to endorse a highly 
individualistic culture. This neatly dovetails with a Neoliberal doctrine which 
supports labour receiving what it ought to in the market place; the individualistic 
culture…“winning”, “make dreams come true” – caters to a small number of 
cyber elite in the market place who can afford the expensive handsets and 
contracts.  
The market is imagined as a space of ‘unconstrained’ choices by 
‘autonomous’ rationally calculating agents who are simply seeking the best 
way of satisfying their individual ends. The process could be summed up as 
a Bottom-Line-thinking Education Service bent on the socialization of the 
Corporate world and the neoliberal doctrine through viral marketing, rule 
mandates, legal norms, fundamentally anti-introspective, and inherently 
obedience based, carefully sustained through a psychologically brutal and 
conniving double speak called Individuality and extended through pseudo-
ideas promoting Equality, Tolerance, Diversity, and Positive discrimination. 
The agenda of free-trade is inherently an agenda of Cultural Capitalism. 
Using shells of old cultures and vestiges of marginally extant tradition as 
familiar icons and anti-icons, creating a set of customized diverse and 
international homogenously inspired products aimed to generate maximum 
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profit and address a fundamental consumption based solidarity sugar-
coated and sold as Equality, Diversity and of course, Globalization. This is 
Cultural Capitalism (Rifkin, 2000). 
Vodacom also makes some bold emotive claims: “Vodacom is a caring company 
that cares about what it does and how it does it, which is always fair, and that 
respects every single person.” The significance of these statements only really 
emerges once juxtaposed with real live examples of customer experience (see 
pages 186 - 219). Together these case histories demonstrate the need to look at 
and rework regulation and consumer resistance in a fundamental way.   
 
MTN 
MTN emerged hot on the heels of Vodacom in South Africa, going live in July 
1994. The MTN Group is another company enjoying phenomenal growth not just 
in South Africa but across the continent. MTN operates in 21 countries holding 
GSM licenses across three continents. The three regions the group operates on 
is SEA: South and East Africa; WECA: West and Central Africa; and MENA: 
Middle East and North Africa (South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Uganda, 
Rwanda, Botswana, Nigeria, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Guinea Conakry, 
Benin, Congo Brazzaville, Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Iran, Syria, Sudan, Yemen, 
Afghanistan, and Cyprus). The origin of MTN is tricky to discern as the 
companies involved in its inception have been completely wound down. Johnnic 
was an early shareholder of the then M-Cell and M-Tell that was later 
consolidated as the MTN group. Johnnic was an entertainment and media 
company (casinos etc.) owned by Anglo American who sold off its controlling 
stake to the National Empowerment Consortium (NEC). Johnnic was 
restructured to focus on media and telecommunications and thus unbundled its 
stake in SAB and Premier Foods. This was done primarily to fund the building up 
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of the MTN stake. Now the Johnnic conglomerate no longer exists and in its 
place is MTN (Web 39).  





Directors of MTN 0.10% 
Empowerment 4.07% 




Mobile telephone networks holdings 1.19% 
 
(Details were obtained from the company website: Web 40).  
Lombard Odier Darier Hemtsch and Cie is the oldest firm of private Swiss 
bankers (Web 41). GEPF refers to the South African government’s employee 
pension fund. The diagram below indicates the detailed share holdings in each 






Like its counterpart Vodacom, MTN’s interests are vast, also spanning twenty 
one countries over three continents. MTN is similar yet different to Vodacom. 
MTN grew out of BEE negotiations and has been one of the best success stories 
of its kind. Whalley and Curwen’s concerns around the complexity of ownership 
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structures are less of an issue when it comes to MTN as the company displays 
this on its website. What is of concern however is that one is unclear as to who 
the ‘non-public’ and ‘Mobile telephone networks holdings’ refer to. In terms of the 
public holdings, 17-18% is owned by PIC, the Public investment Corporation 
which is the South African State owned pension fund. Other shareholders are 
from the South African investment and pension houses: Stanlib asset 
management, Allan Gray, Sanlam, Polaris Capital and Coronation (Web 42). It is 
interesting that the second largest shareholder of MTN is not part of ‘public’ 
listings. “The M1 Group has acquisitions in the Geneva-based Baboo airline, 
French fashion brand Faconnable, Luxembourg-based Avante Petroleum with 
corporate offices in Luxembourg and Switzerland, technical office in the United 
States and representative offices in Colombia and Mexico where its operations 
are located. The company also has a stake in Lebanon's largest lender by 
assets; Bank Audi SAL-Audi Saradar Group. M1 is also the major shareholder of 
Royal Jordanian Airlines” (ibid). 
 MTN does boast a 4% empowerment stake which represents one of the best 
broad based empowerment deals in the telecommunications sector. MTN also 
created some of the wealthiest black business people such as Ireen Charnley, 
Patrice Motsepe and Cyril Ramphosa who all benefitted from their positioning 
either in the unions or industry (Web 42). In the sense of broad based 
empowerment and the creation of an elite black tier, MTN did answer some of 
South Africa’s development goals. MTN also created new hierarchies of power, 
in particular across Africa rendering many of the African countries in the same 
relational position as Vodafone is to South Africa.    
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Board structure  
MTN’s board consists of thirteen directors. The CEO of MTN is RS Dabengwa, 
the Chairperson50 is PF Nhleko. Both are South African. Two of the board 
members are foreign (British and Lebanese) and eleven are South African. The 
Lebanese member is AT Mikati of the Mikati family who own twelve percent of 
MTN, also representing part of the public holdings of the company. Of the eleven 
South African members, two are women. This is strikingly similar to Vodacom. 
Again the female members have ‘non-executive director’ status (MTN annual 
report, December 2013 – Web 88).  
The directors of MTN also hold directorships in: Pembani Group, BP, Anglo 
American, Afrisam, Opiconsivia Investments, Long Street Property development, 
Sea Star Motors Limited, EdgoMErap Energy – London, AOS Orwell Energy 
Nigeria, Aker Solutions Norway, Hayleys Energy Sri Lanka, Tallberg Foundation 
Sweden, South African Bank Note Company, Sappi, Clover, Eqstra, Remgro, 
Eyomhlaba Investment Holdings, Richards Bay Mining, Santam, The 
Development Bank of Southern Africa, Horizon Global Services, IMC, Mint 
Trading, Unioil and Facconable Group, SAQA, SASOL, Growthpoint properties 
limited, Investec Bank, Kumba Ore, Liberty Group pension and provident funds, 
Standard bank group retirement funds, and Pick n Pay stores Limited (MTN 
annual report, December 2013).  
Again, like Vodacom, MTN exhibits a transnational capitalist class (TCC), 
inhabited by people operating across the globe with the central aim of creating 
the right conditions to further TCC interests across the transnational or global 
and as it filters down to the local. This translates into creating the right conditions 
for capital within other markets, rather than holding industry accountable for 
normative conditions in favour of end users and citizens. It is interesting that 
                                               
50 It is interesting that in the company’s annual report, the title is referred to as ‘Chairman’.  
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MTN has been criticized for some of its activities in other parts of the world (see 
pages 161-163) even though it has been seen as an empowerment success 
story in South Africa.  
Equity 
There are three episodes that will be covered in considering the MTN group. 
While the Asonge share scheme is celebrated as the best of MTN, some BEE 
contracts in addition to the links with Iran must surely represent the worst.  
The Asonge share scheme 
The implementation of black economic empowerment in South Africa has often 
been critiqued as having far to narrow a beneficiary base, enriching a few 
players who repeatedly appear to consolidate managerial hegemony. The 
Asonge share scheme was launched in 2007. Procurement of MTN shares was 
open for a window period at a twenty percent discount of current market price. In 
this case the MTN share price was R 99, 51 and it was available at R 80. In this 
sense Asonge represents a broader, perhaps better version of black economic 
empowerment giving ordinary South Africans from designated groups the chance 
to capitalize on a discounted share price in addition to diversifying ownership in a 
very small way. However Rumney remains skeptical as to the reach and purpose 
of the scheme highlighting what has been offered was not without cost. Apart 
from the cost to State and or consumers, the private investment in the share 
scheme is not without risk which again begs the question of whether this offering 
does anything substantial toward broadening black economic empowerment.    
The immutable law of investing is high risk, high reward and, though this is 
mitigated by the discount, the stock exchange is still a risky place. The risk 
attached to investing in shares is that any number of factors outside of 
MTN’s control could hit the share price. No one is expecting anything 
untoward, but such is the nature of disasters: if anyone could anticipate 
them, they wouldn’t be disasters…This scheme, like other retail schemes, 
will do nothing to enhance black business or radically change the ownership 
pattern of the economy. Broad-based empowerment is essentially passive 
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investment, while narrow-based investment at least has the prospect of 
influencing the strategic direction of the company. What are these retail 
share offerings really for? Broad-based schemes are not without cost – who 
pays for the 20% discount and the cost of publicity and scheme 
management, after all? In this case it must be seen as state revenue 
forgone… Here, broad-based schemes are a way of overcoming resentment 
about the “enrichment of the few”. But while they might serve the political 
purpose of keeping a lid on criticism for a while, so far they show no sign of 
displacing narrow-based empowerment (Rumney 2007, 3).  
The debate around the Asonge scheme leads to questioning the very ethos of 
black economic empowerment as the repeated narrative of BEE deals appears 
to be the enrichment of a few politically connected key players. The telecoms 
industry in South Africa has led to the highest number of millionaires in the 
country. While this can be celebrated as a change in the apartheid wealth 
demographic, unfortunately previously disadvantaged ordinary South Africans 
have seen little benefit from these deals.  
Rumney (ibid) also points out that some supposed BEE deals are advertised for 
the purpose of publicity. Karvonen (2004, 348) explains publicity in this sense as 
making an issue or transaction public to win public prestige or public approval. 
This appears so when one considers the absence of publicity of groups like the 
National Empowerment Consortium which initially conferred the BEE credentials 
for companies like MTN and Johnnic Communications.  
A proposed merger between the MTN Group and India’s Bharti Artel would have 
placed more than fifty percent of the company in foreign hands, with the 
Lebanon-based family the Mikati’s already owning twelve percent of MTN 
(Mochiko 2009, 1). This deal fell through and in 2010 MTN again offered shares 
to the black public through another scheme called MTN Zakhele. Four percent of 
the MTN Group ownership would then be in the hands of the black public as a 
means of broad based black economic empowerment (Speckman 2012, 18). It 
would indeed be interesting speculating on whether shares would have been 
open to the public again if the MTN-Bharti deal occurred.  
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This initiates the debate on what black economic empowerment ought to be. In 
an article interestingly entitled: “Too many ships, too few captains”, Milzai (2008, 
4) clarifies that there is still some disgruntlement over the ‘hogging’ of 
directorships by a few connected black people. “According to the King 2 report, 
ideally directors should not sit on more than three or four boards (ibid).” Cyril 
Ramaphosa, Koosum Kalyan and Johnson Njeke all hold non-executive 
directorships in MTN. It is interesting that Ramaphosa51 and Kalyan also hold 
non-executive directorships in Standard Bank (Stewart 2008, 4).  
The symmetry across boards and directors is what Mosco (1996, 189) refers to 
as “direct and indirect interlocks”. This is when firms are linked via common 
board membership, in the first case with one company on the board of another; 
and in the second case, via joint membership on a third board. Mosco 
emphasizes that these are crucial spaces as they represent “nodes in networks 
of class power”.  
This texture, made up of the many daily occasions for contact and 
interaction, gives concentration the quality of hegemony, a taken-for-granted 
belief in the right to use power (Mosco 1996, 189).  
The hegemonic interactions within directorships are notoriously difficult to 
penetrate but it is certainly apparent that there are too few players at this 
particular rank of industry. At the lower levels of procurement and awarding of 
tenders, a perverted texture of BEE resurfaces with little chance for recourse or 
remedy. This is a familiar scenario when BEE contracts are awarded and the 
company of choice either sub-contracts to another company with little or no BEE 
credentials, or remains unable to fulfil the initial contractual obligations. The 
problem with this kind of application of BEE is that consumers end up footing the 
bill for improper choices.  
 
                                               
51 Ramaphosa gave up all directorships when re-entering politics (2014).  
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The problem with tenderpreneurship… 
As part of its mandate and expansion of footprint, MTN was to build cell phone 
hubs in East London, Kimberly and Worcester. This was a construction project 
worth R510 million. MTN chose Umbutho civil and electrical CC over traditional 
large contractors like Murray and Roberts or Grinaker. Umbutho was ranked with 
level two grading which meant that the company was eligible for public sector 
contracts to the value of approximately R600 000. MTN insisted that the 
procurement process was fair and transparent; however a few repercussions 
subsequently emerged. Umbutho was made up of one lone executive named 
Diau April Mokoena. His employee Elias Mabitsela was previously involved in 
many MTN projects managing the sub-contractors who did the work once the 
contract was awarded to Umbutho. Mabitsela signed Smartcon, an engineering 
company under Pieter Swart to do the MTN job in Worcester. This was allegedly 
worth R170 million of the total contract (Noseweek 2010, 26-27).  
When the work was completed, Umbutho underpaid Smartcon by R1.8 million. At 
first an MTN project manager (Thys van der Merwe) assured Smartcon that the 
shortfall would be paid and subsequently another project manager (Stefaans 
Potgieter) stated that Smartcon had to deal directly with the company he was 
contracted to. This saga went back and forth in arbitration proceedings with both 
sides claiming the other had failed to meet contractual agreements (ibid).  
A similar turn of events occurred at the East London hub. Umbutho 
subcontracted to Inyati construction and the latter company experienced the 
same frustrations as Smartcon. Collan Nicholas of Inyati was instructed that no 
complaints were to be addressed to MTN, leaving the project well behind 
schedule and requisite funds (ibid).  
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While MTN was adamant that proper tender processes were followed, it is 
interesting that at the same time there was a high turn-over of procurement 
managers and it is alleged that MTN had to pay a R21 million bail out to a 
contractor who did not meet contractual agreements. A spokesperson for MTN 
stated:  
With regard to MTN taking responsibility for complaints…MTN is not party to 
the sub-contracting contractual arrangements entered into between 
Umbothu and its sub-contractors and cannot be involved in disputes...With 
regard to whether a procurement director was fired within the past two 
years, we would like to confirm that two procurement general managers 
resigned from their positions over the past two years (ibid). 
Firstly, procurement contracts that are mismanaged accrue a double cost to the 
company and are indicative of what is terribly wrong with the tendering process 
and the application of BEE. Secondly, companies that are hired beyond their 
capacity may be under severe pressure to upgrade their staff and equipment and 
if they fail at meeting their obligations, the company could find it difficult to obtain 
new contracts to offset the initial investment in expansion which could leave 
them in a worse off position than when they started. This subverts the whole 
exercise of development and BEE.  
Thirdly, BEE tender awards are given with no real conditions attached in terms of 
who actually will do the work. In the case of Umbothu and Worcester, Umbothu 
sub-contracted to another company whose credentials were not scrutinized in 
terms of BEE scorecards etc. This process enriches very few and also skews 
perception as to the competence of black companies and further does little 
towards developing any skills transfer. If Umbothu sub-contracted with a view to 
training in-built in the project, it could still possibly be salvageable as a worthy 
appointment. However Umbothu’s Mabitsela developed a penchant for 
expensive cars like Aston Martins and Maseratis without too much concern for 
visiting MTN hub construction sites (ibid). This again reveals the texture of BEE 
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contracts (especially in the case of MTN) which were easily subverted for 
individual ostentation and individual gain.  
Finally, such large scale mismanagement comes at a cost and one wonders 
where this is recouped from. It is interesting to note at this stage that South 
Africa still retains one of the highest cell phone rates in the world.  
“MTN has zero tolerance for corrupt and unethical business practices…” 
Ramaphosa said [Director: MTN] (Croty 2012, 1). 
 
Turkcell versus MTN 
Turkcell lost the bid for the second cellular operator in Iran to MTN. Turkcell then 
reported suspicions of bribery and corruption by MTN of both the Iranian and 
South African governments. This was reported to the US while MTN denied 
allegations and further asserted that the US lacked jurisdiction over the case 
(ibid). However the United States of America has been known to take the lead in 
the extradition, prosecution and levying of fines to parties found guilty. This 
process is facilitated under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the 
Securities and Exchange Act. The Securities and Exchange Act requires strict 
auditing procedures to be followed and mandates the obligation to report and 
investigate concerns of possible corruption. The FCPA operates as an umbrella 
covering any firm listed in the US, any US citizen, any money or thing of value 
passing through the US and also extends to the recipient of bribes and not just 
the individual who bribes (Sutherland, public lecture, 2012).  
The Turkcell-MTN case was opened in the District of Columbia – Washington DC 
(Naidoo 2012, 4). Turkcell alleges that MTN bribed the Iranian and South African 
governments for the second cellular operator license in Iran. It is alleged that 
MTN encouraged the South African government to take a lenient position 
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towards Iran’s civil nuclear power programme at the UN Security Council in 
exchange for the Iranian cellular license and the South African government 
would be enlisted as Iran’s provider of military equipment (McKune, Sole and 
Brummer 2012, 2).  
MTN’s response was largely to discredit the whistle-blower, Chris Kilowan 
(Naidoo 2012, 4). Other issues that surfaced were allegations of MTN assistance 
with ‘spyware’ and thus tacit support for Iranian human rights contraventions.  
DA Party MP David Maynier said allegations which emerged in a lawsuit 
filed in the US District of Columbia in Washington DC suggested that MTN 
may have undertaken to provide access to its devices, by agreeing to 
facilitate the installation of “eavesdropping technology” on its devices in Iran 
(The Mercury 2012, 5).  
Maynier said he was concerned that “in possibly facilitating the surveillance 
of the political opposition, MTN may directly or indirectly be responsible for 
violation of human rights in Iran” (Business Report 2012, 19). 
The former US ambassador to the United Nations Mark Wallace, together with 
former CIA chief James Woolsey, have campaigned against MTN, trying to force 
disinvestment from Iran. Wallace stated,  
While Iran’s nuclear and terrorist activities should be reason enough for a 
corporation to pull out of Iran, the regime’s serious human rights abuses 
should be of particular concern to MTN. As MTN must know, there is ample 
evidence of Iran using telecommunications equipment to illegally track, 
monitor and, in some cases, arrest, detain and torture Iranian citizens 
opposed to the current extremist regime. While Uani [United against Nuclear 
Iran] recognizes that telecommunications firms do not necessarily condone 
those activities, it is nevertheless a concern to many that corporations such 
as MTN allow their technology to be used to carry out egregious human 
rights abuses. MTN must end its irresponsible business activities in Iran, 
and in particular its direct collaboration with the Iranian regime (Ntingi and 
Gqubule 2010, 1).  
The MTN BEE icon emerging out of a democracy and liberal constitution 
promoting equality for all and redress for the previously disadvantaged, stands in 
stark contradiction to the MTN-Iran second cellular operator license, in which a 
harsh regime is supported that employs surveillance to suppress oppositional 
voices. It is troubling that MTN appears blasé about cellular surveillance in Iran 
as it indicates that for the sake of “business as usual” MTN could be prepared to 
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engage in similar tactics against South African citizens  especially as the high 
ranking official in the business is now the president (Cyril Ramaphosa) of the 
majority party in South Africa.  
 
Cell C 
Cell C was introduced in 2001 to address service delivery and promote 
competition and economic growth in South Africa. As a late comer in the field, 
Cell C was beset with many anti-competitive problems but has managed in the 
long run to gain and maintain a decent hold on the South African market. This 
diversified ownership and restructured the industry along oligopolistic lines. Cell 
C (Pty) Ltd is wholly owned by 3C Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd, which in turn is 
60% owned by Oger Telecom South Africa, a division of Saudi Oger, 25% by 
CellSAf, a black empowerment organisation, and 15% by Lanun Securities South 
Africa which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Saudi Oger Ltd52 (Web 43). Cell C 
had a rocky beginning and experienced some very harsh anti-competitive moves 
as it set out to provide some level of competition to the South African cellular 
duopoly. It currently commands 17% of the market share.  
Cell C’s equity partners once fulfilled ICASA’s mandate of forty percent as at 
inception, CellSAf’s stake was 40%, but this has now reduced to 25%. Twenty 
five percent in a company is far from a controlling interest or even an interest that 
can influence pricing etc. In addition, the ten companies that together form the 
equity partner of Cell C are different companies with different interests. In order 
to have some controlling power or interest, they need to all be in agreement in 
the first instance, which may not necessarily be easily achieved. So Cell C’s 
                                               
52 Saudi Oger Ltd is the Saudi Arabian multinational company with interests across the globe. 
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equity partner remains a somewhat silent one, with no demonstrable allocative 
control53.   
With regard to equity ownership, the ICT charter states under its main objectives 
that it seeks to, “promote an increase in the number of black people, including 
black women and other vulnerable groups such as those with disabilities, 
workers and the youth, who directly own and control ICT enterprises; eliminate 
and discourage the practise of token ownership committed by blacks and whites 
alike, otherwise commonly referred to as fronting” (Web 44).  
With regard to fronting, gender, and the disability composition of ownership, a 
deeper scrutiny needs to be carried out in order to measure substantive changes 
with these demographic groups in this company. At present the company’s 
equity partners are represented in a complex business network that reveals little 
with respect to ownership composition. It is difficult to assess the level of change 
with respect to disability and gender. This aspect therefore warrants more 
exploration and analysis.  
Cell C boasted a business plan that projected the creation of 2 500 direct and 15 
000 indirect jobs. It now has a staff complement of 3060 out of which 9 are 
disabled people.54 Cell C states that more than 87% of current employees are 
individuals from previously disadvantaged sectors, and women account for more 
than 40% of the total staff complement; however this has not been confirmed by 
ICASA. With regard to managerial positions, prior to the reduction of CellSAf’s 
stake in Cell C (from 40% to 25%), there were two female non-executive 
directors on the board of Cell C. This is the same as Vodacom and MTN. Since 
the change in ownership with Saudi Oger’s Lanun acquiring a 15% stake from 
                                               
53 Consists of power to define overall goals and scope of enterprise and determine general way it 
deploys resources. 
54 Operational control is confined to decisions about effective use of resources already allocated. 
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CellSAf, the board structure has changed. There are ten directors and all are 
male (Nhlanhla Rigney Kunene, Ian Elvis Pierce, Yusuf Mahomed, Simon Dufffy, 
Rami Aslan, Mazen Abou Chakra, Homoud Mohammed Alkussayer, Kabban 
Hassan, De Villiers and Charles Knott-Craig).  
Cell C’s aggressive publicity campaign has branded the company as a champion 
of feminist rights with its “Take a girl child to work” campaign. Yet Cell C’s Board 
of directors and Executive team, now that Saudi Oger has a larger stake, does 
not boast a single female member (ICASA annual compliance report 2012-2013). 
Another aspect is the contradictions that emerge from global relations. It is 
indeed interesting that the feminist cause has been so supported and 
championed by Cell C in South Africa, when its parent - owner emerges from 
Saudi Arabia, a country with such conservative views on women. Krisjan 
Lemmer ponders if the possibility would ever arise of driving the “Take a girl child 
to work” project to Saudi Arabia: 
…where special Islamic police roam the streets checking that women wear 
the head-to-toe black abaya55. Women walking unaccompanied, or in the 
company of a man who is neither their husband nor a close relative, risk 
arrest on suspicion of prostitution or other “moral” offences. Perhaps one 
should drive A Girl Child to Work to honour the quaint Saudi law that forbids 
women to get behind the wheel of a car? (Web 45) 
The contradictory texture of Saudi Oger versus Cell C is also interesting as it 
demonstrates the possibilities of acting apart from the dominant ethos of the 
major shareholders. Cell C’s departure in this regard marks a sort of localised 
application that is accepted because of the lucrative nature of the telecoms 
contracts. This begs the question why the company did not push the boundaries 
along other issues also. Perhaps one answer could be that the “Take a Girl Child 
to work” campaign served more as a branding exercise positioning Cell C in 
opposition to the other two established networks (Vodacom and MTN), and the 
board membership reducing from just two out of fifteen executives being women 
                                               
55 This refers to the Islamic dress for women, which is mandatory in some Islamic countries. 
165 
 
to none out of ten, reveals another contradictory texture to the branding of Cell C 
as opposed to its actual ethos.56  
Another key aspect related to disability and development is the support and 
promotion of assistive technology. Assistive technology refers to the 
development of technology that is designed specifically to aid individuals with 
disabilities. While Cell C boosts of a future of multimedia communications that 
will be transmitted via their network, the company does not claim any research 
investment in developing or adapting assistive communication technology for the 
local context.  
Cell C reveals a power-geometric spanning the globe and covering all aspects of 
the value chain from hardware and software systems that enable them to control 
major pieces of the entire circuit of production, distribution, and exhibition or 
display. The “power-techno” circuit extends across from Africa through to Saudi 
Arabia in the Middle East; the US in North America; Germany and Switzerland in 
Europe, and practically all parts of the globe, linking some of the most powerful 
multinationals / business interests. Thus power, money and technology 
interconnect to produce a thickly “webbed” set of business relations, which 
makes for difficult analysis of even local productive relations as they are 
implicated by, and have global implications and allude to global power dynamics 
in the information economy.  
Holden and Van Vuuren explore the Cell C saga of licensing which alludes to an 
illicit arms deal. The text, “The devil in the detail” (2011) makes allegations of 
how the Oger group won the Cell C license through less than fair means in terms 
of South African consumers and the promotion of competition. The deal was 
alleged to be struck as a result of an arms procurement agreement, which was 
                                               
56 Perhaps the irony reveals itself when one considers that the campaign promotes “taking a girl child to 
work” but the company ethos is to not hire her at management level! 
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not concluded in strict terms. The objection to the licensing in this case was 
centrally a matter of a lack of transparency and (broad based) black economic 
empowerment. Weiss (2010, 172-3) indicated that a problematic assumption as 
regards the primacy of the nation state is that theorists tend to exaggerate its 
past power and reach in order to over-emphasize its current weakness.  
In the South African case, the State certainly participated in illicit arms deals and 
there were several other options in terms of a third national operator. This also 
proves the point that local control from the state and regulatory bodies is almost 
null and void as internationalization enables the more powerful transnational 
companies to exert a tighter control over local communication policy and the 
communication industry. These businesses are linked to parts of the globe either 
through direct ownership of companies in foreign markets or through strategic 
alliances, what Vincent Mosco (1996) refers to as ‘teaming arrangements’. 
These kinds of ‘teaming arrangements’ have brought about significant changes 
in international policy-making, including the decline of UNESCO (a site of the 
major support for the NWICO) and the opening of the International 
Telecommunication Union to considerably greater private sector participation. 
These organizations are either less powerful or are transformed to reflect new 
power balances that not only eradicate equal representation among the world’s 
nations but prioritize the interests of big business over that of the individual.  
An example of this in the Cell C case would be the Qatar bid for a majority stake 
in Oger Telecom. If acquired Qatar would have Oger’s controlling stake in Turk 
Telecom (Turkey’s mobile operator) and of Cell C in South Africa (Nair 2012, 1). 
Transnational telecommunications companies are often very eager to 
consolidate and advance their telecoms footprint given the large revenue this 
industry generates. What is euphemistically referred to as increased footprint 
may be decoded as a horizontal transnational concentration which serves to 
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strengthen a company’s position globally making it even more impervious to 
localized regulatory frameworks.    
From Cell C’s global relations, a new power balance, favouring the 
informationally and technologically richer nations, may be traced illustrating 
Mosco’s assertion. What remains to be seen for the African development 
projects is how successful policy and regulatory strategies will be in managing to 
negotiate with business for universal access and core development needs. 
Telkom - Heita 
Telkom - Heita is a subsidiary of Telkom Group Limited. Telkom is the ex-
parastal once operated by the South African Post Office, and was the fixed line 
utility wholly owned by government. Since the development and threat posed by 
mobile telephony, Telkom has managed to aggressively maintain its natural 
monopoly status until recent times (2006) when Neotel was granted a fixed line 
license in South Africa. Telkom offers wireless and wireline broadband and a 
range of data services. Telkom operates in thirty eight countries throughout 
Africa, but has not achieved the phenomenal success of its mobile counterparts. 
It remains semi-privatized with a government ownership stake of 39%. Telkom’s 
first entry into the mobile market was via a partnership with Vodafone, the 
subsidiary of which become Vodacom. In 2008, Telkom sold its stake in 
Vodacom to start up its own 3G network – 8ta (Telkom Heita). 8ta’s rocky 
inception was in October 2010. 8ta has not performed tremendously well and 
limps along with a 2.3% market share. Apart from delving into Telkom’s history 
with Vodacom, there is really not much to comment on with regard to 8ta as it 





Government of South Africa 39.80 
Government Employees Pension Fund (PIC) (GEPF) 13.48 
Telkom Treasury Stock (Acajou investments and Rossal) 1.96 
Free Float (Telkom’s foreign shareholding from the US, UK and 
Europe and a small percentage of the local public) 
44.76 
 
Details were obtained from Web 46 and 47.  
Telkom and Vodacom  
The telecommunications sector has generated new and interesting power 
relations that present even more interesting challenges to development 
discourses. Although Telkom is the fixed line natural monopoly in South Africa, it 
needs to be included due to its minority shareholding of Vodacom. In relation to 
development, Telkom was once seen as South Africa’s success story. Former 
president Mbeki raises two fundamental issues that relate to the economic 
imperatives. 
African countries are now in a position to use their vast ‘natural resources 
for the benefit of the peoples of Africa’…The imperatives of sustainable 
development dictate that African countries should not only produce raw 
materials for export but they should also produce processed products that 
build local economies and do not just buttress foreign economies…An 
equally important concern he raises is that Africa imports just about 
everything. Africa consumes what it does not produce…Africa’s economies 
were developed to service European metropolitan centres. The transport 
and telecommunications infrastructure that was developed was intended to 
link the colonies with their colonial powers for the purpose of siphoning 
African produce. He advocates a reversal of the situation to promote intra-
African trade and cites Telkom’s proliferation into Africa as an example 
(Mzamane 2001). 
Telkom, South Africa’s fixed line monopoly, is hailed as the darling of the African 
development objectives, quoted again and again as the company that challenged 
old techno-finance-scapes through its ‘proliferation into Africa’ (Nxasana: 1999, 
399 - 403).  
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Until the late 2000’s Telkom had a 50% shareholding in Vodacom (mobile 
telephony) and via Vodacom has expanded into Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Web 48). Africa has 
traditionally been considered as a high-risk market that most North-Atlantic ICT’s 
investors avoid. Telkom’s role in developing telecommunications in these regions 
benefits the host nations tremendously as they have been otherwise ignored by 
the telecoms multinationals and therefore suffered the lack of development ICT’s 
could have brought. 
However branding Telkom as a company exemplifying the ideals of the African 
renaissance is also problematic, for Telkom’s expansion into Africa has not been 
entirely motivated by noble development ideals. Robust competition from the four 
cell phone operators in South Africa led to Telkom’s timely proliferation into 
Africa. It should therefore be no great surprise that Telkom has recently identified 
new markets in Botswana, Angola, Nigeria and Kenya ‘ripe for investment’ (Web 
48). This inspiration comes opportunely, after a second national operator in 
South Africa had been finally licensed.  
One can read this as a change of players in the same game, representing 
the spread of South Africa’s capitalist tentacles into other African countries, 
in a way that is not different from similar investment by Western countries 
motivated by self-interest. The projects may appear to other African 
countries that are suspicious of South Africa’s motives as self-serving, as 
South Africa seeks new markets in less developed African countries…There 
are apprehensions, real or imagined, among some African countries that 
South Africa’s intentions are less than noble, given the fact the capitalism is, 
well, capitalism (Mzamane 2001). 
At home, Telkom enjoys an almost permanent space at the South African 
Competition tribunal, as an array of smaller ICT companies constantly lodge 
complaints against Telkom for anticompetitive behaviour. In 1997 Government 
unbundled thirty percent of Telkom to SBC communications (a US company, 
now AT&T) and Telekom Malaysia for R 5.54 billion. Telkom SA was granted a 
five year exclusivity period during which no competition would be allowed on 
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fixed lines. In return Telkom and its partners agreed to deliver 2.8 million new 
lines and meet service, quality and upgrading targets. This was not achieved. 
SBC Communications owned eighteen percent of Telkom and had management 
control, and was said to use the same strategies to protect its market share in 
the US. The company managed Telkom from 1997 to 2004 and then sold its 
interest in the company, soon after the exclusivity period expired. In 2004 the 
Competition commission had recommended that Telkom be fined ten percent of 
its annual turnover, for anticompetitive practices like predatory pricing.57  
  What becomes quite interesting is how the economic icon of the African 
renaissance transforms on closer scrutiny.  The controlling interest behind 
Telkom is a US based company which takes advantage of the exclusivity period 
but unbundles at the inception of competition. Thus Mzamane’s observations 
ring too true, as she questions how contesting discourses of development and 
big-business will conclude the future of the African renaissance project.   
Virgin Mobile 
The inception of Virgin Mobile (Web 49) was 2006; however it may not be 
considered independently as it is a joint venture between Cell C (Pty) Ltd. and 
Virgin Group Ltd. The Virgin Group is a multinational venture capital 
conglomerate with unique branding. Technically Virgin Mobile is also a service 
provider of sorts as it does not own any network infrastructure, thus needing to 
buy network time from other mobile companies. Theron and Boschoff (2006, 
579) argue that Virgin Mobile may be described as an enhanced service 
provider. While Virgin mobile uses Cell C’s network infrastructure, its product and 
service range is branded differently and it is effectively in competition with Cell C 
                                               
57 Predatory pricing refers to when monopolies use their resources to offer preferential rates below 
market value, just for the purpose of luring away clientele from rival companies, causing them to go out 
of business.   
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(in addition to the other mobile operators in South Africa). Following on from 
international experience, it was hoped that the introduction of a new entrant in 
the market would stimulate competition and would ultimately drive telephony 
prices down.  Virgin Mobiles market share is 0.7% but the company means to 
increase this to 10% (Web 50). The Virgin Group reach throughout the globe 
through its interests in travel, entertainment, media, and telecommunications. 
Like its counterparts, the Virgin Group represents a power techno circuit linking 
business interests across the globe, however as with 8ta, Virgin mobile has not 
impacted South Africa significantly enough to be considered for further analysis.  
 
Scenes from Global Telecoms 
Sutherland (public lecture, WITS, 13 March 2012) recently stated that corruption 
within the telecoms sector has been going on an international level at an 
Olympian scale for over a decade and within a more informed audience precious 
little is known about this. Unabashedly, in his lecture entitled ‘Corruption in the 
global telecoms sector: undermining ICT sector reform’, he declared the source 
of corruption as avarice and greed which leads to the multifold problems of 
nepotism, bribery, unaccountability and a culture of impunity. This is certainly 
complicated by the nature of telecoms in that the field is a huge profit generator 
requiring large procurement contracts, expensive equipment and expertise (ibid).  
The Washington Consensus endorsed and promoted the neoliberal three-
pronged approach to telecoms which was privatization, liberalization and 
independent regulation. However whether within or without the developing 
context, there is no strong or direct counterincentives proposed to the probable 
corruption that may occur as a result of a lack of such failsafe measures. Given 
the global scale and scope of corruption in the telecommunications sector there 
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is a surprising lack of serious recognition or acknowledgement of these problems 
across the big global telecoms and related bodies like the ITU (International 
Telecommunications Union), OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development), ATU (African Telecommunications Union), and APECTEL 
(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Telecommunications and Information 
Working Group (ibid). 
However there are several international treaties against corruption and most 
companies are part of these treaties and international agreements. The United 
States of America takes a lead in extradition, prosecution and levying fines to 
parties found guilty. This process is facilitated under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA) and the Securities and Exchange Act. The Securities and 
Exchange Act requires strict auditing procedures to be followed and mandates 
the obligation to report and investigate concerns of possible corruption (ibid).  
The FCPA operates as an umbrella covering any firm listed in the US, any US 
citizen, any money or thing of value passing through the US and also extends to 
the recipient of bribes and not just the individual who bribes. To date large 
telecoms MNC’s such as Alcatel and Siemens have been fined in the region of 
nine hundred million US dollars (ibid).  
The international treaties against corruption are as follows: 
 United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) 
 United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) 
 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions 
 Organisation of American States (OAS) Inter-American Convention against 
Corruption 
 Council of Europe:  
o Civil Law Convention 




The following account summarizes evidence of corruption within the sector 
across the continents. Although this account does not mean to set an 
international standard for corruption nor tolerability, the prolific scale of these 
cases of corruption appears to suggest it!  
 
Asia and the Middle East 
In Bangladesh between the late 1990’s and mid 2000’s, the then two alternating 
political parties agreed to collude and not investigate corruption in either camp. 
Siemens58 and Alcatel59 admitted to paying bribes to cronies, ministers and 
relatives for Telecoms licenses. ‘Siemens Bangladesh engaged consultants to 
pay bribes to Bangladeshi officials with corrupt payments totalling USD 5.3 
million which were improperly recorded as ‘commissions’ and ‘business 
consulting fees’ (Loughman and Sibery 2012, 256). When the regime fell, 
investigations and prosecutions ensued under the caretaker administration but 
unfortunately these were abandoned once civilian politics returned. One 
conviction that was pursued was that of the ex-Prime Minister’s son who was 
living in Malaysia (ibid). After a guilty plea Siemens eventually agreed to pay 
USD 450 million as a result of combined criminal fines (Loughman and Sibery 
2012, 256).  
In Syria, a cousin of President Assad, Rami Makhlouf, owns 75% of Syriatel 
(ibid). This ownership evolved after Makhlouf and Orascom (the Egyptian 
telecommunications company) were awarded one of Syria’s two mobile licenses 
in 2001. A court dispute ensued and Orascom sold 25% of its stake. An 
opposition MP, Raid Seif, who went public with his criticisms of the telecoms 
deals was arrested and imprisoned. Makhlouf controls a range of business 
                                               
58 Siemens is a global ‘electrification’ company also involved with telecoms (Web 51). 
59 Alcatel is a global information technology/telecoms company based in France (Web 52). 
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interests including two banks, free trade zones, an airline, two TV channels, duty 
free shops and a construction company. In addition Makhlouf owns shares in and 
is the vice-chairman of Cham Holding which has stakes in oil and gas 
companies. The US treasury imposed sanctions on Makhlouf by banning US 
firms and individuals from doing business with him. It was alleged that Makhlouf 
abused both the Syrian judicial and intelligence officials to intimidate potential 
rivals in business, leading the former Vice-president of Syria, Abdul Halim 
Khaddam to say in 2009 that Bashar al- Assad’s rule had been marked by 
transforming corruption into an institution headed by Mr. Makhlouf (Web 53).  
Syria is a good example of nepotism leading to extreme concentrations of power 
via telecoms and other key national industries. This concentration leads to 
problematic textures of power with one family wielding enormous control over the 
key industries in Syria.      
In India Shri Sukh Ram was an MP for an astounding forty five years of which he 
spent five years as a minister of state for telecommunications. The Central 
Bureau of Investigation raided Minister Sukh Ram on 16th August 1996. The 
Bureau found twenty four and a half million Indian rupees in his official 
residence. Sukh Ram accumulated millions as a result of bribes for telecoms 
licenses. Officials found eleven and half million Indian rupees in his house in 
Himanchal Pradesh and the names of individuals who paid him (Sutherland 
2012). In February 2009, Sukh Ram was sentenced to a three year term of 
‘rigorous imprisonment’ and ‘disproportionate assets’ to the tune of forty two and 
a half million Indian rupees were confiscated by the State.  
Sukh Ram who is now eighty five years old is on bail pending an appeal (ibid). In 
spite of Sukh Ram’s age and a plea for leniency as his co-accused D.S. 
Choudhary and his wife had died since the inception of the trial, the judge 
175 
 
indicated that acts of corruption by a long standing minister amounts to a terrible 
betrayal of public trust as granting leniency on the basis of age would send out 
the wrong message sanctioning corrupt practices (Web 54). The Sukh Ram case 
indicates the way in corruption can become institutionalized, and having access 
to large amounts of money to keep investigations and lawsuits at bay.  
The next big Indian telecoms scandal involved A. Raja who became known as 
The License Raj. Raja was an MP for the junior party in the coalition government 
and the minister for ICT’s. In 2008 Raja sold 122 spectrum licenses at 2001 
prices at a first come first serve basis. These private companies that bought the 
2G licenses at retro prices were then acquired by telecommunications’ operators 
at higher prices, ensuring that the ministry was effectively cut out of the massive 
profits which went to a happy variety of middlemen (Web 55).  
In November 2010, the Auditor General investigated and found that there was a 
failure in following due process in licensing which amounted to a loss to 
government. This was approximated between five hundred and eighty billion 
Indian rupees to one thousand, five hundred and twenty billion Indian rupees 
(Sutherland 2012).  
In January 2011 an appointed one man committee of inquiry found that principles 
of fairness and transparency were breached. In addition the minister did not have 
approval for the pricing and this was inconsistent with government policy. The 
public accounts committee reporting on the telecoms fraud was blocked by 
government MPs. However the Central Bureau of Investigation then charged 
Raja under the Prevention of Corruption Act and he is on trial with the Supreme 
Court overseeing the case (ibid).    
The Indian Supreme Court was a key and powerful driver against corruption and 
restored faith in the bureaucracy and legal process. Here public interest litigation 
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was the vital aspect. The Supreme Court threw out all 122 spectrum licenses as 
they were deemed invalid due to the illegality of the process of acquisition. The 
Supreme Court’s intervention under the Prevention of Corruption Act also 
reduced ministerial interference in due judicial process. As was the case with 
Raja at the inception, Ministers tried to block the prosecution. The Supreme 
Court removed the privilege of the Prime Minister and Chief Ministers to block 
prosecutions (ibid). 
In Thailand a police lieutenant colonel Thaksin Shinawatra got IT contracts but 
along the way lost a big telecoms franchise. Shinawatra (later the Prime Minister 
of Thailand) started to get political contacts and then decided to create his own 
political party to gain control over the communications ministry. As a result, the 
barriers to entry for other or rival players become prohibitive. In early 2006, 
Thaksin sold his family’s shares in Shin Corp – the largest telecoms group in 
Thailand - and netted the family $ 1.9 billion. This caused a backlash against 
Thaksin as civilians felt that he had given control of an important national asset 
to Singaporean investors. The Supreme Court recouped $ 1.4 billion in contested 
assets and has imposed a two year jail sentence as a result of a ‘conflict of 
interest’ charge. Thaksin lives in exile in the UK and Dubai but still has a hand in 
Thai politics through his sister, Yingluck who is leading the main opposition party 
to the incumbent (Web 56). According to Sutherland this Thai telecoms mess 
has yet to be resolved (2012). 
 
North, Central and South America 
In 2009 U.S. congressman Bill Jefferson was sentenced to thirteen years in jail 
for both accepting bribes and intending to bribe within the Telecoms sector. The 
unprecedented raid on a congressional office found USD 90, 000 hidden artfully 
177 
 
in Jefferson’s freezer in Pillsbury Pie Crust boxes. This money was intended as a 
bribe for the Vice-President of Nigeria in order to secure a multimillion dollar 
telecommunications deal (Web 57).   
The Costa-Rican case is not without its ironies as the ex-president of Costa Rica 
Miguel Ángel Rodŕiguez was elected as Secretary General of the Organization of 
American States. This organization was responsible for promoting anti-corruption 
within the Americas. Rodŕiguez served a month as Secretary General and was 
prosecuted and sentenced to five years in jail for ‘instigating corruption’ in the 
telecommunications deal between the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) and 
Alcatel-Lucent (Sutherland 2012).   
In Haiti, bribery and corruption at Haiti Teleco was brought to light by the ex-MD 
Patrick Joseph admitting to accepting bribes and then co-operating with the US 
anti-corruption organization. In subsequent reports a key unnamed official 
featured consistently referred to in the local media as “Official B” (heavily 
implicated in the telecoms corruption charges)! In early March Patrick Joseph’s 
father Venel Joseph was killed (‘gunned down’). Venel Joseph was the former 
head of the Central Bank when Jean-Bertrand Aristide was still in power. The 
execution occurred after newspapers alleged that the identity of “Official B” was 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide purportedly involved in the telecoms bribery and 
corruption deals (ibid).    
Another aspect that remains murky is US involvement in blocking Aristide’s 
return to Haiti, after a seven year exile in South Africa. This complicates the 
picture in terms of what may be accepted as truth and a convenient version 
emerging towards political ends. This may prove to be the primary problem in the 
US leading in international telecoms investigations and prosecutions as it may 
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provide a convenient legal arena to exercise coercion and repression over 
political players not willing to toe the dominant line (Web 58).  
 
Eastern and Western Europe 
The exposure of bribery and corruption saw a most useful resolution in Greece. 
Siemens paid bribes to the dominant political parties and the incumbent operator 
over decades. This sums amounted to € 10 -15 million per year. In early March 
2012 the settlement for these nefarious activities was € 170 million towards the 
Greek State and a € 100 million investment in Siemens Hellas thus ensuring its 
continuity in Greece, which has six hundred employees (Sutherland 2012).  
Siemens also had to pay huge fines to authorities in Germany and the US for 
bribery for telecommunications contracts in Algeria, Libya, Nigeria and Russia. 
Payment of bribes though systematic was not sophisticated as this was done via 
cash in suitcases! Siemens also had to consent to compliance programs across 
all its sectors (ibid).  
In Montenegro, politicians accepted bribes from Magyar Telekom in the 
privatization of Crnogorski Telekon. Magyar Telekom is a subsidiary of Deutsche 
Telekom AG. These companies have been fined by US prosecutors and the 
companies have been delisted from the US (ibid).  
Africa    
The two major telecoms companies in Tunisia are Tunisiana and Tunisie 
Telecom each with French and Middle Eastern (Dubai) stakes in the respective 
companies (Web 59). Prior to the change in leadership, large percentages of the 
two Telecoms companies were owned by two individuals. These two individuals 
were the sons-in-law of the previous president of Tunisia - Ben Ali.  
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One son-in-law owned a fifty one percent stake in the Telecoms Company 
Orange Tunisie while the other son-in-law owned a twenty five percent stake in 
the other Telecoms Company Tunisiana (Sutherland 2012). These ownership 
stakes have been since confiscated by the new government. In Libya, the 
Ghaddafi family owned both mobile operators in Libya and a host of other 
operators in Africa (ibid). Libya’s telecoms duopoly of Madar and Libyana 
remains firm as Etisalat’s bid for entry as the third operator was not successful 
(Web 60).  
In Morocco Inwi Morocco was introduced by Wana Morocco in 2010 as the third 
GSM operator. Wana was initially a subsidiary of France Telecom but it is now 
controlled by ONA – a Moroccan conglomerate of which 30% is owned by Zain 
of Kuwait (Web 61). In Morocco where an absolute monarchy reigns, the King 
owns sixty nine percent of INWI. The King’s ministers are the directors of Maroc 
Telecom which is supposed to be the second operator or competition to INWI. 
This absolute monopolization is interrupted only by the Kuwaiti investment in 
INWI and the France Telecom purchase of shares in Méditel (Sutherland 2012).  
In Zambia attempts to privatize the telecoms sector went awry when the then 
minister of communications, Dora Siliya had to resign as minister due to a string 
of irregularities uncovered by an appointed tribunal. The tribunal of three Justices 
found that Siliya had breached Article 54 (3) of the Constitution, had failed to 
comply with the legal advice of the Attorney General and had failed to observe 
the appropriate tender procedures (Web 62). Subsequent to these findings and 
the minister’s resignation, a single High Court judge overturned the tribunal and 
Siliya returned to cabinet as a minister with a new portfolio (ibid).  
After the election of the new Zambian president Sata, an inquiry was conducted 
by the minister of Justice. The government under Sata revoked the sale of 
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Zamtel to LAP Green. This was as a result of findings from the inquiry in which it 
was alleged that Zamtel was grossly undervalued and that the Zambian 
negotiating team was not neutral. In relation to this scandal, Interpol was 
pursuing Henry Banda for questioning. Henry is the son of ex-president Banda 
(ibid).  
In Kenya, the telecoms sector is beset by the descriptor ‘mysterious’. Safaricom 
and Vodafone were both involved in paying large sums of money over a period 
of time to a mysterious Guernsey firm. While the owners of this firm are 
protected and their identities are concealed by a non-disclosure agreement, it is 
alleged that this firm is owned by non-other than former President Daniel Arap 
Moi and the telecoms minister (Sutherland 2012).  
Alcatel (a French based telecoms company) was asked to pay twenty million US 
dollars to an unnamed and mysterious middleman in Mauritius on behalf of the 
Kencell / Sameer Group in order to secure a license. France Telecom has a 
mysterious UAE partner in Telkom Kenya (ibid).  
Nigerian James Bori migrated to the UK and was convicted for theft and handling 
stolen credit cards. Bori returned to Nigeria to become Governor of the Delta 
State. In February 2012 he returned to London where he awaits sentencing for 
thirteen charges of fraud and money laundering. His wife, mistress and lawyer 
were also convicted and sentenced. Thirty five million pounds worth of assets in 
the UK was seized. In South Africa Bori owns a three million pound mansion and 
a Mercedes Maybach that was shipped from London. Bori’s connection to 
telecommunications is that he took seventeen million US dollars from the sale of 
shares in V mobile, a Nigerian telecoms company (ibid). The Nigerian telecoms 
sector has proven to be the most lucrative in Africa recently overtaking even the 




Strangely, no regulator has ever uncovered corruption, despite information 
powers. A few have been caught at it (ibid).  
The scale and scope of corruption within the telecoms sector is truly astounding. 
Reform mechanisms via various UN and US treaties and acts must certainly be 
recognized for creating legal and even psychological deterrents to the 
performance of corrupt activities within this sector. Also, academics and public 
intellectuals in the field like Sutherland, Loughman and Sibery, Van Vuuren and 
Holden and Feinstein must also be applauded for the attempt at publicity, making 
information about corruption freely available and accessible as information is key 
to civil protest which in some parts of the world could precede legal intervention. 
Civil intervention or protest will become an increasingly important catalyst in 
stemming the flow of corruption as civil society will increasingly have to act as 
the fourth estate or watchdog of the telecoms sector. This is purely on account of 
Sutherland’s quote, “Strangely, no regulator has ever uncovered corruption, 
despite information powers. A few have been caught at it” (ibid). Co-ordinated 
civil or consumer intervention is needed to counter-balance or at the very least 
stem the flow of corrupt global telecoms practices. The burgeoning telecoms 
sector worldwide has created a super elite, acting with impunity and leaving 
individual consumers ‘out on a limb’ with little legal recourse.  
The legal edicts of disclosure and confidentiality need greater debate for 
application to a global telecoms sector (Web 63). The opposing tensions of 
public interest or the public’s right to know (disclosure) and the State’s defence 
rights to non-disclosure need greater clarity in a sector where industry is 
transnational. Despite over a billion US dollars of fines and recouped bribes from 
corruption cases that were litigated, most regulators can be best described as 
feeble, playing little to no role at all in enforcing their mandate. While the US may 
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be commended for investigating the cases of corruption, the individual 
consumers from the countries where these corrupt practices occurred accrue 
nothing from this meting out of justice, even while these very consumers created 
the surplus funds for corruption and subsequent fines. The US lead in this case 
represents Hardt and Negri’s idea of newly emergent types of juridical power at 
the center of empire which is based on notions of order, ethical truths and the 
very tricky concepts of ‘right and wrong’ (2010, 214). Sutherland admitted that 
compensating consumers in the case of corrupt telecoms practices would be 
very difficult even if industries have paid fines imposed (Q&A at public lecture, 
WITS, 13 March 2012).       
The final point is measuring the cost of corrupt practices to the consumer or end 
telecoms user. While Sutherland asserts that it is difficult to estimate the cost to 
consumers, the thesis takes up this assessment in the following sections. In the 
South African case, the two key texts that delve into allegations of corrupt 
practices in the telecoms sector are Holden and Van Vuuren (2011) and 
Feinstein (2007) explore the Cell C saga of licensing which alludes to an illicit 
arms deal. These texts detail the corruption specific to the arms scandal and the 
procurement for the Cell C license as the third operator in South Africa and 
MTN’s murky relationship with Iran. As they are detailed and well documented, 
they will not be referred to in any great detail as they represent the macro-scale 
of corruption, and the purpose of this thesis is to uncover the micro-scale or as 







CHAPTER SIX: NEOLIBERAL 
ILLOGIC 
The ‘primitive’ ritual of offering goods to an angry or potentially angry God in 
order to appease it into a state of neutrality continues to replay itself in 
complex capitalist economy. All things must be subordinated to neutrality – 
to uselessness. One major difference between the age of the virtual and 
more primitive times is that the contemporary idols have no metaphysical 
referent. The ones that have been constructed are not the mediating points 
between person and spirit, or life and afterlife; rather, they are end-points, 
empty signs. To this paper master, sacrifice has no limit .The stairs of the 
temple flow with blood every day. How fitting for progress to come to this 
end in the empire of the uselessness. As this mythic narrative continues to 
play itself out, the suggestion of Arthur and Marilouise Kroker begins to 
make more and more sense. We are not witnessing the decline of late 
capital, but instead, it’s recline into its own delirious death trance (Kelly, 
1994). 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the South African mobile environment from the consumer 
perspective. With regard to this, narrative becomes important in the process of 
making meaning. It is interesting that an account of mobile telephony in the EU 
puts the narrative form as the central way of discerning truths about the 
experience of mobile telephony.  
Many media texts take narrative form, often working together in, or as, a 
group of texts telling the same story, or pieces of a story, about life. Policy 
documents [and commercial narratives] can be understood as narratives to 
the extent that they offer a vision of why society needs certain technologies, 
how these technologies should work and be deployed (Lillie 2009).  
The regulatory body governing communication industries in South Africa is 
ICASA (the Information and Communications Authority of South Africa). 
According to ICASA’s mandate the regulator is responsible for regulating 
telecommunications, broadcasting and the postal industries in the public interest 
and ensure affordable services of a high quality for all South Africans (Web 14).  
With regard to telecoms ICASA regulates licensing of telecoms operators and 
184 
 
oversees issues around competition, pricing, consumer protection etc. In theory 
the regulator stands independently between government and industry working 
towards the best interests of the general public or end users. One of the key 
issues emerging as a result of global MNCs operating in a development context 
is to what extent a regulator can withstand capture either by the state or industry.  
The chapter takes up the contradictions presented by neoliberalism. Neoliberal 
doctrine asserts a free market (or market fundamentalism) as the primary means 
of economic growth. Neoliberal doctrine also promotes the idea that market 
competition is the best way to achieve the best products and services. Through 
consumer narratives, the chapter reveals the very problematic assertions of the 
neoliberal doctrine. Critics state that neoliberalism pits market efficiency against 
social protection and that the conditions of perfect competition are not likely to 
ever exist without state intervention. Rather than competition, the chapter reveals 
that the mobile industry veers more to cartelism. The profit motive is pitted 
aggressively and ruthlessly against social protection (which hardly arises as a 
consideration).  
Finally industry appears to act constantly on the state to transform it to better 
respond to the demands of global capital. Regulatory bodies are feeble in the 
face of TNCs with turnovers equalling state revenue. As a result there are few if 
any counter-incentives to corrupt practices as the powerful matrix of the state 
and industry consolidate.  
Enter the South African sagas 
As elucidated earlier, I will explore a few narratives littered across the South 
African Telecoms scene. These narratives have evolved into sagas as they 
represent the texture of user experience which has proven not to be unique or 




 Predatory solicitation 
 Privacy 
 Market apparatuses of coercion and compulsion flanked by legal apparatuses 
of repression 
 
All of these sagas represent the functioning of technological apparatuses in the 
service of maintaining the capitalist mode of production dominated by a ruling 
elite consisting of technocrats from MNCs and the ruling coalition. The EU review 
of mobile narratives explores how Althusser’s ideological state apparatuses 
evolve in the information society.  
For Althusser (1985) “ideological state apparatuses,” ISAs, are the social 
institutions that serve to reproduce the dominant ideologies necessary for 
the perpetuation of the repressive mode of production and domination by 
the ruling class. ISAs include the educational, religions, media, legal, and 
political institutions of modern society. Although commercial and policy EU 
mobile narratives are being produced within the logics of different ISAs, they 
nevertheless are ideologically serving the same function, the re-creation of 
consumers and the colonization of new cultural/social spaces created by 
new media innovations. The activity needed for the reproduction of 
advanced capitalist society is not that of political subjects in the liberal 
sense of citizenship, but rather one of consumption. The modern mode of 
production necessitates an ideology that promotes new technologies and 
their users as being first and foremost about consumption and other needs 
of global capitalism, such as the ability for labor power to be “on call,” 
connected 24/7 and anywhere in the world. Commercial and policy mobile 
narratives are thus created within ISAs functioning to bolster a State whose 
“ruling coalition” includes not only politicians and policy makers but also the 
major transnational corporations. Political consent in this formation is 
typically achieved through a hegemony in which ISAs play the decisive role. 
Furthermore, the political subjectivity and citizenship promoted by ISAs is 
increasingly one of the citizen as consumer and laborer (i.e., the major roles 
that citizens/members of the population need to serve are consumers and 
workers (Lillie 2009).      
Communication is not just a human right, it is a fundamental right. No matter the 
economic status, people tend to prioritise communication expenses. Duncan 
indicated that ‘spending on cell phones accounted for eight per cent of income at 
a national level and eighteen percent of income for the poorest’ (Duncan 2012). 
It is clear that high costs (unnecessarily high costs) in the communications 
industries only frustrate the fundamental aims of development and 
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transformation. While industry benefits from high profits, little trickles down to 
closing the digital divide.  
The unbelievable story of interconnection 
Telephony costs in South Africa has always been comparatively higher and 
many analysts in the field allege that South Africa’s cellular rates are among the 
highest in the world (Van Rensburg 2009, 16-17). One major key to high cellular 
cost is interconnection rates. Interconnection rates refer to the tariffs one cell 
phone company charges another to link a call to its network. The history of 
interconnection rates in South Africa has been interesting, provoking many 
debacles which have yet to be resolved.  
 
The history of interconnection costs, actual costs and true costs… 
The initial rationale for interconnection rates was to help networks establish 
themselves, given the initial financial investment in network infrastructures. This 
initial investment would be recouped over time when user volumes increase as 
economies of scale would apply. There is some difference of opinion over what 
the actual or true cost of interconnection is. While analysts indicate that the true 
cost is around 20 to 30 cents per minute, the international benchmark is 
approximately 40 cents a minute (Van Rensburg 2009, 16-17). As of February 
2010, the interconnection rate in South Africa still remained at R1,25 a minute at 
peak times (Mochiko 2010, 3). 
Internationally cost of telephony, especially mobile telephony has been gradually 
and steadily reducing as user volumes have increased. However, the 
proportionally inverse ratio has not transpired in South Africa.  
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Volumes [in South Africa] here have screamed up to more than 50 million 
(Sim card) connections but call costs haven’t come down. Interconnection is 
a major component of the cost of a call. Drop it to a much more moderate 
level and call costs could fall dramatically. But purely on the grounds of user 
numbers call costs should in any case have dropped by now…Should you 
reduce interconnection tariffs to 40 or 50 cents a minute, R 2,50 a minute for 
a call suddenly becomes about R 1,70. Cost based tariffs could cut call 
costs by at least 30 per cent…other analysts put the figure even higher (Van 
Rensburg 2009, 16-17). 
Interconnection rates not only affect individual users, but impacts on business as 
well. The lack of competition and oligopoly collusions has resulted in artificially 
high user costs. This negatively impacts business costs across the board in 
South Africa.   
Apart from the negative impact on business in general, the cellular telephony 
industry in South Africa has suffered itself due to inflated interconnection rates. 
The astronomical rates that Vodacom and MTN have aggressively guarded and 
defended, has been an effective means of reducing the competitive advantage of 
the previously new incumbent in the market – Cell C. The established operators 
were able to offer discounts on their own networks which the new incumbent 
could not, thus affecting and severely limiting their ability to recruit new clients.   
New operators will be reluctant to enter the market because the large 
operators will once again use high interconnection fees as a means to 
squeeze out their new and smaller rivals (De Lille 2009, 12). 
John Holdsworth (ECN Telecoms) stated that even though interconnection rates 
are unjustifiably inflated, they are unlikely to decrease as these rates have 
inadvertently become “such a big income stream” that no business would want to 
willingly reduce this revenue (Van Rensburg 2009, 16-17). 
 
Price comparisons 
The following table indicates South Africa’s poor performance in terms of 
interconnection rates (IC). The table indicates peak times, but South Africa’s off-
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peak rates are not that much better.  The table was supplied by ICT Research 
Africa. 













South Africa R1,25 
 
 
South Africa is often charged with being the least competitive in terms of cellular 
telephony.  
Our cell phone usage per user costs are up to 1000 per cent higher than 
India’s. Our interconnection tariffs are among the highest on the continent. 
Senegal’s are just 21 cents, for example (Van Rensburg 2009, 16-17). 
  
South Africa is the leader in telecommunications and connectivity in the continent 
of Africa. The profits cellular companies accrued in South Africa due to the huge 
increase in user volumes made it possible for these companies to expand to 
                                               
60 93c is being sharply reduced. 
61 R1,06 is being sharply reduced. 
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other countries in Africa. It is perplexing and rather ironic that the very fuel of 
expansion – South African users - do not benefit from their consumption. 
Instead, other countries with stronger regulatory frameworks and enforcement 
appear to be the key beneficiaries. The cellular giants like Vodafone which has a 
65% stake in Vodacom use South Africa as a means to offset their lower profit 
margins in other countries of operation such as the UK, where they are forced to 
comply with more stringent regulation. As they clearly do not benefit from cellular 
rates, in a way, it is almost as if South African consumers offset and pay the 
price for the UK’s and Africa’s more stringent regulation. 
While interconnection tariffs aren’t regulated in South Africa there have 
been interventions in this area in several other countries to lower costs. For 
example there was an outcry in Britain because their cell phone calls were 
far more expensive than in Europe. Britain’s interconnection tariffs were 
high. The government set a limit on what companies could charge for this 
and these costs are being substantially reduced. Earlier this year the British 
Competition Commission ruled big cell phone networks had to reduce their 
interconnection tariffs to 4p (about 52 cents) by 2010/11, according to a 
Research ICT Africa study. In Namibia it was also recently decided to 
reduce interconnection fees by 43%, De Lille says. And they’re aiming at 
further reductions to just 30 cents a minute by 2011, compared to our 
current R 1,25 (Van Rensburg 2009, 16-17). 
 
The debacle (histories) 
Vodacom and MTN entered the South African market in 1994, enjoying an 
uncontested and rather profitable duopoly for approximately four years. During 
these years the interconnection rate was fixed at (an amazing) 25 cents per 
minute. In 1998 when Cell C was considered a viable competitive incumbent and 
it appeared a fait accompli that the third operator would be entering the market, 
Vodacom and MTN increased their interconnection rates quite dramatically over 




A kindly explanation to the lack of contestation from ICASA to this sharp increase 
could be that it was permitted only as a means for Vodacom and MTN to recoup 
their initial investment in the networks infrastructure. As was stated earlier, 
cellular telephony is a volume business where economies of scale apply. Thus it 
is questionable if the two operators did not in fact recoup more than their initial 
investment in the first six years of their uncontested duopoly. By 2005, both 
Vodacom and MTN maintained a healthy market share of 55% and 35% 
respectively (Theron and Boschoff 2006, 575-579). The interconnection tariff 
increase was not related to any real or actual costs, and rather served as a 
means of “throttling Cell C’s market penetration” (De Lille 2009, 12).   
This is a good example of how attempts to liberalize the market and introduce 
competition are fundamentally flawed by the collusive tendencies of dominant 
players already established in the field. This is more especially so when 
dominant players are connected to political regimes and it appears as if the 
independent regulator is without any wherewithal to act in terms of reducing 
telephony rates to fair and reasonable levels.  
A feeble regulator 
As was state in the introduction, a regulator stands independently between 
government and industry working towards the best interests of the general public 
or end users. This is particularly vital in a developing context where end users 
are not as equipped with information to protect their communication rights. Given 
the economic might of the telecoms industry, it is apparent that the regulator has 
not been able to withstand regulatory capture by industry and the state.  
ICASA has experienced the unfortunate history of severe criticism for failing to 
tackle interconnection rates and allowing the steep hikes in the first instance. An 
analyst in the field states: “For the past five years the Independent 
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Communications Authority (ICASA) has threatened to take action on 
interconnection rates but it’s yet to take a firm stand” (Van Rensburg 2009, 16-
17). 
The former Communications minister, the late Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri was often 
strongly criticized in the public domain for taking an apathetic approach to 
interconnection tariffs. The late Minister of Communications who was elderly at 
the time of leading the Communications ministry had a penchant for falling 
asleep during meetings and by her own admission "only [heard] about rate 
changes when her friends [told] her" (Theron and Boschoff). 
In 2009, De Lille (a minor opposition party MP) submitted a complaint to the 
Competition Commission to look into the cellular telephony industry for collusions 
and anti-competitive behavior. She stated in 2009 that,  
Some of the alarming facts I highlighted in my letter of complaint have been 
in the public domain for some time, and yet nothing has been done by our 
regulatory bodies and authorities to intervene in this market and alleviate 
what effectively appears to be a major rip off (De Lille 2009, 12).  
The Minister of Communications (Nyanda) who succeeded the late Matsepe-
Casaburri, proceeded to take on the cellular giants. After conferring with the 
cellular giants, the operators resolved that the interconnection rates would be 
reduced by 36 cents to 89 cents per minute by March 2010; 85 cents by 2011 
and 80 cents by 2012 (Mochiko 2010, 2).  
The proposed interconnection tariff reduction is still nowhere near the actual or 
true costs to operators and both government and some industry insiders 
proposed that an even lower rate of 60 cents per minute would be appropriate62. 
Given the initial fee of 25 cents per minute (between 1994 and 2001), 60 cents 
per minute appears on the steep side of appropriate. 
                                               
62 Alan Knott-Craig, the former Vodacom chief executive, stated that an interconnection rate of 60c 
would be fitting. 
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The debate over the tariff reduction entered the public domain more visibly in 
2009 via De Lille63 and the then Communications Minister Nyanda pursued the 
matter far more aggressively than the previous administration. While former 
minister Nyanda must be complimented on reinforcing ICASA’s position as the 
sector regulator, the critique remains that the tariff cut is a compromise. Cellular 
operators were merely pre-empting regulatory pressure and simply sought to 
dictate the course of the rate cuts that afforded the best profit margin possible for 
as long as possible (Gedye 2009, 36).  
The new rate cut will come into effect by March next year and will bring the 
peak interconnection rate down from R1,25 to 89c. The off-peak rate will 
remain the same, at 77c…There are bound to be many who are 
disappointed with the agreed cut. Some stakeholders have been calling for 
interconnection rates to be cut to a cost-based rate closer to 25c (Gedye 
2009, 36). 
This was a voluntary offer from operators,” said Rikhotso64. “We did not 
prescribe or force change (ibid). 
 
 While ICASA welcomed the reduction, it affirmed that this voluntary offer from 
operators would not affect its own work in determining and enforcing a more 
cost-based tariff. Critics argued that the tariff cut was a compromise as it may 
have bound ICASA to the cellular operators pace of tariff reductions over the 
next three years (2010 – 2013). ICASA was also criticized for not attending to the 
off-peak rate which comparatively speaking is still very high at 77 cents per 
minute (Gedye 2009, 36).  
One industry insider who did not want to be named said the compromise by 
Nyanda on the rate cut bore the “hallmark of a new minister and team at the 
department of communications who painted themselves into a corner 
through a lack of appreciation of the complexities of the industry and the 
time frames involved for effecting change” (ibid).  
The cellular operators and the Independent Communications Authority of 
SA (ICASA) are at loggerheads over the new interconnection tariff 
                                               
63 It is alleged that De Lille was merely an opportunistic pawn who was tipped off about the fractured 
relationship between Vodacom and the Government, who then pursued a public campaign, grandstanding 
about cellular rates in South Africa. 
64 Communications ministerial spokesperson at the time.  
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agreement, which the regulator rejected this week. ICASA said the 
proposed new interconnection agreements signed by MTN, Cell C and 
Vodacom late last month ‘sought to bind the authority to an undertaking not 
to review mobile termination rates until March, 1 2013…The rate is currently 
set at R1,25 a minute at peak times (Mochiko 2010, 2). 
The initial reduction was supposed to be a voluntary offer, but time reveals the 
true intention of the operators was to force the tariff reduction on their own terms 
rather than relating it in some way to actual costs. This is indicative of how 
operators consistently attempt to thwart competition and social development, and 
fail to comply with sector regulators. 
Vodacom was particularly vehement in its defence that the tariff reduction ought 
to follow the “glide path”. What this translates into is an effective binding of the 
regulator to the tariffs that industry sets rather than complying with the tariffs that 
the regulator deems appropriate.  
This is problematic as a cursory comparison reveals that the proposed glide path 
reduction to 80 cents in 2012 was still much higher than almost all other 
countries current interconnection rate (in 2009). It is ironic that some of the 
players in South Africa’s cellular industry also operate in these countries with 
lower rates.   
 Neoliberalism and the ideology of naturalness 
On the face of it, interconnection debacles are absurd. The matter would 
instantly be clarified and accompanied by a host of benefits such as stimulating 
the economy (especially small industries) and reaching a step closer to achieving 
universal access, if operators simply fixed interconnection rates somewhere in 
relation to actual costs. This debacle typifies the ideological workings of the 
neoliberal agenda. It was strongly asserted the regulator recede in favor of 
market forces, which would result in a levelling of tariff to the correct price.  
In 2006, the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa 
conducted hearings to draft regulations for interconnection fees. MTN 
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submitted that ICASA should leave interconnection rates alone and allow 
the market to rectify them (De Lille 2009, 12). 
This is indicative is the classic neoliberal double-speak that serves the ends of 
industry profits alone. Neoliberalism is shrouded in, or rather promotes an 
ideology of naturalness that markets are self-correcting; labour will fetch what it 
is worth in such a self-correcting environment; there is no wastage of labour 
therefore full employment goals do not have to be independently pursued by 
regulatory pressure. There is also the assumption of perfect competition 
emerging or existing without regulatory oversight and enforcement. This is easily 
debunked as the market in this case proves to be fiercely anti-competitive, 
collusive and seeking aggressively to squeeze rival entrants out of the market no 
sooner than they have entered. Thus one need only skim the surface of the 
interconnection tariff debacles for the ideology of naturalness to logically 
crumble.  
Operators have colluded, almost forming a cartel to maintain exorbitant 
unjustifiably high interconnection rates. Far from being a state evolving out of the 
natural working of market forces, operators often take a litigious path to promote 
and maintain their stronghold on unjustifiable profiteering. The issue of litigation 
will be explored further under the section ‘Legal apparatuses’, the apparatus of 
compulsion.  
Vodacom complained bitterly that “for every 10 percent cut in the R1,25 
interconnection rate, it would lose R200 million in revenue” (Mochiko 2010, 2). 
This perhaps formed part of the rationale to attempt to bind ICASA to what was 
referred to as the glide path. Again this typifies the neoliberal logic of situating 
debates without a history. The loss of revenue is not juxtaposed to the fact the 
operator was charging rates that were far too exorbitant in the first instance. A 
good example of how the water is muddied by neoliberal double speak: actually 
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the market does not correct itself, and perfect competition does not exist as the 
dominant tendency is for players to collude.  
Gillwald, a South African telecoms expert, states that the factors that have 
contributed to the “regulatory impasse” are “legal bottle necks, regulatory 
capacity [and] institutional arrangements” (Gedye 2009, 36). At this point, 
Rikhotso, the former communication minister’s spokesperson said that the 
minister, “had reached an in principle agreement with the operators, but beyond 
that it was ICASA’s duty to implement the agreement” (Mochiko 2010, 2).The 
legal bottle necks occur mostly as a result of the often obstructively litigious 
nature of the operators with highly proficient / sophisticated legal teams who are 
able to keep matters in court for as long as possible. Given the turnover of staff 
(and consequently expertise) at ICASA and the lack of resources, it is difficult to 
mount some sort of equitable enforcement. A former ICASA councillor, Tracey 
Cohen65 stated that these tactics are part of a “4D strategy”: 
“Delay/deny/debate/deliver” (Gedye 2009, 36). 
While there has been much sound and fury over interconnection rates of late, the 
other issues that seem to have been forgotten are off-peak rates and prepaid 
rates. Prepaid packages generally service the lower LSM groups as they are less 
able to afford the luxury of a contract which requires monthly payments. These 
groups of consumers are often employed in the informal sector; perhaps they 
lack steady employment or even with fixed employment, the wage received is too 
low to maintain a contract. It is ironic that prepaid rates are so punishingly high 
when it is mainly the lower income groups that utilize these packages.  
De Lille stated that “prepaid cell phone calls are still so expensive. It’s often 
up to R3 a minute for a peak-time call – almost three times as much as an 
international landline call in peak time to America, Britain, Brazil, Norway 
and Canada” (Van Rensburg 2009, 16). 
                                               
65A former ICASA councilor and now Neotel regulatory head 
196 
 
With regard to contract packages, Ambrose raises a salient point asserting that  
…the new packages aren’t necessarily cheaper. He says the networks have 
simply looked at consumers’ average monthly spending and redesigned 
packages to ensure they still earn R200 or R300 a month from each user for 
more or less the same value (Van Rensburg 2009, 16). 
This is indicative again of the disjuncture between real or actual costs and what 
may be feasibly charged – or rather what a commodity may fetch in the market 
place. Despite the pressure to lower rates, it must be remembered that the 
business imperative will always be profit driven. Thus the myriad choices in the 
market place are not meant to allow autonomous consumers’ unconstrained 
choice but rather to make it difficult to compare prices and discern the best deal. 
ICASA, the industry’s regulator, will have until the end of November [2009] 
to implement the cuts…The plan was being fast-tracked ahead of 
Christmas. ‘These operators access most of their profits during the festive 
period. That is why we are giving ICASA a November deadline.’ Mohlala66 
said it was also being done to benefit cash-strapped South Africans – many 
of whom were on prepaid contracts and, according to research, paid far 
more for calls than contract customers (Naidu, B and S Pather 2009, 1-2). 
Mohlala said a ‘tariff advisory council’ would be set up to ensure consumers 
and government were involved each time cell phone and fixed-line 
operators wanted to increase costs. “This is something we plan to do. 
Consumers must play a more active role and we are in dire need of an 
advisory council” (Naidu, B and S Pather 2009, 1-2). 
The international benchmark study (comparing Chile, South Korea, India, Brazil 
and Malaysia) commissioned by the Department of Communications indicated 
that cellular rates or mobile tariffs are the most expensive in South Africa. In 
addition mobile broadband tariffs for high volumes are also the most expensive 
in South Africa. South Africa comes second only in sms prices. The rub must 
certainly be that amongst all countries compared, all others have maximum 
broadband speeds that are faster than South Africa (Naidu, B and S Pather 
2009, 1-2). 
While cellular network operators have committed to reducing their 
interconnection fees, they have also indicated that consumers will accrue no 
                                               
66 Mohlala was the Director General of the Department of Communications at the time.  
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immediate benefit from the reduced rates as none would be transferred to 
consumers (Mochiko 2010, 16). This typifies another absurdity as the whole 
point about raising the interconnection debate is precisely so that consumers 
would enjoy lower cellular rates in South Africa as a result. The first issue that 
emerges is that while consumers were cited as the primary casualty with the 
inflated interconnection rates set, and consumers were cited as the primary 
cause for taking up this debacle, consumers were finally not the beneficiaries of 
lowered rates. This proves that the debacle was a shrewd playing out of 
hegemonic agendas as opposed to anything in the interests of citizens, even 
though they were cited as catalysts in this saga.  
Ambrose’s salient point resurfaces corroborating the tendencies of the industry 
to evaluate consumer spending and available disposable income, and thereafter 
to design packages according to this sum. Ambrose stated that networks tend 
not to offer better value necessarily. They tend to look at users average monthly 
spending and tailor packages to ensure that they earn the same amount from 
users (Van Rensburg 2009, 17). Here again, neoliberal economics is rendered 
suspect as the assumption of commodities fetching what they are worth is here 
overturned. It also points to the flaw in asserting competition as a part of sector 
reform as competition does not necessarily drive pricing down.  
The final question that remains is why at this time certain politicians and the 
regulator decided to act in relation to interconnection rates. Despite some 
politicians’ assertions that the move is towards keeping the telephony industry 
honest, Mthombothi indicates that there was more to the interconnection story. 
Barney Mthombothi who was the editor of the Financial Mail alleges that 
President Jacob Zuma, after his inauguration (May 2009), summoned Telkom 
chief executive Reuben September to his Forrest Town home in Johannesburg.  
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The topic of conversation, according to Mthombothi, was Telkom’s sale of 
15% of its mobile arm, Vodacom, to Vodafone, which already owned 50% of 
the South African mobile giant. The deal would see Vodacom listed on the 
JSE and Telkom, which had been at loggerheads with Vodacom for quite a 
while, completely disinvesting in it. But with fixed-line revenue in decline, 
Telkom was in fact being propped up by its mobile arm. Government, as 
Telkom’s largest shareholder with a 39.8% stake and an effective 6.7% held 
by the Public Investment Corporation would have enjoyed the massive 
profits that Vodacom was raking in. It is clear that, if Mthombothi’s claims 
are correct, government has to use ICASA and Cosatu to do its dirty work 
[in attempting to scupper the deal], because former president Kgalema 
Motlanthe had already given his approval for the deal. The last minute court 
application by ICASA and COSATU smacked of political interference 
because of ICASA’s about-turn on whether it needed to approve the deal or 
not. Commentary at the time suggested the sticking point was that Telkom’s 
BEE shareholder, the Elephant Consortium, was set to benefit hugely from 
the deal. The Elephant Consortium, which was made up of people close to 
Thabo Mbeki, such as Smuts Ngonyama, Andile Ngcaba and Gloria Serobe, 
acquired a 6.7% stake in Telkom in 2005. The fact that Ngonyama is now a 
member of the Congress of the People and other consortium members were 
suspected of being aligned with the breakaway party was said to rankle the 
ANC and its alliance partners. It was seen as the real reason behind the 
legal challenge to the Vodacom deal (Gedye 2009, 3). 
 
The South African public celebrated Nyanda’s firm resolve and political will in an 
issue largely ignored by the communications ministry up until now, in spite of 
several requests from the public to intervene in the past. Gedye’s account 
indicates that the regulator, far from being independent remains a pawn of 
government who acted in the sole interests of increasing state coffers as 
opposed to serving the interests of the consumers / citizens. An analyst who 
agreed to comment on condition of anonymity (ibid) said that the biggest loser is 
obviously going to be Vodacom and the political will to solve the interconnection 
conundrum emerged out of a government no longer benefitting from the massive 
profits generated by Vodacom. This effectively means that when government 
was a major shareholder of Vodacom, it benefitted from the revenue generated 
from unnaturally high interconnection rates and so little was done from the side 
of the regulator to challenge these rates even though there was much protest 
and angst raised on the matter in the public sphere. When government sold off 
its major stake in Vodacom to British Vodafone, much agitation emerged from 
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COSATU and ICASA via the incumbent Minister of Communications to lower 
interconnection rates. It is indeed ironic that South Africans did not benefit, nor 
were their interests looked after when the South African government had a 
controlling stake in Vodacom. However, when ownership changed and the 
foreign Vodafone obtained the controlling interest in the company, the regulator 
and the communications ministry were activated with political will to lower these 
rates for South Africans. This does raise questions about what model would be 
the best to serve consumer interests in terms of global and local ownership 
patterns.   
It is apparent that the government had a vested interest in protecting Vodacom 
given the revenue Vodacom generated for it from inception. It is also apparent 
that the finally appropriate stance with regard to interconnection rates had come 
from a vengeful place, where government via an opportunistic opposition MP, 
COSATU and ICASA has exacted its revenge on MNC’s reluctant to toe the 
party line. Government’s use of ICASA and COSATU to “do the dirty work” 
makes a mockery of participatory democracy, citizenship and the all-important 
independence of the regulator. This indicates firm regulatory capture67 by 
Government, which also indicates to the contrary that it is not Vodacom that is 
the biggest loser but the South African public. Geyde’s concluding point is an 
important one as he raises the problem of conflicting interests present when 
government plays the role of policy director in sectors that it is heavily invested 
in. This is simply because government is apt to look after its own interests than 
that of the South African consumer (2009, 3). A cursory look at the whopping 
profits corporations have made on interconnection alone leads one to the 
conclusion that cellular rates pricing has been nothing short of predatory (ibid).  
                                               
67 Regulatory capture refers to when government or industry exerts control over an independent regulator 
like ICASA.  
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Cell C has broken ranks with the incumbent cell phone operators, calling for 
interconnect fees to be cut to 75 cents a minute from the present R1.25 and 
saying that the cut will mean that consumers will benefit from the lower 
prices….A price cut means that Cell C will potentially be able to gain market 
share and create more competition…Vodacom’s interconnect revenue 
topped R8.6 billion (inclusive of income from Cell C for national roaming 
services) last year, while MTN netted R6.9 billion in 2008. Fixed-line 
operator Telkom recorded R2.08 billion in interconnect revenue in the 2009 
financial year. It paid out R5.4 billion the same year to the mobile 
companies and international network operators…Reichelt [of Cell C] 
dismissed claims that the lower interconnect rate would not result in 
cheaper retail calls for consumers. “It is an indirect measure, but the 
experience of other countries tells us that this will happen” (Karrim 2009, 2). 
ICASA has been busy with attempts to regulate interconnection to a cost-
based rate for many years, but it recently admitted that the Electronic 
Communications Act is flawed and that an amendment may be needed 
before it can reach a solution (Gedye 2009, 3). 
 
Market apparatuses of coercion and compulsion 
As was outlined earlier, Althusser’s concepts of coercive and repressive 
apparatuses have been applied to the digital age. These coercive market 
apparatuses of repression and consent effect a blurring of boundaries between 
the private and the public; following which is an effective distortion of the ideas of 
knowledge, information and data. The distortion of the different categories of 
information is a necessary precursor to the manipulation and profiteering off 
private information.  
In this case, the repressive technological apparatuses manifest as legalese. 
Legalese refers to the legal discourses around the adoption of NSMI (new 
systems and machines of information). These are lengthy abstruse legal texts 
which upon adoption forces compliance via the threat of legal action and force 
from the original state repressive apparatus: the police. In addition these 
abstruse legal texts are designed to keep dissenting forces firmly ‘tied up’ in legal 
red tape for as long as possible. This strategy effectively puts off potential 
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queries with regard to billing and contravention of privacy (regardless of who is in 
the right).  
The prime cause for the rise of the collusive forces of these twin discourses is 
the economic value ascribed to the circulation of information, as information in 
the information society is a commodity, “a factor of production, in a category with 
land, capital, and energy” (Talero, quoted in Wilson 2002, 9). When information 
becomes a commodity, an entire legal discourse simultaneously emerges to 
enforce the protection of this commodity and broadly refers to IPR (Intellectual 
property rights). Within these discourses, mobile users are further constructed as 
a fraction of the world representing only the elite who can afford the expensive 
gadgetry and accompanying packages, and citizenship “is the providence of a 
“pay per” nation of liberated citizen-cyborgs” (Lillie 2009).  
Predatory solicitation 
While the construction of the pay per citizen is relevant in the South African 
context, the repressive apparatus extends to protect a seeming criminality 
presiding over citizens who utilize mobile telephony. The Consumer Protection 
Act has gone a long way to address some of the injustices within the local 
telecoms sector but this was implemented (after several delays) only in 2011.68 
Even after the act was implemented, recourse is slow and difficult, few 
understanding the recourse they may have. The case histories that follow are 
ones documented in the press and probably represent only a tiny fraction of the 
gargantuan scale of telecoms contraventions. However these case histories 
have been chosen as they also represent the range and scope of contraventions. 
These have been divided into the two categories of predatory solicitation and 
                                               
68 The Consumer Protection Act was published in 2009 but the consumer protection bill became effective 
only in 2011 (1 April) (Web 64). 
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predatory billing. Both are the most apt terms coined to refer to the specific range 
of nefarious activities local telecoms companies have engaged in.  
They started out as “petty” consumer gripes about mysterious charges – 
R50 here, R120 there – appearing on cell phone bills. It would invariably 
transpire that their network provider was playing banker, deducting amounts 
to pay third parties for sundry ludicrous ‘services’, such as “IQ tests”, “brain 
teasers”, infantile games or outrageous ringtones. All too often, the 
customer was unaware that he or she had subscribed for any of these 
“services” – and had certainly not authorized their network provider to make 
such payments on their behalf….It’s a massive scam with serious 
implications for the national economy, built on the old adage: Steal a million 
from one man and you go to jail for life; steal R35 from each of ten million 
people and you’re laughing all the way to your offshore bank! (Noseweek 
2009, 10) 
While this study focuses almost exclusively on the key telecoms operators in 
South Africa with GSM licenses, the inclusion of some service providers is 
necessary given their role in predatory solicitation. Service providers are referred 
to as Wireless Application Service Providers or WASPs, suggestive of a very 
ironic symmetry between name and form! The authority monitoring the activities 
of WASPs is WASPA: the Wireless Application Service Providers Association. Its 
membership includes Exactmobile, Autopage, Clickatell, Grapevine Interactive, 
Nashua Mobile, banking giants Absa and FNB, and a company called Vodacom 
Service Provider among others (Noseweek 2009, 8-10). 
According to section 5.2. of WASPA norms, commercial messages are to be 
considered unsolicited unless the consumer has requested the message directly 
and the consumer has previously consented to the organization supplying private 
information (i.e. the consumers cell number and banking details etc.) to other 
WASP’s or originators of commercial messages. This section of WASPA further 
indicates that the consumer has to have had contact by way of a commercial 
relationship in a direct and recent way. This means that the interaction ought to 
have occurred within the last six months, hence it would be reasonable to accept 
marketing from the organization or originator. In June 2009, WASPA announced 
a new addition to its code of conduct. This was a requirement that, “any request 
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from a customer to join a subscription service must be an independent 
transaction, with the specific intention of subscribing to a service” (Noseweek 
2009, 8-10). Telecoms companies in South Africa indicate that they adhere to 
industry norms and any new content must be requested or solicited by the 
subscriber (ibid). 
An all too familiar story… 
Mrs. Ensink is an older South African citizen who does not use a computer and 
probably only uses basic telephony on her cell phone. She indicates that she 
does not even know how to send a text message. Mrs. Ensink signed a contract 
with Vodacom in September 2008. On 8 May 2009 (2.57pm) she received a text 
message which read: “Ur Adult video here!” (Noseweek 2009, 8-10) This was 
unsolicited. Ensink deleted this message and wondered how this company had 
got access to her details. Ensink’s all too familiar story follows:  
A couple of hours later [on 8 May 2009] another SMS arrived: “Welcome 2 
African Gsm.VC! Content on its way! Click on it 2 download! […] sms STOP 
to 37425 unsub. Subscription service R15/3 day. 16+”. As she had not 
subscribed to any services, Ensink deleted this SMS too…As she told 
noseweek: “You only unsubscribe from something you have subscribed to. 
There was no way I was going to request such a service – I don’t even know 
how to send a text message. Over the next few weeks, Ensink received 
several more messages, each containing a link to an internet porn site. She 
deleted them and complained to her local Vodacom shop. Staff there were 
unable to stop the SMSs from coming in, but finally assured her that the 
“content service” would be discontinued at the end of May. It was (ibid). 
Interestingly enough, her monthly bill after this incident indicated that Ensink had 
to pay R165 for content services (ibid). 
When noseweek contacted Vodacom, the provider produced a log of 
Ensink’s cell transactions – which indeed confirmed, as she claimed, that 
she hadn’t sent a single SMS. It did show that on 8 May Ensink had 
received two messages from Mira Networks...A Mira consultant 
claimed…that Ensink had sent an SMS on 8 May, requesting what’s known 
in the industry as “erotic content”…the log of Ensinks’s transactions – which 
only served to affirm that it was Mira that had initiated communication with 
Ensink and not the other way around. The transaction log also showed that 
each time Ensink’s phone received an SMS from Mira she was billed 1.5 
Euros (by Vodacom), without any attempt on her part to access the link sent 
to her…Mira forwarded [noseweek] an email which came from Linguistic 
Mobile. It claimed that on 21 April Marie Ensink had accessed an online 
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Google advert for Linguistic Mobile, which ‘promotes cell offers for the adult 
and non-adult market’…further claiming that the user in question [Ensink] 
specifically requested adult content…All of which is highly improbable, if not 
downright nonsense, i.e. simply another ploy to avoid responsibility. 
Investigations showed that Bestcell promos, the internet domain specified in 
the Linguistics Mobile email, was only registered (by Toronto-based 
software company Tucows Inc) on 21 April 2009 – the very day that Ensink 
was alleged to have accessed it. This, as IT specialist Patrick Wright, of 
Rocksolid Systems tells noseweek, is extremely unlikely: ‘After registration 
of domain, it takes up to 48 hours to point to a server…When asked for 
proof that Ensink clicked on the promos ad the response from Mira was, 
“Our role is to provide connectivity for content providers into all the networks 
in SA. We do not sell services and don’t get directly involved with the 
creation of services and we do not advertise any SMS service. That is the 
responsibility of our clients, the content providers. All our content clients are 
WASPA registered members and it is their responsibility to ensure that the 
services they offer are complaint and above-board.” All further queries were 
directed at Linguistic mobile Services (a non-registered entity bearing a UK 
address with a false telephone number – responded “I would like to make 
clear that Linguistic Mobile Services are not the company who are 
advertising these services – it is a customer of ours, Universal 
Mobile”.)…The big question: “Why did Vodacom charge Ensink R165 for 
content services – R30 more than the actual Mira bill?” No response. When 
noseweek asked Vodacom to explain why there is no monitoring of what 
gets sold as content on their network, the reply was that this would infringe 
on the right to privacy of its clients and customers. In other words: if 
Vodacom may not listen in to your conversations, it also may not regulate 
what is being sold to you through its network. Nor is there any system in 
place for checking that porn is being sold only to adults (Noseweek 2009, 8-
10). 
Several troubling issues emerge with Mrs. Ensink’s story of solicitation. The first 
of which is the obvious point that despite any public statements and assurances 
to the contrary, telecoms companies (in this case Vodacom) do not adhere to the 
industry norms of WASPA. The second issue is that Ensink’s experience is 
shared by thousands of cell phone users in South Africa.   
Flouting the finer detail 
Commercial messages are to be considered unsolicited unless the consumer 
has requested the message directly, independently and with specific intent. In 
this case a WASP was perfectly able to send an unsolicited message to a 
consumer and bill that consumer for unsolicited services and content. 
Consumers must consent to their private information being distributed to other 
companies. This did not occur in the Ensink case. Clause 4.1.1. of WASPA 
indicates that, “Members must have honest and fair dealings with their 
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customers”, and that “pricing information must be clearly and accurately 
conveyed to customers and potential customers” (Noseweek 2009, 23-25). This 
clearly was flouted as billing for unsolicited services occurred as a result of 
consumers not deliberately “opting out” by sending an sms that they would still 
be charged for. Not “opting out” via a deliberate sms was conveniently taken as 
consent from consumers for services and content. This was taken as such even 
if consumers (like Ensink) simply deleted the message or ignored it. This kind of 
practice indicates ambiguity in pricing information for customers and is 
tantamount to rogue debits. Unfortunately Ensink’s story is an all too familiar one 
for South Africans. Detailed below are a few other experiences, after which the 
emergent issues will be discussed.   
Other cases: 
There’s just no end to the complaints reaching noseweek regarding 
unsolicited cell phone material. The latest comes from Arthur Clarke, who 
writes on behalf of Mrs. E Williams, a “committed Christian and 65-year-old 
pensioner” who has been receiving “licentious and suggestive photos” on 
her cell. Despite sending SMSs to the “stop” number provided, Mrs. 
Williams keeps receiving the material – and each time R10 is deducted from 
her account. The service provider in this case is Vodacom and, as is the 
norm, it immediately washed its hands of the matter, telling Mrs. Williams to 
sort out the matter with the mobile aggregator, Opera Interactive of 
Parktown North, Johannesburg (Noseweek 2010, 18). 
It appears that pre-paid subscribers are even being hit when they don’t reply 
to messages because they don’t have airtime. When they later top up their 
account, the amount “owing” to the WASP is instantly deducted…Vodacom 
eventually concluded that the proof from the WASP that the customer opted 
in or requested the content, was not adequate (Noseweek 2009, 8-10). 
A noseweek reader, E Taylor, bought a spare phone and a Cell C starter 
pack, to be kept as an emergency back-up. Taylor did not use the phone, or 
give the number to anyone, and it sat in a drawer. Every couple of weeks he 
took it out to charge the battery – and on one occasion discovered a 
succession of messages referring to Sundowns (he assumed this was the 
football club), which he deleted. One fine day when Taylor did try to use the 
phone, he discovered it has “insufficient funds”. He went back to the shop 
where he’d acquired the phone, bought R49 of airtime, and asked how 
come his airtime had been used up without making a single call. The sales 
person did that highly irritating “deny and deflect” thing that shop assistants 
learn on Day One – and insisted that Taylor must’ve made calls. Again the 
phone remained switched off, but for battery checks. Again Taylor deleted 
SMS’s regarding Sundowns. And then, in June, after one short call, Taylor 
discovered that only 4c remained of the R49 top-up. Taylor is very glad the 
second call wasn’t the emergency for which the phone had been bought – 
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and he’s adamant that he won’t do business again with Cell C. He wrote an 
irate letter, but couldn’t get an address from Cell C to send it, so he 
delivered it to the cell shop instead. Mr. Taylor did a bit of investigating, and 
concluded that cell users are getting billed up to R15 to receive a first SMS 
soliciting their interest in content, and up to R15 just to opt out. Upon 
investigation it was discovered that the customer [Taylor] was allocated a 
recycled sim card” and would you believe it – “Mira Networks received an 
opt-in from the previous owner who had the sim before it was recycled and 
continued billing the new customer with content services after it was 
reallocated”. According to Harris [Cell C] this should never have happened 
as, “Cell C provides a list of recycled sim cards to the WASPS on a weekly 
basis to ensure that the listed numbers are removed from their respective 
databases and that all billing to the specific sims are stopped immediately”. 
Not surprising comment from Cell C was difficult to obtain but similar to 
Vodacom: “the network provider bills on behalf of the WASP without 
checking whether the customer requested the content service…Cell C does 
not have any input insofar as the nature of the relationship between the 
WASP and the customer or the content provided to the customer by the 
WASP is concerned”. A bit rich considering that the WASP could only have 
got the customer’s no. via Cell C’s data base! Cell C’s charge over and 
above that – (for providing your no’s to the predators – That’s confidential) 
Failure to opt out was considered as an opt in! – WASPA after much 
difficulty responded that this was not correct (Noseweek 2009, 23-25).  
 
In a terrible perversion of privacy, WASPs gain the numbers of mobile 
consumers via the infrastructure of telecoms companies. Even though WASPA 
deems it unacceptable for consumers’ details to be shared with other third 
parties without their explicit consent, the terms and conditions agreed to by the 
subscriber before purchasing the relevant content from the WASP makes 
provision for the arrangement between Cell C and the WASP (Noseweek 2009, 
23-25). This is even though there is no tacit agreement present.  
A second aspect that arises in relation to privacy issues is that these kinds of 
unsolicited content can actually damage reputation. In the latter section on 
Surveillance, the issue of social intelligence emerges. Organizations in the 
business of gathering social intelligence put dossiers together of what an 
individual’s ‘online health’ is. This covers what websites they visit and what 
content they download. Employers are increasingly paying for this kind of 
appraisal of individuals who come through for interviews and even for those who 
are already hired. Predatory solicitation may inadvertently have a damaging 
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effect on one’s ‘online health’, consequently one’s employment opportunities and 
this without any recourse. 
A third aspect perhaps is the least damaging but has an effect nonetheless. This 
refers to the nuisance value of predatory solicitation. Reviewing Ensink’s story, 
one may see that sms’s are persistently sent at all hours of the day and night. 
Again, an individual who has no control of the sms’s being sent cannot really 
hope to have any control of when they may be sent. 
The fourth and final perversion of privacy is that telecoms companies claim not to 
know what content is bought and sold through their network. The response (from 
Vodacom) was that this is an infringement of the rights to privacy of its clients. It 
is very interesting that Vodacom chooses this instance to endorse privacy rights, 
when in the very same case study, Vodacom went against industry norms and 
flouted privacy rights of its clients but sharing private data like numbers and 
billing information with third parties: WASP’s. The main reason for this 
doublespeak is purely profit.  
It is indeed troubling that Vodacom makes claims of not knowing what circulates 
on its networks. This indicates that there is no system in place for checking that 
pornography is being sold only to adults. There is no system in place to check 
that no harmful data is being sold to consumers.  
A cell mafia 
The story of predatory solicitation appears to be nothing short of a well organized 
mafia commanding fees from innocent citizens. The biggest travesty must surely 
be that the practice of predatory solicitation has probably made millions out of 
something that is questionable in terms of economic or commercial value. This 
does not refer to the industries of pornography or erotica but to charges levied 
for services and content unrequested. 
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The cell phone industry claims that there are as many subscribers as there 
are people in South Africa – around 45 million. It’s therefore fair to say that 
South Africans are shelling out hundreds of millions, if not billions, of rand 
each year for content providers registered offshore (Noseweek 2009, 8-10). 
Another problematic aspect is that some of this predatory solicitation results in 
foreign currency billing as the originator companies are often offshore bank 
accounts of questionable standing. There are a multitude of problems with this 
kind of solicitation as it bypasses exchange controls, taxation, and among other 
things making it difficult to recoup fees wrongly deducted and attempting 
recourse. As it stands, responsibility is deferred from the telecoms company to 
service providers to WASPs and then yet other WASPs. This deferment is 
another way in which companies escape culpability as consumers become 
fatigued.   
The truly scandalous aspect of predatory solicitation is its toll on unsuspecting 
consumers who are perhaps elderly, a little technophobic and who are living on 
government grants in their retirement age. Such individuals do not have the 
luxury of losing airtime money to greedy and corrupt telecoms companies and 
service providers. Such individuals may be more reluctant to come forward for 
their case to be taken up69.   
It is also interesting that even though the industry has earned millions if not 
billions off this scheme, there were few acknowledgements of contravention and 
even fewer returns on amounts wrongly paid. This is more so for prepaid 
customers where there is not such an accessible paper trail to their cell activity. 
A WASPA member stated that it was technically possible for a customer to be 
billed for both the introductory SMS and the opt-out reply, but this would be 
unlikely as any panel or adjudicator of WASPA, “would take a dim view of this” 
                                               
69However this does not in any way mean to suggest that some predatory solicitation is more 




(Noseweek 2009, 23-25). This seems to indicate that unless consumers issue a 
formal written complaint, their individual case will not be addressed and they may 
not have their money (the wrongful charges) returned. Even when consumers 
proceed to take their individual cases up, resolution appears not to be swift or 
easy. What follows are five different corroboratory incidents detailing the 
frustrating experience with predatory solicitation.  
I have a similar problem, with Mira Networks, who have, unbeknown to me, 
been deducting R4,99 from my cell phone account every day since June 6 
2009 (a total of well over R1000). I contacted Mira Networks, after getting 
their number from Vodacom (who also score from this scam) and was told I 
had subscribed to receive a horoscope every day at R4,99 per day. When I 
protested that not only had I not subscribed, I had never received a 
“horoscope”, I was told the onus was on me to prove I hadn’t subscribed, 
but I could unsubscribe, which I did. Next day I received an SMS from them 
saying “You have subscribed to receive ring-tones and wallpapers every 
week at a cost of R4,99 per day!” I reported the case…I’ve not heard from 
anyone since (Buckley) (Sunday Times 2010, 8). 
It seems I am paying some R120 a month for something I did not request 
and do not want. This is, at best, a harmful business practice and, at worst, 
fraud (Potgieter, Sunday Times 2010, 8). 
I have had the same problem with Vodacom, and it took great effort to get 
them to stop billing me for items not ordered. The so-called suppliers are 
offshore and the proceeds are exported legally. (I received my refunds in 
cash from London in a plain envelope with no covering letter.) Many of my 
employees who have pay-as-you-go have been hit (Cowton, Sunday Times 
2010, 8). 
I, too, have been charged under content charges in my November 
statement for R263,13 + VAT. I phoned MTN but was referred to the call 
centre of a company called Integrated Pty Ltd. I said my contract was with 
MTN and not Integrated Pty Ltd, and asked why I was being charged by the 
latter. The call centre person promise to come back to me – no reply as yet. 
I wrote to MTN – no reply to date (Ghingai, Sunday Times 2010, 8). 
I had a similar experience with Vodacom billing me for services not 
requested. Like MTN, Vodacom washed their hands of the matter and it 
took much effort and the assistance of Waspa to sort them out (van der 
Westhuizen, Sunday Times 2010, 8). 
Apart from some of the South African banking giants, there are a range of 
WASPs, one even called Vodacom Service Provider. This does give one pause 
for thought as to the ownership patterns and concentrations amongst these 
powerful players (Noseweek 2009, 23-25). This line of enquiry is given some 
credence when one considers that Vodacom refuses to give a detailed 
breakdown of content services revenue within its financial statements. This could 
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also be as a result of other services rendered. It is estimated that networks like 
Vodacom earn 50% of what they are billing on behalf of WASPs. This effectively 
means that even if WASP charges are unsolicited and basically illegal, Vodacom 
gets paid half of the charges for facilitating billing and payment to WASPs. In 
addition to overcharging for telephony and grossly over-charging for 
interconnection, to add insult to injury networks manage to be paid a vast sum of 
money to allow WASPs access to the private details of consumers by way of 
billing or banking information.     
Mira Networks claims to be one of Vodacom’s “top SMS aggregators”. Mira 
would not disclose their fee for distributing pornographic content to local cell 
phones. Nor would they say how they obtain the cell numbers to which they 
send unsolicited material (Noseweek 2009, 8-10). 
Not surprising comment from Cell C was difficult to obtain but similar to 
Vodacom: “the network provider bills on behalf of the WASP without 
checking whether the customer requested the content service…Cell C does 
not have any input insofar as the nature of the relationship between the 
WASP and the customer or the content provided to the customer by the 
WASP is concerned. A bit rich considering that the WASP could only have 
got the customer’s no. via Cell C’s data base! Cell C’s charge over and 
above that – (for providing your no’s to the predators – That’s confidential). 
Failure to opt out was considered as an opt in! – WASPA after much 
difficulty responded that this was not correct (Noseweek 2009, 23-25).  
Like the story of interconnection, this one of predatory solicitation smacks of a 
weak regulator; an industry watchdog that has little or no authority; direct 
government interest in the sector; industry collusions and concentrations hitherto 
obscured by legalese – lengthy, obfuscatory jargon designed to protect all 
involved but the consumer, and in particular the poor consumer in a development 
state supposedly working to overcome the digital divide.  
Predatory billing  
The two salient areas that emerge when it comes to the predatory side of billing 




With regard to competitions, one aspect deals with the cell giants like MTN and 
Vodacom enticing consumers to rack up a hefty bill by sending expensive entries 
(R7,50 per sms) for supposedly lucrative prizes like BMWs and bonds. The 
terms are not altogether clear and after many consumers created massive bills 
by entering these competitions repeatedly (to increase their chances) the 
competition was beset by controversy and was abruptly stopped. Competition 
entrants were still left with the massive bills and no real recourse (Knowler1 2009, 
6).  
Content services have certainly proven to be lucrative business, especially given 
the predatory way South African companies operate. A WASP, Clarion 
Marketing, was ordered to stop predatory billing and stated: “The current 
subscribers in respect of which Clarion has ceased billing constitutes 80 000 
subscribers; the total loss of revenue to date as a result thereof being in excess 
of R1 000000” (Knowler2 2009, 6). It is interesting as the loss recorded 
demonstrates the extent of the illegal billing as it is thus clear that not all 80 000 
subscribers were willing subscribers. This means that Clarion charged 
consumers or content for services they did not solicit or purchase.  
A second aspect in relation to cell related competitions was again with the cell 
giants like MTN and Vodacom enticing consumers to enter competitions for a 
car, cash or a holiday. The terms are not altogether clear and after many 
consumers enter they find that they have been unwittingly entered to a monthly 
subscription of R210. Upon investigation WASPA found that the advertising, in 
this case Opera Interactive (a WASP), was not prominent and explicit in relation 
to locking consumers into a subscription service, and therefore was misleading. 
Opera Interactive was ordered to stop on many accounts. The company was to 
stop the competition immediately and stop charging consumers who were being 
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billed. In addition all entrants had to be informed and a refund option must be 
offered to consumers affected (Knowler1 2009, 6).  
Contracts    
Cell phone contracts represent the repressive aspect of telephony and are used 
to intimidate and force an often unfair compliance from consumers. As was 
clarified earlier repressive technological apparatuses manifest as legalese. 
Legalese refers to the legal discourses around the adoption of NSMI. These are 
lengthy abstruse legal texts or contracts which upon adoption forces compliance 
via the threat of legal action and force from the original state repressive 
apparatus: the police. Consumers are routinely warned to read the fine print to 
avoid being cheated or overcharged (Noseweek 2009, 23-25). The problem often 
arises in finding the fine print. Consumers and the researcher’s own experience 
across the networks indicate that contracts extend beyond the period of the 
contract and often on not the same terms. One consumer shared his experience 
with MTN: 
When my 24-month contract with MTN ended recently, I discovered the 
contract period was actually infinite unless I gave 30 days notice. I cancelled 
the service at the branch where the contract was signed, sent them e-mails 
and called their 808 number. Nevertheless, my account continued to be 
debited – by an even higher amount than before (Sunday Times, Business 
Times 2009, 11). 
When he queried this continued billing he was informed that a notice period for 
cancelling the contract was necessary and the extra billing referred to normal 
pricing as the promotional pricing that was applicable during the time of the 
contract no longer applied as the contract was terminated (Sunday Times, 
Business Times 2009, 11). 
This is simply ill-logic borne out of neoliberal doublespeak, where only the profit 
margin applies. It is as best contradictory and at worst fraudulent to admit that 
the contract is terminated and simultaneously enforce new terms and conditions 
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that the other party has not agreed to. These contractual contradictions or fraud 
represent the finer aspects of predatory pricing and as yet have not really been 
addressed by ICASA. Lucrative revenue has been derived from this source of 
predatory pricing which proves the old saying true:  
Steal a million from one man and you go to jail for life; steal R35 from each 
of ten million people and you’re laughing all the way to your offshore bank! 
(Noseweek 2009, 10). 
In addition contracts are abstruse legal texts designed to keep dissenting forces 
(or consumers) firmly ‘tied up’ in legal red tape for as long as possible. As was 
seen in the case histories, this strategy effectively puts off potential queries with 
regard to billing and contravention of privacy regardless of who is in the right. A 
few categories emerge when dealing with the issue of contracts. Anti-competitive 
behaviour, capping and privacy are three categories that need some attention 
and they represent predatory pricing.  
In a bid to lock consumers into a network, cell phone companies in South Africa 
have been engaging in anti-competitive practices of forcing consumers to cede 
handset warranties if they port to another network. Although ICASA ruled that 
warranties are linked to handsets and not service providers, it appeared that at 
the point of purchase and sales (on the shop floor as it were) consumers were 
being threatened with or forced to cede warranties if they were planning to port 
their numbers to another service provider. This was so even though a 
memorandum existed between ICASA and providers to no longer Sim-lock cell 
phones. While companies responded that they no longer did this, it still appeared 
to be the case for entry level phones (Geyde 2007, 3). The analogy is often given 
that ICASA to the big 4 is like a flea trying to take on an elephant. Even when 
memorandums are agreed upon, the practice appears to be inconsistent and 
penalties are not brought up.  
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The next issue of capping deals mostly with the rules and pricing around 
international roaming and internet usage. More than a few consumers have 
received astronomical bills as a result of international roaming.  
Greef received a shock cell phone bill of R275 674. This amount was levied for 
internet access for two weeks abroad. It is ironic that a month’s usage for him at 
home amounted to R700. Greef was charged R35 000 each time he logged onto 
the internet when overseas. This is interesting as Greef was told by his service 
provider that an automatic cap was in place and charges for one month would 
not exceed R5000. It is quite obvious that a consumer would not willingly or 
knowingly rack up a massive bill of R275 674. However, “MWEB stated in the 
summons issued in March against Greef that he is bound by contract and has to 
pay the full R 275 000, plus costs. Shortly thereafter, MWEB proceeded with an 
application for summary judgment in the Cape High Court, with MWEB CEO 
Rudolf Jansen claiming that Greef should be denied the opportunity to defend 
the case as “[he] has no bona fide defence to this action and has entered an 
appearance to defend solely for the purpose of delay” (Noseweek 2009, 30). 
Apart from the researcher’s own experience of bill limits not taking effect, another 
consumer had the astounding experience of a R1 million MTN bill created in a 
matter of a few days. While this unravelled to be a case of fraud and was 
eventually resolved (Knowler 2011, 6), the question still remains why the bill limit 
does not apply consistently70. A few other consumers travelling abroad 
experienced similar charges. Bartram (Knowler 2012, 6) whose bill was usually 
in the region of R 1200 escalated to R 10 500 over a short trip overseas. Sadler’s 
‘overseas’ bill came to R34 000 over a period of a week. Both consumers had 
caps or bill limits in place that did not take effect and both claimed to have 
assumed that the cap would be in place as their respective service providers did 
                                               
70 When I queried my own bill limit not taking effect, the MTN call centre person simply said that ‘it 
sometimes does and sometimes doesn’t’, and could not explain any further than that. 
215 
 
not indicate otherwise. Like Greef, both also claim that they would not have 
willingly or knowingly racked up such a massive bill.  
Here again, it appears that it is solely the consumer who literally pays the price 
for ill-defined contracts and a lack of clarity. Here again, the regulator and other 
industry watchdogs are slow to react perhaps as a result of legalese. Ironically, 
the very players who contravene the basics of contracts and clarity reported one 
of their competitors for the small misdemeanour of misleading advertising.  
Vodacom and MTN complained to the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) 
that Cell C was misleading consumers by labelling its broadband network as 
“4Gs”. A spokesperson for Cell C said that the 4G logo was meant as a 
marketing term to indicate “4 Great Speed”, “4 Great savings” and “4 Great 
Service”. However Vodacom and MTN countered that 4G was a technical term 
referring to broadband speed and connectivity. Cellular networks in the United 
States and Europe offer 4G but all cellular providers in South Africa lack this 
capability. The ASA found Cell C guilty of “dishonest and misleading” advertising 
claims and forced it to withdraw its 4Gs logo from all advertising. It is interesting 
to reflect on how quickly issues related to the big 4 become resolved by the 
regulator and various watchdog bodies, while the individual consumer may wait a 
lifetime and still not arrive at an equitable or fair resolution.   
A perversion of privacy 
In a related incident involving an individual consumer Varejes, an MTN user, 
discovered inconsistent billing. When he received a bill of R3912, when his usual 
bill amounted to R249 per month, he naturally queried it as he expected the 
monthly cap to take effect.  
He reported the matter to MTN and finally found himself talking to an agent. 
He accused MTN of moral bankruptcy for applying such exorbitant rates to 
the excess usage, and threatened to go to the media with the story. Oh but 
sir, came the agent’s response, you don’t want to do that, because then it 
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will become public knowledge that you’ve been looking at porn 
sites…Varejes threatened to report MTN to the SAPS for blackmail. 
Noseweek isn’t sure Varajes would have got very far at the local SAPS 
charge desk, but we can be sure that, were a charge of blackmail 
successfully laid, it would never reach court – unless Varejes had a spare 
R1m (at least) to hand over to attorneys, in the interests of taking a fleabite 
at the elephant’s foot (Noseweek 2010, 16-18). 
Upon questioning MTN tried to justify its investigation into the URL’s the 
consumer accessed by saying that when clients dispute “the mathematics” 
behind billing, this was standard practice (Noseweek 2010, 16-18). 
As to the legality of the thinly veiled blackmail, MTN had no comment. 
Unfortunately, this nefarious practice is not isolated to MTN.     
Bob Buckley – who got into a spat with Vodacom, aggregator Mira 
Metworks, and content provider Vira Movil about horoscopes he didn’t order 
– sent an email to Mira, which he copied to the industry body WASPA, 
reading: “Incidentally you seem to think it necessary to repeatedly imply that 
I knowingly subscribed to receive ‘adult content’, which I didn’t. Maybe you 
are planning to refund me for that as well…Other than that I cannot see the 
relevance – unless, of course, the idea is to try and embarrass me so that I’ll 
drop the case. It’s probably a tactic that you people use quiet often. Rest 
assured, it won’t work with me” (Noseweek 2010, 16-18). 
In another incident, which can only be categorized as a perversion of privacy, 
MTN threatened to expose its customers if they did not settle their bills. Bena an 
MTN consumer, uses a monthly amount of R1000 for cellular telephony, even 
though he had a limit of R3500. In this case, unable to make a call, he received a 
message saying he had reached his credit limit. Bena queried the matter given 
the healthy difference between his usage and his limit. MTN informed him that he 
had downloaded R1800 worth of data over a few minutes (Noseweek 2010, 17).  
Bena disputed this billing on the grounds that he seldom uses his phone for the 
internet and on the day in question he was at home when he only uses Wi-Fi for 
the internet. Bena was a more informed consumer who worked in IT and said 
that it’s simply not possible to download that much data so quickly on local 
broadband speeds. When Bena asked MTN what he was supposed to have 
downloaded, the response was that it could not be revealed as it would be a 
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breach of privacy. This is in spite of the fact that the consumer himself is 
querying the matter and not some outside, independent investigator. MTN 
maintained its stance saying that the information was still private. At the time of 
the report, Bena had been attempting to unravel the problem but got nowhere - 
in four months (Noseweek 2010, 17).  
Conclusion 
Privacy has certainly become a troubling and significant issue in the digital age 
as telephony companies increasingly engage in the contradictory doublespeak 
detailed above. It appears that privacy is used as a shield to deflect unwanted 
queries and then flouted when necessary to enforce compliance in terms of 













CHAPTER SEVEN: THE 
PANOPTICON STATE 
Introduction 
On the 12th of February 2015 the South African public was effectively shut out of 
parliament and the State of the Nation Address for a period of time as a result of 
cell phone signals being jammed. This meant that journalists in parliament could 
not communicate with their editors or the public via twitter, Facebook and other 
social media platforms. Although the regulator ICASA indicated in 2012 that it is 
unlawful for any individual or institution including the State to use cell phone 
jammers to interrupt the flow of communication, on the 13th of February 2015 
ICASA capitulated stating that, “the national security cluster departments may, 
where supported by relevant security legislation, deploy the use of jammers in 
relation to, amongst others, state security functions” (Mail and Guardian 
reporters February 2015, 2). In the ensuing protest from journalists and civic 
organisations the State remained unclear as to who authorised the interruption of 
cell signals circulating obfuscating releases about the ignorance of 
Parliamentarians and key security personal about the jamming devices used, 
sometimes even claiming that the incident was due to mistaken use (Mail and 
Guardian reporters February 2015, 2-4). Journalists agree that the real reason 
behind the jamming of cell phone signals at this time was because the ruling elite 
were expecting disruptions from one of the opposition parties (the EFF71) on the 
issue of Nklandla (see pages 231-232). The cell phone jamming incident clearly 
                                               
71 The EFF is a minority party (The Economic Freedom Front) lead by breakaway former ANC Youth 
League leader, Julius Malema. 
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indicates the ruling party’s attempt to control the flow of information thereby 
attempting to create the hierarchical conditions of an informational panopticon 
whereby it keeps its citizens under surveillance (see pages 224-233) while 
citizens do not have transparent, immediate access to information about and 
around the inner workings of the state (ruling elite). Whitaker stated that 
surveillance and the state’s control of information is probably as old as the oldest 
professional. However ‘intelligence’ of this kind differs in modern times as the 
ruling elite shifts its outward gaze inward toward its citizenry (1999, 8). New 
media technology makes it possible keep citizens under surveillance, however it 
is yet unknown how successful modern states will become in controlling the flow 
of information.          
Blurring boundaries: privacy and individual property 
The digital age which brings with it the commodification of information, also has 
increasingly blurred boundaries between the public and private sphere. It 
appears with each case that a commercial imperative takes precedence over 
civic sensibilities and this ought to give us as a society some pause for thought 
on how to better manage, regulate and enforce a healthier digital age. In this 
section I will consider voluntary and involuntary digital displays, surveillance and 
the extension of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR).    
Voluntary and involuntary digital displays 
This sub-section has been divided into two parts, though implied the former is 
not necessarily less dangerous or less problematic than the latter. In a word 
voluntary digital displays refer to sexting. This commonly applies to children 
under that age of 18 but may not be restricted to that age group exclusively. 
Sexting thus refers to the practice of children under 18 selling nude pictures of 
themselves for approximately ZAR 170 per image or for airtime. A psychologist, 
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Dr. Ramphal, stated that it is not clear if the practice represents an extension of 
the child porn epidemic or an expression of adolescent narcissism (Boomgaard 
2009, 1). It may be much more serious than just adolescent phases, as 
pornographic images of youth have been routinely circulating in the virtual 
sphere and psychologists and social workers warn that a circulation of nude 
pictures could be dangerous in that it could easily fall into the hands of internet 
pornographers and agents of human trafficking. No doubt human trafficking and 
child pornographers represent a very real and extreme danger for the tween and 
teenage groups; however there are other damaging aspects to this practice as 
clearly there appear to be financial motivations behind sexting that cannot be 
ignored.   
Involuntary digital displays are when individuals are unfairly targeted or targeted 
without their consent, by the release of compromising information and images of 
themselves. A good example of this would be the MXit slut list, which was a list 
naming girls as promiscuous. This list was circulated among the multitude of 
MXit users (Thatiah 2008, 4). Typically MXit’s first response was to absolve itself 
of any culpability by stating that, “No technology company can provide systems 
that are 100% foolproof, and it is not our job to do the parenting” said Laura 
Hallam – brand manager for MXit” (ibid).  
MXit chose to do little to nothing about removing the content but after much 
public outcry and protest, the company announced the implementation of a trial 
parental control program. This was launched after several incidents of children 
being exposed to danger occurred. Company statistics approximate 23% of 
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users aged between 12 and 18; and a negligible 2-3% of users under the age of 
12.72  
Involuntary displays have the same repercussions as voluntary digital displays. 
In a macabre inversion of participation, youth engaged in sexting create new 
forms of digital consumption. However they remain on the lower strata of the 
emerging network environment. They create streams of finance by stimulating 
consumption but do not gain entry into the new class of technical and 
professional intelligentsia.     
While sexting implies voluntary digital displays, it is still problematic as once 
released into the digital ether, an individual has little control over how and where 
images are replicated. This also applies to involuntary displays. Both could prove 
damaging later in life when tweens and teenagers grow into working life. 
Employers now evaluate one’s virtual health as a matter of course, scanning the 
net for images that may be compromising or damaging to a corporate’s profile or 
overall image. This enduring aspect of sexting may also prove to be the most 
damaging and while it was a voluntary act of display, legal frameworks are 
needed to define the public interest parameters and the probable enforcement 
mechanisms.       
The legal framework is not clear enough when it comes to the allied threatening 
behavior in the virtual sphere. Two reports demonstrate the difficulty of victims to 
retain control over their image. In one story a woman reported of her torment on 
the social networking site, Facebook by her former lover who used her details to 
create an imposter profile in which he demeaned and threatened her routinely 
(Pillay 2010, 1). In another story a 15 year old girl alleged that she was drugged 
and raped by a friend she had met on MXit. When the family sought legal advice 
                                               
72 MXit is an instant messaging software application that runs on 3G phones and prices texting at 1cent 
per message.  
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and were preparing to take legal action against the perpetrator, he sent 
threatening SMS’s instructing them not to pursue the matter or the 
consequences would be dire (Smillie 2010, 1).  
Other related behaviour that is difficult to prosecute of defend oneself against is 
when damaging information and images are spread of oneself across the digital 
sphere. Two students reported that relatives notified them of compromising 
pictures of themselves appearing on particular sites. Upon investigation, the two 
female students found that head shots of both girls were superimposed on nude 
pictures of other girls.  
The girls managed to contact the host to have their pictures deleted but were 
shocked that these images (albeit doctored) were circulating without their 
knowledge.  Here again, the long term consequences could be dire and 
employers now scan the digital ether for a clean bill of online activity. The issue 
of legal rights and enforcement again arises as a key variable in resolving these 





The most disturbing violations of all must certainly be the list of cell phone 
recorded gang rapes that were circulated. The first incident in 2010 involved 
three pupils from Jules High School in Johannesburg. While this incident 
involved consensual sex, one of the participants did not consent to the circulation 
of these images (Pillay 2012, 1).     
The second incident occurred in March 2012 in the South Coast, KwaZulu-Natal. 
Four pupils (teenagers) gang raped an intoxicated fellow student without her 
knowledge or consent. They subsequently circulated this footage which resulted 
in their arrests (ibid).  
The most publicized attack was the third which occurred also in 2012. A 
teenager in Soweto (Gauteng) was gang raped, the rape was filmed with a cell 
phone and this was circulated. In this instance statements of condemnation and 
outrage were profuse from South African premiers, spokespeople from the 
Council of Churches, Unions, and various political parties. This media attention 
occurred as a result of the video going viral attracting the attention of global 
news organizations such as CNN, the Los Angeles Times, the Huffington Post, 
and the BBC. While the attack rightly generated condemnation in the strongest of 
terms both internationally and locally, a cynic would question if the same crime 
would have resulted in the strong local attention, condemnation and action if 
such a crime did not hit the international news radars (De Wet 2012, 19).   
It is evident that pornography and snuff movies earn far too large revenue to 
sequester or restrict. Global revenue from pornography on cell phones has more 
than doubled over five years, grossing $4.9 billion in 2012 (Kondo, M and R. 
Swift 2009, 20). This income stream appears to constrict company’s public 
interest sensibilities; therefore they are often reluctant and therefore slower to act 
in cases of illicit distribution over the networks. It is often the case that action is 
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swiftly taken when celebrity is involved as was seen in the third of the gang rape 
– online distribution cases. Perhaps another example of this could be when FHM 
2011 model of the year, Jessica Leandra dos Santos, was stripped of this title 
among others for a racist tweet in 2012 (Naik 2012, 1).        
Surveillance  
In the consideration of surveillance, Zimbardo’s (Web 13) disturbing yet revealing 
case study brings to mind two salient questions. The first asks how behaviour 
changes when individuals internalize the constraints of surveillance in the virtual 
world73. The second question which is of mounting concern asks who has control 
of and access to surveillance; and what are the implications of this control or 
access. It is the second question that will be taken up in this instance as it is 
more immediately relevant than the first question raised around surveillance.  
Global context 
In the UK, privacy laws in the virtual sphere emerged as needing recasting when 
an MP used parliamentary privilege to refer to an affair between two celebrities: 
a UK footballer and a UK former reality TV star (Wintour, P and D. Sabbagh 
2011, 30) on Twitter. While the involvement of celebrity brings much attention to 
such contraventions, ordinary citizens may even more so suffer from the 
damaging effects of surveillance. Knowler (2010, 8) refers to the possibilities of 
identity fraud that occurs out of a type of surveillance, stealing and sabotage.  
Like it or not, our lives are largely governed by a series of numbers: ID 
number, bank account number, tax number, PIN, cell phone number. Hell, 
someone in possession of all your numbers can steal your identity and 
present themselves to the corporate world as you – if your credit record is 
unblemished – as thousands of South Africans have discovered (Knowler 
2010, 8).  
                                               
73 One has only to review Zimbardo’s work (though dated) to see that surveillance has a direct behavioral 
change effect on individuals. Other key references would be Foucault: Discipline and Punish (1975).  
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Sadly in South Africa, as Knowler points out, identity fraud in some way or 
another is so rife that one need not imagine the frustration and fear this kind 
experience engenders. While this represents a very serious and direct type of 
violation of individual rights, another more endemic, quieter kind of infringement 
is quickly engulfing the online sphere. Marsden (2011, 2) explores this disturbing 
trend and rather than a blurring of boundaries, Marsden asserts that the internet 
has brought about a ‘head-on collision’ between the private and public sphere 
indicating our personal and professional lives respectively. He states: 
Employers are increasingly aware of and keen to use the huge informational 
resource that social media serves up on a plate; all kind of information is in 
the public domain, and incredibly easy to find (Marsden 2011, 2). 
This has led to the burgeoning business of online snooping, otherwise known as 
“social intelligence.” Executives from these companies insist that they are not 
infringing on any rights as the information is freely available. However what is not 
revealed is the fact that people often frequent social networking sites to relax and 
do not consciously upload material of them with the idea of later being 
microscopically analysed. A whole range of aspects and attitudes are collated 
and analysed from immigration to charities, drug taking, sexuality, explicit 
violence, weapons usage etc. The worst aspect of this trawling is that people 
have been encouraged to share information about themselves by online 
companies in the business of “social intelligence” under the guise of friendship.  
Marsden describes how this process occurs, often without our knowledge.  
Wary of being brought into disrepute by the online misdemeanors of 
employees, many companies implement social media policies that punish 
transgressors. It has reported that 8 percent of companies have dismissed 
people for inappropriate online behavior. But far less is heard about those 
whose applications for new jobs fail because of things they’ve left visibly 
strewn around the net. An American firm, Social Intelligence, is gaining a 
high profile following the launch of its web-based pre-employment screening 
service. But the evidence suggests that the practice of digging up dirt online 
has quietly become endemic among employers; you might think that you’re 
being judged on the information you send them, but it might be the things 
you choose not to reveal that end up denying you the post. And you may 
never find out the real reason. Social intelligence has stated that its 
activities have very precise boundaries. A “deep trawl” is done through the 
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last seven years of blog comments, forum contributions and even classified 
ads that might have been posted, along with any visible social media 
content (ibid). 
The alarming aspect of this kind of surveillance is the tangible effect it has on an 
individual’s life path. One may be denied a job as a result of an innocuous online 
search that others deem as a misdemeanour. Sometimes there are extenuating 
circumstances to risqué material, often in the case of a breakup; some wounded 
parties have been known to take revenge online by publishing risqué material 
that the subject did not voluntarily circulate in the virtual sphere. Given the way in 
which societies are closing across the globe, this kind of trawling lends itself to 
the bigger threat of good old-fashioned discrimination under the guise of a 
questionable online reputation. In this regard it would be interesting to track the 
way in which corporations utilize findings from such social intelligence 
companies. It could lend itself to huge abuses, being applied unequally and used 
as a means to dismiss those who question or hold management to account. 
Marsden quotes Purdy, a recruitment business executive:  
Your online reputation is part of your professional reputation. If say, a man 
is going for a private banking post that puts him in charge of 200m 
portfolios, pictures of him wearing a thong at a stag won’t go down well. 
(ibid) 
Purdy’s response may carry some weight but a more balanced point of view 
would be that there are worse things. Executives engaging in insider trading are 
far worse. A closed society exposing its citizenry to routine surveillance is far 
worse. The lack of culpability from executives who have proven to have engaged 
in serious white collar crime is far worse. Corrupt politicians who are not brought 
to book under the scrutiny of the law are far worse. This small list of far worse 





The local context is even more disconcerting than the global context. Swart 
(2011, 2-3) in an article on South African law enforcement describes how 
technology and loopholes in the law result in surveillance that one may not even 
be aware of. History proves a repeated point that all it takes is gung ho enforcers 
in the service of political elites to decimate individual rights paving the way for 
tyrannical rule. Swart reports: 
In 2005 an investigation of the then-National Intelligence Agency’s use of 
the centre found that bulk interception facilities had been used illegally to 
intercept conversations of private citizens in South Africa…Despite strict 
legislative provisions, people working in state intelligence agencies can 
access private communication at any time by bypassing the legal system. 
And you are unlikely to know about it, unless someone in an agency informs 
you. This is possible, sources say, because of the huge number of 
interceptions that take place, the advanced technology involved and the lack 
of oversight in intelligence agencies. The office for interception centres in 
Sandton houses the technology and expertise that enable the state to 
scrutinize ordinary citizens’ private lives. In particular, cell phone and 
telephone conversations, text-messages and data – emails and internet 
website addresses – are intercepted using these facilities, all supposedly 
within the bounds of Rica. (ibid) 
This extremely disconcerting report goes further indicating that the state’s use of 
outsourcing to a private company may aid in deniability and is also utilized. 
Anonymous sources stated that there are such volumes of interceptions made 
that even if brought to court or investigated, it would take a long time to monitor 








South African surveillance process 
A number is dialed or a text message is sent from cellphone A to cellphone B. 
Alternatively, phone A may be used to send data (such as an email) to cellphone 
B. 
 
                                                    
The signal from phone A passes through a cellphone mast, also known as a 
base transceiver station. The mast allows your phone’s signal to pass to the 
cellphone network. 
 
    
The mobile switching centres and the short message service centres are located 
at your service provider. Here, the cellphone signal (which can carry a verbal 
conversation, a text message, or email and internet-browsing data) is duplicated. 




As you are talking on your 
cellphone, or sending text or 
data, the original signal 
continues to cellphone B. You 
proceed with your conversation, 
texting or emailing as usual. 
Neither you nor the other 
cellphone user knows that your 
conversations are being 
intercepted. There’s no click, 
buzz, echo or hum. Anything 
you may hear on the line is 
merely ambient noise or network 
glitches. 
The duplicate signal travels to 
the Office of Interception 
Centres (OIC). At the OIC it is 
possible for staff to listen to your 
conversations as they are taking 
place, or to see text messages 
or e-mails as they are sent. The 
OIC can also receive any web 
addresses browsed on 
cellphone A.  
 
Most commonly the intercepted 
communications are recorded 
and passed on to SAPS crime 
intelligence or the State Security 
Agency. If it is a voice recording 
your conversation will be 
transcribed. 
 It is quite a mystery to discern how South Africa has such a high level of crime 
given the sophisticated surveillance capacity. Crime statistics beg the question of 
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what surveillance is used for. Swart states categorically that, “the role of 
surveillance in our politics recently is undeniable.” (ibid) 
The South African Panopticon 
In the film, A scanner darkly (2006) the absurdity of national surveillance reveals 
a nexus of power (the State, the police via intelligence agencies and industry) 
working together to generate hegemonic relations and manage the citizenry 
through surveillance and force when necessary. South Africa has an intimate 
memory of the suffocating and oppressive effects of such nodes of power during 
apartheid years. In a way the abuses during this era provided a tremendous 
impetus for comprehensive provisions for freedom of information in the post 
1994 constitution as one of the pillars of good governance enabling 
transparency. The South African constitution, when passed into law in 1996, was 
saluted as one of the world’s most progressive constitutions. The legislation 
around freedom of expression is dealt with in section 16 of the Bill of Rights 
detailing the list of freedoms; i.e. of the press and other media; to receive or 
impart information and /or ideas; of artistic creativity; academic freedom and 
freedom of scientific research (South African constitution, 1996). The limitations 
to freedom of expression typically deals with propaganda for war; incitement of 
imminent violence; and advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, 
gender or religion and that constitutes incitement to cause harm. The constitution 
also details allied freedoms; such as freedom of assembly (section 17); freedom 
and right to security (section 12); and access to information held by the State 
(section 32) (Berger 2007, 99-104). A little under two decades later since 
adoption, South Africa remains a legislative democracy facing serious threats to 
these key constitutional freedoms. 
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The Secrecy Bill formally known as the ‘Protection of State Information Bill’ 
emerged in 2010, when public hearings were held for debate on the bill (Staff 
reporter, 2010a). It drew widespread condemnation from all walks of South 
African life. In its original form the Secrecy Bill or Information Bill sought 
government latitude in classifying information deemed in the interests of 
protecting national security (Staff reporter, 2010b). The bill further criminalised 
any infringements of said classifications without any protective provisions for 
weighing up public interest against what was a matter of national security. Simply 
put this amounted to the possibility of wholesale classifications of any information 
government would not want released into the public domain. There were even 
provisions for municipalities to classify information.  
The Information Bill when first proposed was referred to as an elephant dressed 
up as a sheep. Sole (2010, 27) explores the multitude of problems with the bill.  
The Bill allows commercial information held by the state to be easily 
classified, which will mean tender processes and the activities of state-run 
enterprises are likely to be shielded from public scrutiny. This will have a 
negative impact on competitiveness and accountability in the government 
and will promote corruption…The Bill makes members of the public or 
journalists as guilty as those who disclose classified information. The 
possessor and the publisher are as guilty and the “leaker” (Sole 2010, 27).     
Vuuren and Nkomo (2010, 17) add that the Bill could impose harsh sentences 
(up to twenty five years) on whistle-blowers criminalizing even the leaking of 
information in the public interest. Ironically such whistle-blowers and journalists 
could face a longer prison sentence than officials who deliberately hide 
information that is in the public interest, and which ought to be disclosed. The bill 
would trump the Promotion of Access to Information Act seen as unconstitutional 
as the Act provides for citizens’ rights to have access to State information. A 
further clause in the bill sanctions banning the release of any state security 
matter (Clause 49) (Witness reporters 2012). Another final aspect which is most 
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troubling is the veil drawn over the work of intelligence services preventing public 
scrutiny of abuses of power and violations of human rights.  
The Secrecy Bill has been strongly contested by opposition parties; civil society; 
ngo’s and public intellectuals. The official opposition, the Democratic Alliance 
(DA), amongst others raised objections to the bill in parliament comparing it to 
apartheid style laws, stating that ‘the opposition parties would continue in their 
efforts to not back down in the face of this assault in democracy’ (SAPA, 2013). 
Following the public hearings on the original version of the bill in 2010, a civil 
society coalition formed to stop the bill and its damaging effects on freedom of 
expression in South Africa and the troubling knock-on effect on levels of 
corruption. The coalition was named the Right2Know (R2K) campaign, garnering 
support from other organizations, famous South Africans and ordinary citizens, 
who mobilized to voice their opposition to the Secrecy Bill, (Staff reporter, 
2010a). R2K embarked on a week long campaign of raising awareness and 
protest, the climax being on the 27th of October 2010 when thousands of South 
Africans marched to Parliament and also flooded the main streets of the other 
metro-poles giving visual voice to the protest against a repressive ‘apartheid-
style bill’. R2K has the support of 400 organizations and has collected 14 000 
signatures in a petition (Staff reporter, 2010b).  
The civic protest which included the support of major labour unions in the country 
and the prolific publicity around the bill forced a rethink resulting in a revised 
version appearing before the national assembly in 2013 (SAPA, 2013). In the 
revised version, the secrecy bill no longer trumps the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act; clause 49 covering banning the release of information relating to 
State security has been revoked and the provision extending power to 
municipalities to classify information has also been revoked (Witness reporters, 
2012). The revised bill though still contentious gained a majority vote and now 
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awaits President Zuma’s signature to be passed into law. The limbo in relation to 
the bill is good news for South Africans as it could be testament to the vigorous 
protest raised against it. However it could also be that 2014 was an election year 
and the ruling party did not wish to chance any unpopular moves. The public 
sphere continues to reflect the R2K debates on the bill revealing the problematic 
issues in relation to freedom of information and a decisive win would be for the 
bill to be retracted altogether.  
It is clear that under the guise of state security, very repressive control 
mechanisms are being promoted in relation to information. The secrecy bill even 
in its revised format promotes parallel information regimes reminiscent of the 
apartheid past. The revised bill still criminalizes any use of classified information 
without the inclusion of a public interest defence. This will effectively close the 
public sphere in South Africa if the revised bill is signed into law. It will also 
extend the state security ministers powers to regulate on oversight bodies like 
the Public Protector, including what access and use can be made of classified 
information (Editorial, 2013). Under these conditions the South African public 
would not have been made aware of the exorbitant upgrades of President 
Zuma’s home (Nkandla) that was bankrolled by public spending; as Nkandla is 
defined as a national key point. National key points are another throw back from 
apartheid times used to define sites of national security. National key points have 
increased from 118 in 2006 to 344 in 2013 (Hunter 2014). Apart from a private 
home, the public service broadcaster (SABC), the national energy regulator and 
petrochemical firms are listed under national key points. These amendments to 
the constitution reflect sinister efforts towards creating a securocratic state, one 
where democratic principles are adjusted and modified until democracy is all but 
gone leaving behind a bureaucracy of surveillance and force in the service of a 
small political and financial elite. The former president, the late Nelson Mandela 
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once said, “The administrative conduct of government and authorities are subject 
to the scrutiny of independent organs. This is an essential element of good 
governance that we have sought to have built into our new constitutional 
order…It was, to me, never reason for irritation but rather a source of comfort 
when these bodies were asked to adjudicate on the actions of my government 
and judged against” (Editorial, 2013). 
The digital sphere in all its permutations has the potential to bridge the great 
divides existent in society. It is possible for content to be made available at 
minimal cost through mobile devices. While much rhetoric abounds for open 
access and freeing information, any real commitment appears to be solely in the 
safe field of education (Czerniewicz 2012, 36). However the real frontier remains 
the public sphere, where information is freely available in order for civil society to 
freely question and react to the type of localized democracy on offer and the 
power structures of big business among other things. Roper finally expresses the 
wish fulfilment of many in the field of NSMI and development.  He states:  
The true worth of social media lies not in its ability to make time pass in a 
blur, but in its disruptive potential politically. All over the world, social media 
practitioners are using the power of the internet to fight despots, dictators, 
corrupt politicians, evil regimes and cell phone companies. They’re also 
using it to bring knowledge and information to places where those essentials 
for civic action are sorely repressed (Roper 2011, 33).    
Alongside the burning discourses for freedoms for information and the capacity 
to mobilize against corrupt regimes be they political or economic, lies the binary 
opposition of control in the virtual sphere. This refers to Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR), often manipulated solely in the interests of industry.  
Extending IPR  
Give the penchant for institutional surveillance of individuals in the digital age, it 
has become vital to extend and clarify definitions of intellectual property. At the 
start, perhaps a differently nuanced designation would go a long way to 
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cementing a semantic signifier for legal protection of rights other than that of 
government and big business. At present IPR covers all creative acts even 
extending to e-mails, poems and even text messages. It covers these ideas or 
products or processes that have an economic value or potential economic value. 
This is a key factor to refine in the extension of IPR.  
As a starting point perhaps a new designation could be Individual property rights 
(INDPR), referring to a range of extended protections in the digital sphere. 
INDPR ought to cover personal property regardless of whether it contains an 
economic or potential economic value. Personal property must extend to the 
right to control the circulation of images and ideas about oneself. Again, there 
must be legal frameworks in place to enforce this idea regardless of whether or 
not there is an economic value attached.  
However in some instances one could argue that potential economic value 
applies if a candidate is denied employment or fired as a result of questionable 
(by the company’s standards) images, texts and ideas circulating about the 
incumbent. This is especially since companies may use this kind of information in 
times of recession, among others, to trim excess staff unfairly or to get rid of staff 
that is critical of management.      
There must also be a very clear definition of the division between the online 
private and online public spheres. This could assist in knowing what information 
about an individual may or may not be admissible in relation to employment or 
dismissal.  
MXit was slow to take steps to remove the slut list from circulation. There must 
be some legal, enforceable culpability ascribed to telecoms MNCs and the 
smaller corporations that profit from the circulation of obviously harmful and 
damaging material like the MXit slut list and the footage of the gang rapes that 
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went viral in addition to child pornography. Finally there must be some legal 
enforceable individual property rights with regard to institutional surveillance by 
way of companies, educational and social service organizations and the 
government. These suggestions represent just the start and needs to be refined 
as NSMI practices evolve.  
As was stated at the start of this section, the digital age has blurred the 
boundaries between the public and private sphere. A commercial imperative 
appears to preside, laying civic sensibilities to rest. As a society we must pause 
and ask how better to manage, regulate and enforce a healthier digital age. 
Perhaps it may be worthwhile considering the differences between data, 
information, knowledge and wisdom as these categories are often conflated to 
our detriment in the calculation of evolution and progress in the digital age.     
 
Data, information, knowledge, wisdom 
In the digital age, data, information, knowledge and wisdom are often conflated 
to signify similar meanings, giving rise to a generic binary of knowledge and 
ignorance. As was stated in chapter four, knowledge is equated in an unqualified 
way to abundance and success while the lack of knowledge is equated to 
poverty and darkness.  
The knowledge society set against the backdrop of neoliberal economic model 
defines information as an economic category. Talero (a member of the World 
Bank) quoted by Wilson states that “information is a factor of production, in a 
category with land, capital, and energy”. The information society is hailed as a 
global panacea to social ills but what is remarkably silent about the information 




The point was made, also in chapter four that the categories of data, information 
and knowledge are considered as such only when they have an economic or 
potentially economic value. This first difficulty with this construction is other 
categories are ignored as valueless, insignificant and hence a category of 
ignorance. The second difficulty is that development initiatives are designed 
within this trajectory of thought and ICT development is often seen in terms of 
providing access or more technology. This is because knowledge is seen as an 
accumulation of sets of data.  
Maes (2006, 10-11) explores the notion of wisdom beyond information, in so 
doing reveals why technologically deterministic trajectories remain inadequate. 
Maes makes a plea for data modesty as a result of observing how data is seen in 
IS as a source of wisdom.  
After all, too many systems developers and other standardizing do-gooders 
gladly forget the wise words of its author, Bill Kent: “The questions aren’t so 
much about how we process data as about how we perceive reality, about 
the constructs and tactics we use to cope with complexity, ambiguity, 
incomplete information, mismatched viewpoints and conflicting objectives.” 
The world view of these IS people is quite often straightforward and one-
dimensional: data are supposed to be interpretation-free representations of 
reality, we get information if we add interpretation to these data, information 
in the head of people means knowledge and knowledge is the first step 
towards wisdom. Hundreds if not thousands of textbooks on information 
systems have been filled with this type of repeated claptrap: data as the 
source of wisdom…Ultimately, information is not in the transformation of 
data, but in our continuously adapted understanding of the real world: “We 
do not need more data; we need a more primordial understanding, more 
thinking. This understanding, by definition, deals with the full complexity, 
ambiguity, incompleteness and other “annoying” features of reality Bill Kent 
was referring to as the true issues of information processing. Knowledge 
based on this reading of information has nothing to do with the mechanistic 
world view as expressed in the technical knowledge management literature. 
Knowledge is not an asset, but an insight (Maes 2006, 10-11). 
 
The following table elicits proposed definitions that may be useful not just in a 




RE-DEFINITIONS OF DATA, INFORMATION, KNOWLEDGE AND WISDOM 
DATA Representations of reality. 
INFORMATION 
Sets of representations that may be divided 
into personal and public information. 
PERSONAL 
INFORMATION 
Representations or constructs of individuals 
that may not be used in the public arena to 
any effect. This refers to the use of private 
online information to deny or terminate 
employment, the circulation of damaging 
images or ideas etc. 
PUBLIC 
INFORMATION 
Representations or constructs that may be 
used in the public arena to any effect.  
KNOWLEDGE 
Information that arises out of applied thinking 
and reflection or applied analysis connecting 
cause and effect and processing complexity 
and ambiguity of reality so that it becomes 
insight.  
WISDOM 
Insight that applies to abstractions or solutions 
that brings about the best possible 
consequences for the most number of 
stakeholders.  
 
In a recent public lecture, former president Mbeki stated that, “knowledge must 
be used to better the human condition [and a vital question is] what does the 
betterment of society mean?” (2012). Burkett (2000, 691) in a way directs us to 
possible answers to this question stating that,   
it seems that what is needed to resolve these ‘real’ problems is not further 
information, but rather things which are much more difficult, time-consuming 
and probably not as glitzy as ICT development – that is, political will, 
recognition of personal and social responsibilities, and ultimately action on 
the part of governments and civil society…a call is made for a turn to social 
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and human development to counter the increasing emergence of a “cyber-
elite alliance” which is neatly camouflaged within much of the largely 
apolitical ICT and development discourse (Wilson 2002, 4). 
Thus the conclusion based as much on logic as humanity is that it is ultimately 
wisdom that we must seek and cultivate. Wisdom must drive all our 
considerations of the information age.  
Conclusion 
The comparative analysis of the narrative of commerce, consumption and policy 
appear to collude to create and maintain twin hegemonic discourses. These are 
the technological apparatuses of coercion / compliance and the legal apparatus 
of compulsion. These twin discourses function in the service of what Wilson 
referred to as a cyber-elite alliance comprising of telecoms MNCs and political 
regimes, a framework within which normative goals are all but abandoned.  
The narratives of commerce demonstrate the technological apparatuses of 
coercion where the shiny portal of technology teaches consumers their place as 
an obedient digital prosumer. The narrative of technology also betrays the 
repressive legal apparatus which enforces an adoptive compliance of new age 
digital citizens. Finally the narrative of policy indicates a weak will towards 
development aims; signifying an arcane publicity, just enough for the acquisition 
of consent. All these factors point to NSMI bolstering a seemingly legislative 
democracy but not a participatory one.  
The following section attempts to capture citizen experience of mobile telephony. 
Though the analysis reflects a small sample it is revealing and useful to the 





CHAPTER EIGHT: CONSUMPTIVE 
HABITS 
Description of data gathering 
A survey of twenty five questions was administered over a five month period 
(June 2013 – November 2013) in Glenwood, Durban. One hundred and ninety 
five respondents completed the survey. The survey was voluntary, anonymous 
and contained no questions of a sensitive nature to warrant ethical concerns. 
The questions were dominantly of a categorical nature, with only two questions 
inviting a longer written response. The questions focused on demographics, 
consumption of mobile telephony and regulation, and finally invited opinion about 
sector-related issues that were highlighted in the survey. The respondents were 
between the ages of 18 and 25. They were selected as ‘mature’ users of mobile 
telephony. The survey was collated and data was captured by L. Msholo 
between March 2014 and May 2014 and it was checked by the author. Numbers 
reflected in tables are recorded in percentages of the whole group.  
The Data 
Demographic breakdown 
Race Black White Coloured Indian Asian Total 
Gender       
Male 17% 5% 1% 4% 1% 28% 
Female 39% 6% 6% 21% 0 72% 
Total 56% 11% 7% 25% 1% 100% 
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The survey was voluntary, however the statistics according to race are roughly 
aligned to the demographics in the region, but that of gender is skewed in favour 
of females. This was simply because females were more inclined to respond to a 
questionnaire.  
Consumptive habits  
In order to gauge consumptive habits of this group of respondents, questions 
were raised in relation to cell use, cell preferences, branding, and pricing. 
Seventy-one percent of the respondents cited communication as the main 
purpose of cell phones while three percent cited connectivity instead. Twenty-
four percent cited both as key purposes while two percent did not respond to this 
question. Of the seventy-one percent, nineteen percent were male respondents 
and fifty-two percent were female.  
In terms of choice of brand responses were interesting if only anecdotal. The 
table below indicates the brand respondents currently possessed and the brands 
they desired if they had more or unlimited funds.  
Brand Current Desired 
LG 6% 2% 
Samsung 21% 6% 
Nokia 37% 16% 
Blackberry 21% 11% 
Apple 2% 42% 
Sony 5% 1% 
Motorola 3% 2% 
Siemens 3% 2% 




The popular brands appear to be Nokia, Blackberry and Samsung; however the 
group does indicate an overwhelming preference for Apple iPhone range. 
Factors that influenced the initial choice of phone were cost, internet access 
(smart phones) and the camera. It is interesting to note the desired choice of a 
significant percentage of the group for Apple which has always been perceived 
as quite a modernist instrument, in that it exists as an elite computing and 
telephony tool where one can do little to modify it in any individual way. This 
becomes significant to a later non-categorical question inviting responses to 
whether cell phones may be seen in a modernist way where users choose cell 
phones for the Veblenesque purpose of conspicuous consumption, thereby 
conferring a certain class position and reflecting a certain status; or if choice of 
phone has anything to do with postmodern ways of constructing identity and 
reflecting the self through modifications and savvy choice.  
In a 2013 survey conducted by Effective Measure74, 4956 desktop internet users 
were asked about their consumption with regard to mobile telephony (Effective 
Measure, March 2014). The survey indicated Blackberry to be the highest 
ranking at 37.9% with Samsung (35.2%) and Nokia (31.4%) being other popular 
preferences. Apple reflected a lower percentage at 12.3%; however the survey 
did indicate that the, ‘relatively lower ranking of Apple’s Iphone in South Africa is 
mainly attributed to the pricing structure of the brand as numerous studies 
showed that South Africans find Iphone quite expensive’ (Effective Measure 
March 2014, 7). One respondent from my survey stated, “South Africa’s internet 
costs are high, and Blackberry makes it affordable for South Africans” (Survey 
2014). Another respondent from my survey confirmed that, “…having an Iphone 
is known to be an ‘elite’ phone because not everyone can afford it as only the 
                                               
74 Effective Measure is a global provider of digital audience, brand and advertising effectiveness 
measurement and targeting solutions for publishers, agencies, networks, advertisers and researchers. The 
company is involved exclusively with administrative research. Its South African division is located in 
Cape Town.    
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rich can, while anybody can own a Blackberry because it’s a reasonable and 
affordable price pre-owned as well” (Survey 2014). 
The survey conducted by Effective Measure did look exclusively at desktop, 
internet users which immediately accounts for the difference in current choice as 
the survey universe suggests a working population, while this study looked at 
young users who were still studying or were at the inception of their careers. 
Other statistics roughly correlated:  
Sony Ericson:   3.2% 
Siemens:   0.2% 
LG:    1.3% 
Motorola:   0.8% 
Effective Measure also investigated future purchase choices of their 
respondents. The comparison between both surveys reveals some points of 
correlation and surprising points of variation. 
Brand Effective Measure: future 
choices 
Desired by respondents in this 
study (2014) 
LG 0.6% 2% 
Samsung 40.2% 6% 
Nokia 16.7% 16% 
Blackberry 14.9% 11% 
Apple 16.3% 42% 
Sony 3.5% 1% 
Motorola 0.2% 2% 




LG, Sony Ericson, Motorola and Siemens remain consistently the least popular 
cell phones. There is a strong correlation across studies with Nokia and 
Blackberry, while there is a big variance across Samsung and Apple. Effective 
Measure found that Samsung dominated the future choice of desktop, internet 
users, while Samsung did not feature very strongly among respondents of this 
study. In contrast Apple did not feature as highly in Effective Measure’s survey 
(16.2%) while it was significantly high in this study (42%). One of the reasons for 
this is the framing of survey questions. Effective Measure asked respondents 
what their future cell phone purchase would be while this study asked what 
respondents desired if money was no object. Clearly Apple is the desired brand 
but is prohibitively priced and hence it was not the featured choice of a significant 
number of respondents. There was a close correlation with Nokia and then 
Blackberry, with a rough correlation with the four least popular brands in South 
Africa: Sony Ericson; Siemens; LG; and Motorola. 
Functionality Awareness of cell 
functions 
Actual use of cell functions 
Calling/SMS/MMS 65% 89% 
Internet 61% 68% 
Social Networks 21% 57% 
Radio 64% 64% 
Games 7% 2% 
Camera 42% 58% 
 
Respondents tended to recognize only the basic features of their phones (as 
listed in the table above). They tended not to be able to describe the specific 
technical level of the camera or the battery life or the range of other features 
commonly advertised. Respondents cited first generation functionality as the 
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most recognized and the most used feature of their cell phones. Although the 
radio was cited to be second, the internet and use of social networks appeared 
to dominate the second most used feature. The use of cameras also ranked 
highly; however the most surprising was that games were ranked astonishingly 
low in comparison to the other features recognized and used.  
The Effective Measure indicated that when using the internet via cell phones, 
users tended to use instant messaging the most (27%), with accessing emails 
second (24%). It is interesting that even though these respondents (desktop, 
internet users) represent the more affluent classes in South African society, they 
reflected the most use of the cheapest functions such as messenger services 
and accessing emails (which is also quite cheap or free). This also points to the 
fact that data costs in South Africa are still prohibitively high. Only 14% of 
respondents from the Effective Measure survey accessed the social media via 
their cell phones and with regard to radio/music usage, games and camera/video 
functions it was a negligible 2-3%.  
It is interesting that even desktop, internet users and young adopters use first 
generation functionality most on their cell phones. The contrast of actual use to 
the dizzying array of cell phone products and packages available in the market 
indicates the way industry utilizes planned obsolescence to create incremental 
changes to handsets and data offerings so as to generate a sense of value for 
the high charges. The range of choices available in the South African market 
place (over 4000) also indicates that the market does provide choice but with the 
cost of obfuscation. It is difficult for South African consumers to sift through the 
best cellular package as hidden costs are revealed / understood only with actual 
use. Companies like Tarifica and Phonefinder.co.za are telecom pricing 
providers. Tarifica is a US based company that provides tariffs internationally 
while Phonefinder is South African. Both companies use complex algorithms to 
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determine or rank cell phone deals. These are updated on a monthly basis as 
cell phone companies modify and publish new deals on a monthly basis. With 
regard to South Africa as of 29.4.2015 there are approximately 4581 options if 
one browses deals by type and 4400 is one considers deals by the network (see 
table below). There are also options to browse deals by manufacturers like 
Blackberry; Alcatel; Nokia; Samsung etc. which is also quite extensive.  
Deals by type Deals by Network 
Voice 
Contracts 
2722 Telkom 198 
Data 
Deals 
1678 Vodacom 3786 
Deal with 
free gift 
181 MTN 168 
  Virgin 
Mobile 
9 
  Cell C 239 
Total 4581 Total 4400 
 
In light of the cellular industries practices, Kelly’s argument as to the homage to 
uselessness when it comes to technological goods resurfaces even though he 
was referring at the time to the video cassette recorder.  
Marketing departments of corporations, in their struggle for market share in 
the electronics industry, force their engineers and designers to create new 
products laden with extra features. One main selling point: Our machine has 
the most features for the money. The question for the consumer is: “Did I 
get a good deal [i.e., the most for the money]?”  The question of “Can I 
actually use what I buy?” is never raised. The corporations know of the 
desire for the useless (a desire that can never be fulfilled), and comply by 
heaping on their products as much useless gadgetry as possible in order to 
seduce the bargain-hungry consumer. And so the cycle starts (Kelly, 1994).  
The cycle is perpetuated by the neoliberal economics and technology is driven 
by the perpetual production of new gadgetry marketed as new and improved 
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laden with a host of (incremental) new features, rendering the old still usable but 
obsolete. One respondent from my survey spoke directly about planned 
obsolescence reflecting  that, “…technology and major companies have an 
influence on people and are able to manipulate them into wasting their money 
and buying goods and services that they don’t require” (Survey, 2014).   
Furthermore the purpose of having 4500 packages when even a few hundred 
would do serves to obfuscate pricing structures rather than clarify when 
consumers are attempting to compare pricing. Duncan states that pricing of 
cellular telephony is deliberately opaque, “Pricing has become so opaque that it’s 
become practically impossible for the ordinary consumer to decode what the true 
cost of the service is” (Duncan 2012). The array of cellular options also reflects 
commodification, where competition is created among products in the 
marketplace in order to generate value. In this sense, a sort of negative value is 
created via murky, unclear pricing packages. Value is also created via branding 
and making the most out of new or incremental changes. The table below 
(Survey 2014) illustrates various influences related to branding and if 
respondents were at all influenced by brands.  
 Male Female Total 
Attention to branding 19% 45% 64% 
Attention to adverts 14% 52% 66% 
Attention to celebrity 3% 10% 13% 
Keeping up with new phones 12% 26% 39% 
Pricing 
Affordability 8% 15% 23% 
Prohibitive 10% 21% 31% 




It is interesting that while a significant number of respondents did pay attention to 
advertising and followed brands, they did not necessarily follow celebrities linked 
to these brands. Only 39% kept up with purchasing new cell phones perhaps 
accounting for the fact that these respondents were mostly in the age range of 
18-25, even though they are deemed mature users of mobile telephony. 
Affordability is an important qualifier as this group may not be part of the 
productive workforce or may only be part-time or casual workers. In relation to 
pricing, a larger number (31%) found pricing prohibitive while a less significant 
number (23%) found it affordable.  
Internet use proved to be surprising as respondents cited unexpected categories 
in relation to internet use. Overall 82% of respondents said that they did access 
the internet via their cell phones. When asked to clarify their usage, i.e. what 
types or categories of sites they frequented, news and information sites were not 
top priorities.  
Internet Use Male Female Total 
Sport 7% 5% 12% 
Ringtones 12% 40% 52% 
News 6% 14% 20% 
Current Affairs 4% 10% 14% 
Celebrity news 3% 14% 17% 
Games 12% 28% 40% 
Pornography 2% 2% 4% 
 
This indicates Garnham’s (2004: 358) and Karvonen’s (2004: 348) salient points 
that access to technology does not guarantee participation in the public sphere. 
It merely facilitates it as the potentials the internet creates can only be actualized 
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via human discrimination and commitment and not via the provision of 
technology in and only of itself. 
95% of respondents indicated that they would feel the absence of their cell 
phone if it was mislaid. However most missed features correlate with internet 
usage in that the first generation use of simple telephony, i.e. calling and 
sms’ing, was the most missed feature and social networks was the second.  
 Male Female Total 
Sms’ing 14% 47% 61% 
Social Networks 9% 29% 38% 
Radio/Camera 4% 11% 15% 
Internet 3% 9% 12% 
Games 2% 2% 4% 
Regulation and consumer/user reflections 
With regard to regulation questions related to knowledge of ICASA (the key 
regulatory body of telecoms in South Africa) and it’s allied public activities, it was 
found that a very small number of respondents were aware of ICASA or any of 
their activities.  
 Male Female Total 
Awareness of ICASA 7% 6% 13% 
Awareness of ICASA public 
road shows 




14% 38% 52% 
ICASA 0% 1% 1% 
CW 1% 0% 1% 




The low level of awareness of the regulatory body governing telecoms is quite 
troubling. In order to discern a bit more of end user thinking around cellular 
telephony and the public sphere, respondents were asked to record their 
thoughts in reaction to quotes. Two quotes were used to elicit reactions from 
respondents. One question referred to the 2008 Mxit75 ‘slut-list’ saga where an 
increasing list of names of teenage girls were being circulated via Mxit and it was 
alleged that this list was a ‘slut list’. The second question described modernist 
and postmodern identity formation, where in modernity commodities reflected 
social status and in postmodernity commodities form part of one’s identity in that 
consumption and use is part of self-construction.    
10% responded to the question regarding the MXIT ‘slut list’ saga and of this 
group, 10% reflected positively about the service. 90% of the responses 
highlighted the negative aspects arising as a result. More respondents made 
reference in some way to technologically deterministic thinking. That is, referring 
to the potential of technology to drive certain activity, where even if it is negative, 
it is perceived as inevitable or unavoidable.  
It’s abuse but things like these are inevitable. 
It should be understood that with the growth of technology and its 
accessibility such things are becoming quickly unavoidable. 
I believe it’s a glimpse of the future; bullying etc. is becoming more 
sophisticated. Technology is bringing us closer together and breaking down 
geographical barriers.  
It’s unfortunate but that’s just the bad side to it.  
It is an abuse of technology for one’s own personal gain at the humiliating 
expense of others – just because you can.  
It epitomizes the platform which social networks give to people to insult 
people anonymously; one takes no responsibility for their actions. 
Technology allows for ‘hidden acts’.  
                                               
75 MXit is an instant messaging software application that runs on 3G phones and prices texting at 1cent 




There was also a yearning for control but no reflection or knowledge as to where 
that should come from. Perhaps the low levels of awareness of the regulatory 
body accounts for this perception.  
People take advantage of technology and there should be some control. 
It is really shocking that Mxit took so long to take that content down.  
This is shameful and an indication of the misogyny still rife in our society, 
technology can amplify this.  
 
The respondents who reacted positively stated that, “this is a good thing for 
those who want to meet new people”, and, “it is not fair to blame MXIT for this 
sort of behaviour. These people on the list took advantage of the service and got 
what they deserved.”  
With regard to the final quote (below), respondents were invited to expand on 
their reflections to the thoughts raised by May and Hearn (2004, 200). 
The convergence and blurring of industry boundaries increasingly see 
entertainment, ICTs and lifestyle products and services combine. These 
personalized services lie in contrast to mass-produced goods and services, 
more suggestive of the modernist industrial period. Poster (2004, 416) notes 
how in modernity, ‘consumer objects represented social status: in 
postmodernity they express one’s identity…consumption is part of self-
construction.’  
It is interesting that only 10% responded to the issue of Mxit raised in the earlier 
quote but 51% responded in some way to this quote. It is clear that respondents 
felt the need to express their opinions on the issues raised.  A few respondents 
made reference to how cellular telephony (also referred to by respondents as 
technology) has emerged as the new staple: 
I still feel that people are certainly becoming inseparable from their cell 
phones. 
I agree cell phones have become as much a part of people’s lives as food. 
I think that phones are taken over as an important part in the media. People 
are using their phones almost every day to see current news, weather. It 
has become vital. 
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Yes, technology does have control over us. 
An overwhelming number of respondents reflected on their own consumption 
and people who they know who engage in consumption for the purpose of 
reflecting or projecting social status. This may be seen in a modernist way where 
users choose cell phones for the Veblenesque purpose of conspicuous 
consumption. The South African cellular market is seen as one that lacks 
maturity in that consumers are affected not strictly by functionality and pricing but 
by status and class positions as they relate to cell phone choice. Some 
respondents simply reflected that consumer goods generally reflect an 
individual’s status.  
The consumer has changed in terms of their receptiveness to objects and 
the new currency is social status through possessions. 
Objects that people have do show a person's status. 
Sometimes you are classed or given a social status according to the way 
you dress, look, even the possessions you have. That is how society is. 
Through media people see lifestyle products which they long for, this is 
done through effective advertising, and thus lifestyle products have become 
status symbols to many. 
It is true that we are more or less what we purchase and our purchased 
items resemble or symbolise or even make a statement about our social 
status. 
Other respondents reflected that consumption reflects the status one aspires to, 
i.e. that consumers will invest in commodities beyond affordability in order to 
reflect the status they aspire towards. This was still in a general sense, as 
opposed to reflecting on cellular commodities themselves: 
What people consume is a way to define themselves and when something 
is expensive it gives them status. 
By having the latest brands and new technology is a status thing and many 
people want people to identify them as being modern and more upmarket. 
People judge others according to their external appearance and material 
objects that they have. This puts pressure on individuals to present 
themselves in a way that will reflect how they want to be seen- even if it is 
not who they really are.  
In a way, I'd say that these consumer objects do to some extent now 
represent social status, you are considered "cool" just for owning something.  
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Of course, everyone likes feeling head of the crowd and technology helps 
them achieve that. 
Consumer objects do to a certain point define a person’s social status and 
maybe identity. 
Our identities to the exterior would world are defined by our consumption 
preferences. E.g. if a person buys an ipad, one would confer great taste and 
a wealth status on that person. Our identity is constructed by the technology 
we possess. 
It seems that in today's society you are what you own. 
The more expensive it is shows that a person can afford stuff and are quite 
up there in the social class. 
The more expensive your product is the more you are seen as being of 
higher social status. 
It is true that in this day and age, having the recent technology and being 
well educated about it has nothing to do with having money and has 
everything to do with the image that one wants to portray of themselves. 
Appearances have become very important and if you aren't well connected, 
you lose out. 
Technology is often used to express on individuals lifestyle and personality. 
It also aids in presenting the image that person the world wants to have of 
them. 
It is interesting that respondents who chose to gain status through cellular 
commodities themselves appeared to show a rather overt connection to status:  
 
The brand and technology you are able to afford says what kind of person 
or prestige you are. It’s true, even the most behind people nowadays have 
the most expensive phones and one has also noticed that in townships 
people would rather sacrifice their education and reputation just to keep up 
with the brands because they declare that even if you live in a township one 
can still afford the most expensive things. 
The more gadgets and more compact my blackberry, the higher is my social 
class and greater acceptance. My efficiency is marked by the technological 
ability. 
If you have an expensive phone you are seen to be rich; those cheap ones 
reflect you are not so rich. 
Technology is now able to show social status and project ones identity to 
others. Consumer’s use these avenues (cell phones or laptop covers for 
example) to either conform or stand out. 
The phone you have can determine your social standards as having an 
iPhone is known to be an 'elite' phone because not everyone can afford it as 
only the rich can, while anybody can own a blackberry 8520 because it’s a 
reasonable affordable price as pre-owned and second hand as well. 
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If a person owns a certain type of cell phone, you can immediately link it to 
their status and the same goes to their purchases. 
Objects do reflect one's social status. We live in a very materialistic world 
and the use of technology on consumer reflects how rich you are, e.g. 
expensive cell/house with cool features say you are a 'brat'. 
One respondent did add that, “consumption is part of our identity now, more than 
ever before, simply because capitalism has created an environment where 
almost everything we do requires payment. We are affected by technology and 




A review of consumptive habits of young cellular users indicates a few pertinent 
findings. The first irrefutable point is that cellular telephony has moved beyond a 
novelty item of the ‘yuppie set’ to being a ubiquitous staple of the current age, 
what with ‘spending on cell phones accounting for eight per cent of income at a 
national level and eighteen percent of income for the poorest’ (Duncan 2012). 
The survey conducted by Effective Measure (2013) provided a useful contrast to 
the survey conducted by the researcher (2014). Effective Measure surveyed 
approximately five thousand respondents who were desktop internet users. This 
group represents a more upwardly mobile set than the young adopters 
represented in this survey. It was interesting that despite different levels of 
upward mobility and financial independence some statistics correlated across the 
surveys. This indicated that cellular services are still prohibitively high as both 
sets of respondents tended to use first and second generation telephony most 
(like calling and messaging). Even if respondents had smart phones through 
which they could access the internet, they tended not to via their cellular phones 
and if they did, they accessed their email account which is a relatively cheap 
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thing to do as opposed to viewing news sites. Consumption peaked around the 
cheaper services.  
It is therefore questionable if telecoms companies can claim universal access in 
South Africa as one has to balance the question of access qualitatively. This 
means scrutinizing what consumers are accessing via their cell phones and what 
services they actually use. One has to be quite circumspect in claiming that the 
public sphere has arrived via the cell phone as most South Africans own one, as 
data costs remain prohibitively high.  
It is also clear that traditional neoliberal mechanisms like competition cannot be 
relied on to drive pricing down. The experience in the sector has been for 
industry to hold on to inexplicably high pricing for as long as they are permitted to 
do so. The interconnection debacle is one example and another is the pricing of 
smses.  
But the most perverse indicator of profiteering is the profit margins on sms’. 
International research has put the cost incurred by cell phone companies to 
transmit an sms at 2.6 cents per sms, and industry insiders claim that it is 
definitely below 5 cents. Yet the cell phone companies [in South Africa] 
continue to charge as much as 80 cents per sms, which means up to a 
3,000 percent profit on these sms’ (Duncan 2012). 
 
It is also clear that industry tends to obfuscate when it comes to pricing and the 
researcher found it surprising that so many people were simply unaware of the 
vastly different cellular pricing regimes in South Africa versus other countries in 
Africa and even the north Atlantic region. Respondents were also not aware of 
the regulatory structures governing telecoms in South Africa which points to the 
dire need for communication campaigns to gain traction.   
The Right 2 Know Campaign has conceptualized and developed a Right 2 
Communicate Campaign, with the costs of communication as a key focus 
(Duncan 2012).  
A final concluding thought is that consumer protest for better communication 
value/s in South Africa telecoms needs to harness the larger population of end 
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CHAPTER NINE: FURTHER STUDY 
Introduction 
Within this burgeoning sector, there is no real limit to further studies in this field 
as the field itself appears to be constantly morphing. However within the 
trajectory of this study, one may list a few key areas that are worthy of further 
research time and effort. This list has been loosely divided into specific issues of 
local relevance and other issues of broader interest.  
The local context 
Gender 
Taking gender equity into consideration, further research of a strongly qualitative 
nature must be conducted in order to ascertain how female employees and black 
female employees manage their work environment. This could be to discern how 
much line managers do (and what they are encouraged to do) to facilitate an 
enabling work environment; how promotions occur and if fronting persists in 
gender appointments. This research task is not without huge challenges as it 
necessitates an almost anthropological insider approach which may prove very 
difficult to arrange.  
Disability 
In terms of disability employment, Vodacom reports a rise from 0.5% in 2007 to 
1.2% in 2009. The company indicates that the aim is to reach 2%. Using 
Vodacom as an example, it would be useful to track the progress of company’s 
projections and promises quantitatively. Further research or a strongly qualitative 
nature must be conducted in order to ascertain how employees with disabilities 
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manage their work environment. This could be to discern how much line 
managers do (and what they are encouraged to do) to facilitate an enabling work 
environment and to discover if fronting occurs in the disability sector.  
Here again this research task is not without huge challenges as it necessitates 
an almost anthropological insider approach which may prove very difficult to 
arrange.  
Universal Access  
Until achieved, universal access will continue to be a bugbear in the developing 
context. Communication access speaks to the basics of human rights and the 
constitution. It is thus imperative to achieve this goal. Alongside universal 
access, one must also consider the quality of access. 
The broader context 
The following issues apply to the local context but also have broader applications 
and are therefore listed as such.   
Corruption  
Sutherland in his public lecture (WITS, 13 March 2012) listed a range of further 
research activities as a contribution to stemming the flow of global corruption 
within the telecoms sector. These are very activities relevant to both the local 
and global levels and are listed as follows:  
 Identification of unreported cases  
 Analysis of cases 
 Tracing ownership of operators 
 Development of a framework in terms of: 
 “Crony capitalism” 
 Nepotism 
 Regulatory or state capture 
 Corruption 
 Identification of best practice: 




 Estimation of overall: 
 Payments 
 Costs 
 Effects (ibid) 
 
In relation to the identification of unreported cases, the analysis of these cases 
and uncovering ownership and control patterns across the operators, and 
publication of findings is an important harbinger to corrective measures. Apart 
from publication in academic style, researchers in the field ought to summarize 
or condense findings into accessible feeds for the popular press in the relevant 
locations. Of particular relevance is the publication of operator’s license fees, 
levies and taxes recorded both in terms of monies paid and monies received. 
This record ought to include the details of the principal players and the location 
of transacting accounts which preferably ought not to be in the Cayman Islands!    
Policy and legal frameworks  
This consistent research work would certainly assist in the development and 
constant updating of the policy and legal frameworks which often suffer time-
lags, given the sophistication, creativity and scale of telecoms corruption. Much 
work is needed in the legal sector in order to fast track effective extradition, 
prosecution and fund or asset recovery. Clarity is also needed in terms of 
beneficiaries’ of fines especially as telecoms companies are often MNCs 
operating across many differently nuanced and differently enforced legal 
systems.  
On the micro level, legal frameworks protecting against individual property 
infringements must be developed in a meaningful way that allows the arms of the 
law to work swiftly in defamatory cases and INP infringement.  
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Consumption and citizenship – the divide  
The EU narratives of mobile citizens (Lillie 2009) concluded with the idea of 
addressing significant research questions in the field of NSMI. These refer to the 
attempts to discover alternative mobile narratives than that offered by the 
discourses of commerce and consumption; and alternative mobile practices and 
techniques of resistance to the dominant discourses of commerce and 
consumption. Also included is the need for the development of “specific 
technologies that open up rather than close down possibilities for future uses of 
new media for public and political communication vis-á-vis “citizenship” as 
merely consumption and labor articulated through a global and pervasive media 
and information network” (Lillie 2009).     
This effectively translates into the kind of programs related to municipal voting; 
aids medication assistance; and corruption name and shame campaigns among 
other interventions.  
Cell phones and health 
The popular press has been littered with stories across the spectrum either 
warning of cancer-causing cell phones and wireless devices or appeasing public 
fears by discrediting any causal link between cellular telephony and cancer. An 
example of the former is a Daily News headline: “Wireless device hazard. 
Experts warn on effect on babies, pregnancy” (2011, 1). This story cites 
scientists from one of the world’s top 50 universities which also supply the 
scientists who select the Noble health prize winner76.  
The panel of influential international scientists has called on governments to 
introduce in much stricter safety measures needed to protect people from 
being harmed by electromagnetic radiation from devices including cell 
phones, cell phone towers, powerlines and wireless internet. They are 
                                               
76 These credentials were cited by the author but need to be taken with some skepticism as increasingly 
academic institutions appear to be influenced by funding sources. Hence findings must always be 
juxtaposed and balanced with that in mind.  
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particularly worried about how radiation affects the development of children 
and foetuses. “Safety standards also ignore developing foetus and, and 
young children who are more affected”…The scientists met to consider all 
the evidence linking wireless devices to cancer, neurological diseases and 
infertility, and concluded that there was evidence of “serious disruptions to 
biological systems”…Many researchers now believe the existing safety 
limits are inadequate to protect public health because they do not consider 
prolonged exposure to lower emission levels that are now widespread. 
(Cullinan 2011,1). 
It is also very interesting that the first response from Vodacom was that there is 
no real cause for alarm as there is no real evidence to convince experts that 
exposure below the guidelines set by the International Commission on Non-
Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP) carries any health risks for either adults 
or children (Cullinan 2011, 1).  
Another article in the press was featured in the Health section of the Mail & 
Guardian (2010, 25) entitled: Health scare often just a brain scam. Williams’ 
explores a publicized statistically dubious report linking brain cancer to prolonged 
cell phone use and questions biases that emerge among scientists and further 
asks how this information may be reported in a meaningful way to the public.  
Williams’ perspective is useful as another report indicates that a study into the 
link between cell phone use and cancer was put on hold as scientists from 13 
countries interpreted the results differently thus findings have been delayed as 
scientists have failed to agree (Mail & Guardian 2010, 28).  
While the opposing perspectives need to be considered in a balanced way, and 
scientists’ work must also be cast against the canvas of their funding sources 
and possible obligations arising thereof, it remains clear that much more 
research is needed in this important area of health. Perhaps the rather 
ambivalent telephony corporations could be taxed and funding could be supplied 
to researchers in the field via government grants. This would effectively reduce 




While a range of areas for further research have been furnished, the concluding 
remarks in this section must certainly be a short and singular plea for the urgent 
focus on tracking, reporting and documenting corruption and conclusions of 















CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION 
On 15 June 2015 FNB, a traditional bank in South Africa launched its own mobile 
services (Van Zyl 2015, 5). This means that the bank can now offer a range of 
cellular services (not unlike that of Vodacom and MTN) to clients and also 
integrate its traditional banking services with a range of cellular services. This is 
a surprising form of diagonal integration no doubt motivated by the two hundred 
billion rand industry that the cellular business generates. Neither the regulator 
(ICASA) nor the competition commission found the license wanting in terms of 
conflict of interest or anti-competitive practices (Web 66).  
This recent move (amongst a range of others) indicates the changing position of 
the state from custodian of citizens’ rights to an entity that performs for business 
and for itself. Given the new configurations of power it is no longer possible to 
rely on traditional reform mechanisms or traditional ways of regulation. This is 
simply because the traditional regulator is too weak to withstand the pressures 
from government and industry.  
Post 1994 with South Africa’s change to a democratic dispensation, 
communication rights were established as an equal and fundamental part of the 
bouquet of human rights. At this juncture the newly elected government 
addressed the provision of human rights for all via the three tier system77 for 
traditional mass media (print, and broadcast). In relation to telecoms the 
historical redress in terms of communication rights was pursued via connectivity. 
                                               




Licenses were issued to telecoms operators on the basis of universal service 
agreements, and attempts were made to introduce competition to the sector.  
The notion of universal access, affordable communication and bridging the digital 
divide formed part of the first wave of the normative imperatives emerging out of 
the 1994 change in leadership to a democratic dispensation. In addition changes 
in ownership of the communications industries were also prioritised. To an extent 
this has been achieved as the telecoms industry has been the one to create 
more Black millionaires than most of the other sectors in South Africa. Apart from 
this much of government holdings across the companies are in the form of state 
pension funds from the states civil servants and the major alliance of unions, 
COSATU.  
A second wave of normative imperatives is emerging as a local and global 
discourse. This second wave deals with issues of citizenry, consumer protection, 
surveillance and personal informational property. The exploration into the South 
African telecoms discourses has proven to be alarming with regard to the second 
normative wave as it were.  
In this thesis, I have attempted to investigate the industry along the lines of a 
political economy of communication. This entailed reviewing ownership 
structures, competition and narratives from the end user – the mobile consumer 
– which was compared to the first and second wave of normative imperatives.  
Within the discourses of industry, the central issue focused on ownership and 
control using the key concepts of structuration, spatialization and 
commodification as articulated by Mosco (1996) and (2009). It is interesting that 
despite legal battles and regional spats over controlling interests, the dominant 
narrative of the telecoms industry in South Africa has been one of huge success, 
264 
 
unprecedented profit and both regionalization and globalization of South African 
companies.   
Within the discourses of policy the key issue, apart from a scrutiny of policy itself 
was an evaluation of the independence, strength and vision of the national 
regulator - ICASA. In trying to chart the successes and failures of ICASA, it was 
mainly found via repeated accounts in the press (amongst other critics) that 
ICASA’s performance as a regulator was lack-luster at best, summed up as 
always positioned “between a rock and a hard place”. Ironically a regulator of 
such a phenomenally rich industry attributes its lack-luster efforts on being 
terribly under resourced and subject to regulatory capture.  
Within the discourses of consumption data gathered from reports were taken up 
as case studies, analysed to establish ‘lived experience’. In relation to 
consumers, while any mobile user would testify to connectivity being 
indispensable, the narrative also reveals that a certain texture of mobile 
telephony in South Africa is creeping in, marked by predatory pricing, predatory 
solicitation, predatory billing and surveillance. 
It is thus clear that the telecoms discourses across industry, policy and 
consumption appear dissonant. This dissonance has an undeniable implication 
for the digital divide, which was increasingly revealed as an oppositional binary 
of consumption and citizenship.  
It is of increasing concern that informational industries are becoming increasingly 
centralized, operating equally alongside nation states with a kind of sovereign 
power conferred by the massive revenue the industry generates. Concentration 
and centralization in industry have never boded well for the ideals of citizenship 
and civil liberties and it is now more important for civil society institutions to act 
as this industry’s fourth estate.    
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The international acts presiding over corruption in the field and the international 
cases that have been brought to these courts have inspired hope that these acts 
would be a deterrent to corrupt practices. In applauding the endeavour and the 
forensically intense effort involved in prosecuting these cases, it must also be 
noted that fines are less advantageous as they tend to accrue to the international 
courts or local governments. Corruption that involves profit accrued from local 
revenue must go back to that constituency i.e. the consumers themselves. While 
Sutherland (2012) argues that this is very difficult to do, perhaps fines could be 
imposed in terms of service agreements for a particular nation. A few examples 
of this could be: 
 An enforced lowering of tariffs for a designated period  
 Enforced employment pacts maintaining the employment compliment for a 
fixed term  
 Enforced apprenticeship of tertiary students in the field (at no cost to 
government or the institution)  
 Imposing universal service access goals 
 Once a person is found guilty of corrupt practices, there ought to be a lifetime 
ban on any industry related involvement in the telecoms industry as their 
actions would have been a terrible breach of public trust.  
 
While we may appeal to the large institutions to act on behalf of the citizen and 
end user, citizens themselves must work towards making their voices heard. 
Here local activism especially in the various institutions of learning could be 
initiated, and some work needs to go into developing models to make 
connectivity and consumption work for consumers78. As consumers we are often 
asked to participate in the most inane of polls; given that these avenues are 
already there, industry could be mandated to have a more direct feedback 
mechanism for consumer issues. These portals could be financed by industry, 
                                               
78 This could be done by attempting to get critical mass to engage in a planned boycott of a few hours at 
most of a service provider. In addition sms polls could be organised as a means of consumers airing their 
views on a company.   
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again as an alternative to fines accrued out of anti-competitive or corrupt 
behaviour.  
The final point perhaps must reiterate previous concluding arguments calling for 
more scholars to focus rather urgently on tracking, reporting and documenting 
corruption, anti-consumer practises and surveillance within the telecoms sector 
across the globe. This thesis has been an attempt to add another voice to the 
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